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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between Chilean political elites and the news 
media with the aim of better understanding how political elites in Chile have 
adapted to the process of mediatization of politics.  Theoretically grounded within 
an institutionalist understanding of mediatization processes, this thesis uses a 
qualitative research strategy to identify the main drivers of mediatization among 
Chilean political elites, the operational logics structuring politicians’ and 
journalists’ interactions, and the dynamics of autonomy-control in the relationship 
between political and media actors.  
Findings are derived from analysis of sixty semi-structured interviews with 
politicians, including current and former Cabinet Ministers, parliamentarians and 
political party leaders, press officers working with politicians, and journalists with 
experience covering politics in national media outlets.  
This thesis identifies the core elements of a centralist, elitist and market-grounded 
political communication culture comprised of political and media actors that 
engage in routine and frequent exchanges. In doing so, it identifies cultural and 
structural elements moderating the process of mediatization. Additionally, this 
study critically examines political elites’ understandings of news media logics, 
including dynamics of resistance and instrumental adoption of media languages, 
temporalities, and routines. This is reinforced by power inequalities in the 
politician-journalist relationship, organisational constraints, and a strong insider 
culture acting against the development of journalistic autonomy.  
Overall, this study puts forward the idea that while the mediatization of political 
actors suggests constraints on political elites’ behaviour, it should not necessarily 
be equated with loss of autonomy in the political sphere. Additionally, it advances a 
multi-level approach to mediatization research that enables observation of 
conflicting patterns of power relations between political elites and the news media, 
stressing how mediatization processes are open to multiple normative outcomes. 
Key words: mediatization of politics, political elites, institutional logics, Chile, qualitative 
research.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
An expanding academic debate about the mediatization of politics has developed 
in recent years with the ambition of better understanding the complex linkages 
between media and political institutions, in a context of increasing media 
influence in politics (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Schulz 2004; Hjarvard 2008; 
Strömbäck 2008; Hjarvard 2013; Esser & Strömbäck 2014). This theoretical 
paradigm has provided a locus to revisit questions about the shifting relationship 
between media and political actors in various national contexts (Reunanen et al. 
2010; Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011; Cushion & Thomas 2013; Downey & Neyazi 
2014; Landerer 2014; Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014) on the premise that greater 
institutional autonomy on the part of the media has resulted in greater political 
relevance thereof (Cook 2005; Hjarvard 2013). 
In the case of the Chilean media, the premise of greater institutional autonomy has 
been sustained on the commercialisation process driven by the state that resulted 
in the modernisation of media industries during the 1980s and 1990s (Tironi & 
Sunkel 1993); the evolution of media languages towards less condescending  
forms of political coverage (Cordero & Marin 2006; Porath 2007; Mellado & Rafter 
2014) and strong elite perceptions of the growing power acquired by the media in 
recent years (ICSO/UDP 2004; PNUD 2004; PNUD 20151). While the mediatization 
of politics has been acknowledged as part of the landscape of contemporary Chile, 
                                                          
1
 PNUD (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo) corresponds to Spanish spelling for UNDP 
(United Nations Development Programme). References to PNUD within the thesis correspond to 
reports produced by the Chilean chapter of this institution. 
14 
 
the process has not been the subject of a systematic research program. Academic 
analyses of the intersection between media and political actors have mostly 
derived from studies on the political economy of the media (Sunkel & Geoffroy 
2002; Leon-Dermota 2003; Monckeberg 2009), yet the reactions and adaptations 
of political actors to a changing media environment have gone mostly uninspected. 
This is a significant failure considering that it is precisely in the dimension of 
actors that the implications of mediatization processes for democracy become 
more evident, as it has been associated with autonomy losses on political actors 
and organisations (Blumler 2014). For this reason, this study has been set out with 
the central aim of better understanding how Chilean political elites have adapted 
to the mediatization of politics. 
Empirical research on the mediatization of politics has focused either on news 
coverage or on political actors (Strömbäck 2011b). This thesis focuses on the 
mediatization of Chilean political elites, therefore paying particular attention to 
the increasing dependence of political actors on communication resources for the 
everyday conduct of political activities (Hjarvard 2008), the extent to which they 
have adapted to media requirements and appear responsive to the media logic 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008), as well as the specific forms this 
process of adaptation has taken. In doing so, this study pays close consideration to 
issues of control and autonomy, a core theme to both theorisation and empirical 
enquiry about the mediatization of political actors.  
It is usually argued that political actors adapt to media requirements because they 
need attention, constant public support and legitimation (Esser 2013; 
Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014), and because the media has become a means to 
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pursue governance (Thompson 1995; Cook 2005; Crozier 2007). Hence, 
dependence on media-controlled resources translates into a permanent struggle 
to retain control over media content, and is proportional to the relevance 
mediated communication has acquired within political institutions.  
When the instrumental drive of the mediatization of political actors is 
acknowledged, those assumptions about increasing media power often associated 
with the narrative of mediatization have to be carefully assessed and 
contextualised. I argue that these assumptions derive from early conceptualisation 
of media and political institutional logics as opposite forces that advance to the 
detriment of the other (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008). Using a neo-
institutionalist perspective, this study understands the process of mediatization of 
political elites as one of, at least partially, selective adoption of media logics by 
political actors, which is bound to be determined by both social structures and 
cultural forms (March & Olsen 1995; DiMaggio 1997; Benson & Neveu 2005; 
Benson 2006; March & Olsen 2006; Thornton et al. 2012) 
As a post-authoritarian society, the Chilean case allows for a unique inspection of 
these dynamics. Modernised by means of commercialisation (Tironi & Sunkel 
1993), the journalistic field carries the traces of an authoritarian era (Bresnahan 
2003; Leon-Dermota 2003; Otano & Sunkel 2003). This double dependency – on 
the market and on political authorities – has represented a challenge to the 
assertion of autonomous journalistic practice (Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011), similar 
to other transitional democracies (Örnebring 2013; Márquez-Ramírez & Guerrero 
2014). In order to make sense of these dynamics in a context of increasing 
mediatization, this study pays attention to the political elites’ understandings, 
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interpretations and adoptions of news media logics, while at the same time 
identifying spaces of autonomy and control in the relationship between these 
highly inter-dependant institutional domains (Sigal 1973; Tuchman 1978; Gans 
1979; Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Manning 2001; Davis 2007b).  
As a result, this thesis sheds light on current theoretical discussions in the field of 
mediatization of politics, particularly concerning the concept of autonomy. Even as 
the news media as an institution is perceived as increasing its power in society, 
how the notion of autonomy is best understood in the theory of mediatization has 
been identified by some of the main proponents in the field as in need of further 
clarification and discussion (Esser & Strömbäck 2014; Marcinkowski & Steiner 
2014). The data generated and analysed in this thesis lend support to the idea that 
only by incorporating the complementary concepts of institutional autonomy and 
control in analysis on the mediatization of political actors it is possible to 
appropriately factor issues of power distribution between these groups, as well as 
accurately account for the way cultural and political contexts might shape and 
colour these processes.  
1.1 Problem statement   
The commercialisation of the media has been the basis for claims of modernisation 
in the Chilean communications field. As argued by Tironi & Sunkel (1993), this 
process was characterised by a substantial decrease in the intervention of the 
state in the operations of the media, paired with a significant spread of 
infrastructure to receive broadcast media, growth in advertising spending, 
consolidation of private ownership of news media outlets and the dominance of 
television as the main actor in the cultural industries. Another consequence of this 
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shift towards the market was the increasing concentration of media ownership 
and the subordination of the media to corporate powers, which also resulted in 
great ideological homogeneity among the more relevant mass media outlets 
(Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Mastrini & Becerra 2006).  
The relationship between political elites and the news media in the early days of 
democracy in Chile has been characterised as one of cooperation and even 
submissiveness of journalists to the authorities in power (Bresnahan 2003; Leon-
Dermota 2003). However, a shift in the attitudes of the press started to produce 
cracks in this initial status quo, particularly from 2000 and onwards when political 
scandals and cases of corruption started to surface in the public debate (Cordero & 
Marin 2006). This trend has increased in recent years, prompting historical levels 
of distrust in political institutions (COES 2015; PNUD 2015). In this scenario, 
politicians’ perceptions of the news media have also changed. The ‘centre stage’ of 
the news media is judged with ambivalence by politicians. For example, although 
most of them recognise that empowered news organisations might favour greater 
transparency in politics, they are also perceived as trivializing politics and helping 
to create a negative image of this activity (ICSO/UDP 2004). Chilean political elites 
perceive news media as accumulating unprecedented power by introducing new 
rules of representation on political discourses that respond to their own 
operational criteria instead of political criteria (PNUD 2004; PNUD 2015). The 
latter justifies the need for greater resources and professional support in the 
management of press relations, making it common for politicians to recruit press 
managers or similar advisors, in order to facilitate relations with the media 
(ICSO/UDP 2004; Santander 2013).  
18 
 
According to the literature, there are elements that lend support to the idea that 
politics in Chile have become increasingly mediatized. The emergence of more 
adversarial press coverage of politics (Cordero & Marin 2006) accompanied by 
elites’ perceptions of more powerful news organisations (PNUD 2004; PNUD 
2015), makes plausible the idea that the Chilean news media started a movement 
towards greater institutional autonomy during the early twenty-first century, 
which boosted the adaptive behaviour of political elites. This script is consistent 
with core assumptions of the mediatization of politics, a research perspective that 
explains behavioural and procedural changes in political actors and institutions as 
a reaction to the differentiation of the news media institution2, as long as they 
become increasingly dependent and shaped by the media, a process theoretically 
connected to a loss of autonomy of the political sphere (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; 
Schulz 2004; Strömbäck 2008; Hjarvard 2013).   
The relationship between Chilean politicians and the news media in democracy 
has been under-explored, despite the relevance that these processes of 
communication have had in the transition and establishment of democratic 
politics in the country. Inferences about this relationship generally derive from 
analysis situated at a systemic level. To date, however, the lack of research about 
the way in which Chilean political actors understand and cultivate their 
relationships with the media in an everyday context impedes empirically-derived 
                                                          
2
 The aforementioned description of “mediatization of politics” has been categorized as the 
“institutionalist” variant of mediatization theory, and is the description to which this thesis refers, 
which builds on the work of authors such as Mazzoleni & Schulz (1999); Schulz (2004); Kunelius & 
Reunanen (2011); Hjarvard (2013); Esser & Strömbäck (2014). Within the “institutionalist” variant, the 
media are understood as a relatively independent social institution, functioning according to distinct 
norms (Cook 2005; Benson 2006; Sparrow 2006).  
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claims about the nature of these exchanges and the implications they have had for 
the quality of public communication.  
Additionally, the Chilean case allows for an exploration of the way in which the 
mediatization of political actors has been theorised; in particular, to better 
understand and research the notion of media and political autonomy when using 
this analytical perspective. Two reasons can be presented to justify this emphasis; 
the first one fairly transferable to any context, and the second, somehow unique to 
this case.  Firstly, when analysed from the perspective of everyday practice and 
the on-going negotiation for public attention in the news, the idea of a news media 
institution independent from political actors easily crumbles. A wealth of 
literature on political communication highlights the interdependencies generated 
in the politics-media trade-off and tends to describe political news making as a 
joint production between politicians and professional journalists (Sigal 1973; Gans 
1979; Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Negrine 1996; Cook 2005; Davis 2009; Chadwick 
2013; Wahl-Jorgensen 2014). Indeed, when analysed from the perspective of 
political actors, mass media are predominantly seen as reactive to political 
processes, building news agendas on inputs from political actors rather than the 
other way round (Gans 1979; Sparrow 1999; Nisbet et al. 2003; Wolfsfeld & 
Sheafer 2006). I argue that by incorporating some aspects of the mediatization of 
politics literature in conversation with literature focused on political news 
making, the conceptualisation and research on the mediatization of political actors 
can be nuanced and strengthened. 
Second – and more specifically connected to Chile – is the matter of the uneven 
professionalisation of the Chilean journalistic field, which has been characterised 
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as greatly dependant on official sources (Leon-Dermota 2003; Faure et al. 2011) 
and struggling to achieve professional autonomy (Gronemeyer 2002; Mellado et al. 
2012), as long as journalists have been found to be subjects of both economic and 
political pressures (Waisbord 2000; Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011).  This context calls 
for a more nuanced understanding of the relationships of autonomy and 
dependence that shape the exchanges between politicians and the media, and an 
empirical assessment of the extent to which the framework of mediatized politics 
is appropriate to analyse and understand the relationship between politicians and 
the media in Chile.  
1.2 Significance of the study  
This thesis makes two core claims of originality, through which it contributes to 
knowledge about processes of mediatization of political actors. 
First, this is the first study that attempts to systematically identify how Chilean 
political elites have adapted to the mediatization of politics, addressing 
perceptions and practices and focusing on the exchanges between politicians and 
news organisations, incorporating the voices of these political actors, as well as 
those of press officers and political journalists. Research currently available on 
this topic is scarce, and where it appears it is scattered across academic and non-
academic texts.  In recent years there has been an increase in academic studies 
that look at the development of the journalistic profession in Chile, which has 
considerably enriched the local discussion within journalism studies and related 
disciplines (Mujica & Puente 2006; Mellado et al. 2010; Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011; 
Mellado et al. 2012; Lagos & Cabalin 2013). However, when it comes to locating 
politicians as research subjects and inspecting their relationship with mediated 
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communication from this perspective, the available scholarship decreases 
drastically. In recent years, some studies have looked into media content to 
evaluate mediated representations of politics (Dussaillant 2004; Porath 2007; 
Valenzuela & Arriagada 2011; Navia et al. 2013; Mellado & Humanes 2014; 
Mellado & Rafter 2014) yet empirical studies focusing on Chilean political actors 
and their relationship with the media are virtually non-existent3. In this regard, 
this thesis offers a novel contribution to the understanding of the way Chilean 
political elites have adapted to the news media in democracy, acknowledging that 
a nuanced understanding of the relationship between media and politics has to be 
culturally and historically situated (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Schudson 2004).  
Secondly, this study contributes to wider debates on mediatization studies by 
locating research on political actors outside US and European contexts, and paying 
attention to how this process interacts with contextual features. Additionally, the 
thesis identifies the concept of autonomy as crucial to better account for the 
interaction between political actors and the media (beyond the dichotomy 
between media and political logics) and claims that a multi-level analysis of this 
dimension is a necessary condition to understand how processes of mediatization 
develop in specific contexts. Mediatization of political actors has been described 
primarily as the adoption of logics of action pertaining to the news media 
institutional field by actors that inhabit different institutional spaces. This thesis 
argues that any study of the mediatization of political actors should not only be 
able to identify the components of this logic of action but also how actors 
                                                          
3
 A rare exception is a survey focused on politicians’ perceptions of the media conducted by the 
University Diego Portales (2004) or a recent study that looks into the relationship between journalists 
and press officers in Congress (Santander 2013). Other works that have contributed to this area of 
enquiry are not strictly academic, but journalistic investigations (Cavallo 1998; Leon-Dermota 2003; 
Monckeberg 2009). 
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understand and interact with this institutional logic, and whether by doing so they 
actually suffer a loss of autonomy. As some of the leading figures participating in 
the development of this theory have stated, how the issue of media autonomy is to 
be understood in mediatization theory demands further development (Blumler 
2014; Esser & Strömbäck 2014; Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014; Van Aelst et al. 
2014).  
The findings of this study shows that although adaptation to the logic of the media 
may have unwanted consequences for political elites that could be equated to a 
loss of autonomy, they are also open to instrumental use, indicating that the 
mediatization of political actors may adopt multiple forms when the news media 
show different degrees of autonomy or a lessened capacity to resist external 
pressures. Ultimately, it will be argued that bringing the issue of autonomy into 
analysis, the all-important problem of power distribution between these groups, 
often absent within mediatization of politics discussions, is more appropriately 
incorporated. 
1.3 Research questions, aim and scope of the study  
This thesis explores the relationship Chilean politicians establish with the news 
media, through a consideration of the goals they attach to media exposure, an 
examination of practices regulating their daily exchanges with news professionals 
as well as their perceptions about their ability to get media exposure and influence 
media content. In doing so, this study addresses the on-going debate about the 
mediatization of political actors, paying special attention to the identification of 
prevalent practices within the local political communication culture and to the 
value attached to media visibility by Chilean politicians.  
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The guiding research question animating the study is formulated as follows: 
RQ: How have Chilean political elites adapted to the mediatization of politics? 
This general question is operationalised around three areas of enquiry that will be 
further established within a qualitative research design in Chapter 4. In summary, 
these areas of enquiry can be briefly described as: (1) goals of media exposure, 
discussed in connection to drivers of mediatization among Chilean political elites; 
(2) operational logics structuring political elites’ media oriented-practices and 
their exchanges with the media; and (3) dynamics of autonomy-control in the 
relationship between political elites and journalists, discussing the discrepancies 
between a media institution that appears functionally autonomous and a 
journalistic field whose autonomy has been questioned during the democratic 
transition. The following sub-research questions emerge from these 
complementary areas of enquiry: 
(1) Goals of media exposure- drivers of mediatization  
SRQ1: What are Chilean politicians’ goals when interacting with the news media?  
SRQ2. To what extent is media visibility considered a valuable resource for political 
activity? 
(2) Operational logics structuring media-oriented practices 
SRQ3: How do political elites understand and interact with news media logics of 
action?  
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SRQ4: What are the prevalent media-oriented practices among Chilean politicians 
and how are they accommodated in their daily activities?  
(3) Dynamics of autonomy-control in the relationship between media and political 
actors 
SRQ5: What are the prevalent practices in the trade-off between Chilean politicians 
and journalists? 
SRQ6: What are politicians’ and journalists’ perceptions of their ability to control 
media messages? 
These questions are approached with an understanding of the news media and 
politics as interacting yet distinct social fields, each of them integrated by 
members that share patterned rules of behaviour, thereby drawing on a variety of 
theoretical approaches that offer relevant synergies with the study of 
mediatization of politics. Primarily, this study draws on institutionalist literature 
(Friedland & Alford 1991; DiMaggio 1997; March & Olsen 2006; March & Olsen 
2009; Thornton et al. 2012) and their contributions within media studies 
(Sparrow 1999; Cook 2005; Benson 2006) and to research on the mediatization of 
politics (Esser 2013; Asp 2014; Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014). Secondarily, this study 
adopts other theoretical traditions which are relevant to the discussion of specific 
points; namely, systems theory as developed by Niklas Luhmann (2013; 2000) and 
applied to the study of the media (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Görke & Scholl 2006;  
Kunelius & Reunanen 2012); and field theory as developed by Pierre Bourdieu 
(1990, 1998, 2005) and his associates (Champagne 2005), and later applied to 
Journalism Studies (Benson & Neveu 2005).  
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At an empirical level, this study is informed by data from semi-structured 
interviews conducted with Chilean politicians, political journalists and press 
officers working with politicians. These interviews have been systematically 
analysed using strategies of data collection and analysis pertaining to 
constructivist grounded theory and applied thematic analysis. The interviews 
were analysed as text through successive stages of coding, a process aided by the 
use of software for qualitative data analysis (NVivo 10). Grounded insights about 
the particularities of the local political communication culture have been 
developed as a result, together with a theoretical framework appropriate for the 
exploration of relationships among these groups.  
1.4 Overview of the chapters  
This study is organised in eight chapters. The first four chapters delineate the 
rationale of the thesis; locating the case in the Chilean context, discussing the 
theoretical foundations upon which the study is conducted, as well as explaining 
and justifying the chosen methodological approach. Findings of the study are 
presented and discussed in three separate chapters (5, 6 and 7) and finally, 
chapter 8 provides the conclusions of the thesis, as well as implications for further 
research. 
An overview of the chapter is presented as follows: 
Subsequent to this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a necessary background to 
the study, describing and discussing the main features of the Chilean media and 
political systems, together with a characterisation of the political elite that has 
controlled the country since the recovery of democracy in 1990. The chapter 
examines the way in which the journalistic profession has developed during this 
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period, and identifies important democratic deficits in the way media and political 
institutions have interacted ever since. 
Chapter 3 offers an appraisal of the relevant literature that informs the study and 
justifies the choice of an institutionalist approach to the mediatization of politics 
to better understand the changing relationship between political and media actors 
in Chile. Key dimensions of the mediatization of politics debate are critically 
discussed in order to provide a working definition of the mediatization process 
and advance the idea that political elites in Chile have undergone an increasing 
process of mediatization, which has been largely overlooked by the academia. 
Chapter 4 explains the methodological framework and research methods used in 
the thesis. The chapter locates the study within a constructionist paradigm for the 
understanding of political institutions, and justifies an inductive and interpretive 
research design, as well as the choice of elite interview as the main research 
method. Strategies of data collection and analysis informed by grounded theory 
(Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 2008; Birks & Mills 2011) and applied thematic 
analysis (Namey et al. 2008; Guest et al. 2012) are explained and justified by the 
nature of the research problem and questions guiding the study. Additionally, this 
chapter offers a profile of the research participants and acknowledges the 
strengths and limitations of the chosen approach. 
Chapter 5 initiates the findings section. This chapter locates political elites within 
a circuit of elite communication dominated by traditional media players and 
characterised by frequent and routine exchanges between political and media 
actors. Additionally, the chapter highlights the centralist character of the Chilean 
political communication culture by means of identifying structural features that 
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position some political actors in more advantageous positions than others to 
access this elite circuit, which appears skewed towards the executive power, the 
city of Santiago and media outlets of great significance within the elite. Finally, a 
typology of mediatization is developed, stressing how actors’ adaptation to news 
media logics is greatly responsive to the institutional framework within which 
they operate, and appears aligned to other political resources. 
Chapter 6 explores how political elites understand and interact with the 
institutional logic of the media and what the drivers guiding that relationship are. 
In order to do so, the chapter pays attention to politicians’ goals of media 
exposure, their perceptions of the main components of the news media logic, as 
well as the identification of main domains of adaptation to the news media logic; 
that is to say, those extended practices through which the mediatization of 
political actors is generally expressed. Throughout the chapter, mediated visibility 
is characterised as a mobilising capability (March & Olsen 1995) within political 
institutions, a coveted yet risky form of capital that requires careful management, 
and control of which seems to become more difficult for political elites. This drive 
for mediated attention in a context of increasing media autonomy regarding how 
content is presented to the public prompts political elites to react by means of 
professionalising strategies of political communication; readjusting language, time 
and information subsidies to meet new media demands.  
In Chapter 7, attention shifts to the backstage practices in the relationship 
between political and media actors by examining the routine trade-off of 
information in the political news beat. Additionally, role relations between 
politicians and journalists are inspected, paying attention to elements that 
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threaten autonomous journalistic practice, and how narratives of 
professionalisation are traded by journalists against organisational constraints 
and long-term relationships with elite sources. From this analysis, the gap 
between a more autonomous media institution and a journalistic field that 
struggles to assert its autonomy is acknowledged and discussed in connection to 
the concept of boundaries and the ability political and media actors show for 
navigating between logics of appropriateness regarding the own role and logics of 
expected utility in which compromises are accepted.  
Finally, Chapter 8 contains the main conclusions of the study. The chapter offers 
an overview of key findings of the thesis and discusses its normative and 
theoretical implications. Thus, it is stressed how the process of mediatization 
interacts with features of the Chilean political culture, which moderate the 
development of the process.  Additionally, implications of wider reach are 
discussed; particularly, how the resistance and instrumental adoption of political 
elites to news media logics opens up questions about a loss of autonomy in 
political actors associated with mediatization processes. This argument is further 
developed by identifying conflicting rationales for behaviour in the relationships 
between political elites and the media, which are better understood by inspecting 
spaces of autonomy and control between media and political actors, as well as 
distinguishing between levels of analysis in this contentious relationship. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LOCATING THE CASE:  
CHILE AND THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE 
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the main features of the Chilean 
political and media systems as a necessary background for discussing the 
mediatization of political elites in this national context. In order to better 
understand the current situation and how these institutions interact today, the 
chapter introduces key political and media actors within a historical perspective 
focused on the process of the transition to democracy, initiated in 1990.  
Already 25 years after the recovery of democracy, political actors and institutions 
face important challenges connected with what has been described as an elitist 
political culture (Luna & Mardones 2010) whose representative nature continues 
to be questioned (Godoy 2003). The chapter exposes how the narrative of success 
that surrounded the process of democratisation in the country has been 
challenged on multiple fronts; the lack of attention to the development of pluralist 
media markets being one of them.   
The first section (2.1) offers a mostly descriptive and succinct overview of the key 
players in the Chilean political and media systems. First, the main institutional 
arrangements defining Chilean politics are examined: the presence of a strong 
Executive power, a Congress with limited attributions, and two stable political 
coalitions that have led the process of the transition to democracy and have 
30 
 
dominated most public positions over the last 25 years. Secondly, an overview of 
the key players of the Chilean media system is provided, paying attention to 
broadcast, print and new media actors that have modified the national media 
ecology in recent years.  
The second section of the chapter (2.2) develops a historical analysis of the 
transition process, stressing how complementary dimensions have evolved ever 
since: legal-procedural, actor-based and civic dimensions, which together shed 
light on the main challenges facing the current Chilean democracy, in particular 
the apparent fracture between political elites and civil society, which has been 
identified as one of the main drivers of the mediatization of politics in the country 
(Arancibia 2002; Silva 2004).  
Finally, the third section (2.3) concentrates on recent developments in the media 
system in Chile, discussing competing understandings of the process, specifically 
what it is here called the narrative of modernisation vs. the narrative of 
concentration. This analysis is complemented with an overview of the role the 
journalistic field has played in the democratisation process.  
With a GDP of US$277.2 billion and a population of 17.62 million, the World Bank 
regards Chile as a high income country (The World Bank 2015). From 2009, it has 
had full membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, with the aim of sharing policy experiences with thirty three other 
countries committed to democracy and market economy (OECD 2015). Chile has 
traditionally been well positioned in regional rankings, standing out for what has 
been regarded as an exemplary road to development, based on economic growth 
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and a steady reduction of poverty.4 In matters of civil liberties and political rights, 
Freedom House has regarded Chile as a totally free country from 1990 onwards, 
granting the highest score possible since 2004 (Freedom House, 2014).  Despite 
the prominent position occupied by the country in a variety of international 
measurements, the Chilean road to democracy and development has proven to be 
longer than anticipated, and the narrative of success built during the nineties and 
early noughties is starting to be challenged.   
On the one hand, the foundations and outcomes of the Chilean economic model 
have been questioned, especially on the basis of persistent inequalities in income 
distribution (Meller 2000; Murray et al. 2009; OECD 2014) and limited upward 
social mobility (Torche, 2005). Additionally, the quality of work and the wage 
structure also reveal a less successful panorama, with high levels of 
precariousness in work conditions (Durán & Kremerman 2015). 
On the other hand, the legitimacy of institutional politics has been increasingly 
interrogated and expressed in all-time high levels of distrust and disapproval of 
political institutions such as Government, Congress and political parties (COES 
2015; PNUD 2015). A strategy of democratic consolidation based on an elite 
power-sharing settlement (Cavarozzi 1992) and usually praised as the main 
explanation for political stability, has been questioned on the basis of persistent 
democratic deficits. Dubbed as a “restricted democracy” (Munck & Leff 1997) or 
“pacted democracy” (Godoy 1999) in the years immediately following the regime 
                                                          
4
 According to the government-run survey CASEN, managed by the Ministry of Social Development, 38 
per cent of the population lived in poverty in 1990. This figure decreased to 13 per cent in 2006. After a 
controversial debate, this survey changed its methodology to address new dimensions of poverty. As a 
result, numbers increased. In 2013, 20 per cent of Chileans were considered as living in poverty (more 
information in http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/).  
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change, the political system appears to be experiencing an on-going process of 
democratisation, with traces of the authoritative tradition persisting to this day 
(Schneider & Schmitter 2004; Siavelis 2009; Garretón & Garretón 2010; Munck 
2010; Huneeus & Cuevas 2013). The case of the news media system is emblematic 
in this regard, and shows the paradoxes of a modernisation process triggered by 
commercialisation (Tironi & Sunkel 1993) but nonetheless seriously questioned 
when assessed from the perspective of democratisation (McChesney 1999; Sunkel 
& Geoffroy 2002; Bresnahan 2003; Gonzalez-Rodríguez 2008; Monckeberg 2009; 
Couso 2012), a point that will be resumed and expanded in section 2.4.  
 
2.1. Mapping the key players: the institutional framework of Chilean 
politics 
Chile has a presidential system that has been characterized as “reinforced” or 
“ultra-presidentialist” (Godoy 2003). This is a result of a set of exclusive legislative 
initiatives that favours a tight control of the legislative agenda by the Executive 
power, which becomes a de-facto agenda setter during the policy-making process 
(Aninat et al. 2006). Similar to the U.S. model, Congress is organised in a bicameral 
assembly (Deputies and Senate), and every legislative decision has to be mutually 
corroborated by the other chamber. Unlike the U.S. model, the President has 
exclusive initiative power in all matters of administration connected to the daily 
running of government, in addition to matters of legislation such as the political 
and administrative division of the country, taxation, labour legislation, social 
security, budgetary matters and, more importantly, any legislative initiative 
involving new allocation of resources or changes in public expenses (Aninat et al. 
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2006). As a result of these arrangements, the Chilean Executive power has been 
described as having the greatest “institutional power” among Presidential systems 
in Latin America, a key predictor of agenda control by the Presidency (Santos et al. 
2014). 
There is some disagreement among scholars about the efficacy of the checks and 
balances in place to counterbalance the power of the Executive. Godoy (2003) 
argues that the system lacks a proper balance due to the extensive legislative 
powers of the Executive and the limited oversight capacities of Congress. Others 
have contended that in spite of the President’s strong ability to control legislative 
agendas, the system is protected by a series of veto players that prevent unilateral 
changes and push different actors towards strategies of cooperation (Aninat 
2006).  
2.1.1. Main political coalitions  
 
Two stable coalitions have conducted politics in Chile since the recovery of 
democracy. These are the centre-left Concertación5 and the centre-right Alianza6. 
These coalitions, praised for their high level of stability and institutionalisation, 
have dominated public representation, both in the Executive and Congress, 
making the participation of other political actors marginal. Concertación led four 
                                                          
5
 Concertación is shorthand for Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, a coalition formed to 
defeat Augusto Pinochet. It was located on the centre-left of the political spectrum and initially 
integrated four parties: Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), Partido Socialista (PS), Partido por la 
Democracia (PPD) and Partido Radical-Social Demócrata (PRSD). The Concertación changed its name to 
Nueva Mayoría before running for the second term of Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018), incorporating 
three new parties: Izquierda Ciudadana (IC), Partido Comunista de Chile (PC) and Movimiento Amplio 
Social (MAS).   
6
 Alianza is shorthand for Alianza por Chile and it is located on the centre-right and right of the political 
spectrum. Historically, it integrated two parties: Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Demócrata 
Independiente (UDI), the latter the party with the strongest links to Pinochet’s legacy. The coalition 
changed its name to Coalición por el Cambio between 2009 and 2012 but later returned to its previous 
name. Early in 2015, the coalition incorporated two further groups to their ranks: Partido Regionalista 
Independiente (PRI) and Evópoli and was renamed in October 2015 as Chile Vamos. 
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consecutive governments, those of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei 
(1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). 
Alianza gained office for the first time in 2010, with the election of Sebastián 
Piñera (2010-2014). Despite the disparity in their electoral success in presidential 
elections (see figures 1 and 2) both coalitions show stable and competitive voting 
patterns, capturing around 90 per cent of votes in parliamentary elections. 
   
 
Figure 1: Votes obtained for both coalitions in the first round of presidential elections. The column “others” 
reflects the total share of voting obtained by independent candidates (when more than one independent 
candidate ran for office, their votes have been combined). The textured blue column in 2014 stands for Nueva 
Mayoría, the renovated version of Concertación.  
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Figure 2: Votes obtained by both coalitions in the final round of presidential elections. From 2000-2014 no 
candidate obtained more than 50 per cent of votes in the first round, therefore a second election was held to 
decide between the two first majorities. Note that the centre-left coalition won all except one election (2010).  
 
The stability of these two coalitions has been greatly encouraged by the so-called 
binomial electoral system, which was recently eliminated by President Bachelet 
following decades of discussions (Alvarez 2015). The system used lists of 
candidates who compete for two positions in each parliamentary district. In this 
system, each of the two lists garnering the most votes gets one of the available 
positions, unless the most voted list receives more than twice the votes of its 
nearest rival. The system introduced some distortions; in practice, both coalitions 
generally secured one representative per district, pushing their vote shares in 
Congress towards 50 per cent (Godoy, 2003). The system encouraged parties to 
remain organised in two coalitions, but offered high entry barriers for a third 
coalition or an independent party, reducing the number of relevant actors (Aninat 
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et al. 2006). Additionally, minority parties with significant vote shares – but 
located outside the main coalitions – often ended with no parliamentary 
representation (Godoy 2003; Luna & Mardones 2010). 
In a context where both coalitions have increasingly moved closer in their 
programmatic definitions, one of the main cleavages that still distinguishes these 
groups and their voters has been their positions regarding the military regime 
(Luna 2008), even as recent efforts by a more liberal sector of the right pushes to 
disengage from this heavy legacy. 
Several political analysts agree that both coalitions are showing signs of wear and 
disconnection from their voters (Godoy 2003; Luna 2008; Luna & Mardones 
2010). As a result, the coalitions have initiated more or less parallel strategies of 
expansion and rebranding. In order to return to power for a second period (2014-
2018), Michelle Bachelet was supported by a revamped Concertación, renamed 
Nueva Mayoría, and extended further to the political left by incorporating the 
Communist Party (PC), Izquierda Cristiana (IC) and Movimiento Amplio Social 
(MAS). Alianza, currently in the role of opposition, has embarked on a similar 
process and recently launched Chile Vamos, a group of four centre-right political 
parties (Canales 2015).7 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), Renovación Nacional (RN), Evópoli and Partido Regionalista 
Independiente (PRI).  
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2.2. Mapping the key players: Description of the Chilean media 
ecology 
The Chilean media system is fiercely market-oriented (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; 
Couso 2012) and still dominated by traditional media players (Godoy & 
Gronemeyer 2012). It is, however, a system undergoing change. On the one hand, 
the penetration of online media and the imminent arrival of digital TV have forced 
traditional actors to adjust their approaches. On the other hand, the concentration 
of ownership has intensified across media industries, reviving concerns about the 
oligopolistic nature of the field, a concern that will be examined in greater detail in 
section 2.4.  
The concentration of media ownership in Chile tends to be vertical (within each 
industry) and not horizontal (across industries). As a result, there are no big 
media conglomerates in Chile as occurs in other countries in the region (Mastrini 
& Becerra 2006), and cases of cross-ownership are limited and recent, such as 
those of the multi-media platforms owned by the entrepreneurs Andrónico Luksic 
and Alvaro Saieh (Fernández 2013).  
Nonetheless, the media system as a whole has undergone some changes, which 
can be seen in the variations across historical data of advertising shares. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, using data from 2013, television is still the main media 
industry by advertising share, capturing 43 per cent, followed by newspapers (24 
per cent), online media (9 per cent) and advertisements placed in public spaces (9 
per cent). At the bottom of the table are radio (7 per cent), paid television (6 per 
cent) magazines (2 per cent) and cinema (0.3 per cent). 
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Figure 3: Own elaboration with data from ACHAP (Asociación Chilena de Publicidad), 2013.  
 
This distribution has experienced change over the years. Notably, recent years 
have seen the steady and rapid growth of publicity in online media platforms, 
which has increased by a factor of ten in the last decade, from capturing 0.9 per 
cent of the total advertisement share in 2003 to 9 per cent in 2013.  Additionally, it 
is possible to note the controlled yet steady decrease of advertising in newspapers, 
a process initiated already in the 1980s, and the more recent decrease of 
television advertising seen in the last five years. Figure 4 offers a visual 
representation of this evolution over time, based on data from 5 year intervals for 
the period 1978-2013.  
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Figure 4. Own elaboration with data from ACHAP (Asociación Chilena de Publicidad), 1973-2013. 
  
Below, the main players within each industry will be introduced, paying attention 
to major changes and trends in recent years. For the purpose of the analysis, three 
main areas will be discussed: broadcast, newspapers and online media. 
Broadcast: With a penetration of 99.2 per cent and an average of 2.4 TV sets per 
household (Anatel 2014), the TV industry is still the most important player in 
terms of reach. The industry has certainly resisted the impact of several changes, 
in particular the spread of paid TV and the increase of online media consumption. 
More recently, after the approval of the Digital TV Law (Aguirre 2014), the 
industry is preparing for a general switch from analogue to digital transmission 
and reception, a process planned to span 5 years, which could significantly 
increase the number of free reception frequencies available to the public.  
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Ratings and national production are concentrated in five television stations, most 
of them privately-owned. The exception is TVN (Televisión Nacional de Chile), a 
public TV station with a sui generis organisation; it has a public mandate and a 
politically nominated board, although it is self-funded and subject to the same 
market rules as the rest of the industry (Fuenzalida 2002). Two other prominent 
players are owned by powerful family holdings. Since 2010, Canal 13 has been 
mostly owned by Luksic Group, with minority participation by the Catholic 
University, and Mega has been owned by Bethia Group since 2011. The Luksic 
group belongs to the Luksic family, with prominent business interests in mining, 
banking, manufacturing and energy industries, among others; it is located among 
the top 3 national fortunes (Echeverría & Arce 2014). Bethia Group belongs to the 
Solari family, in possession of the third greatest national fortune (Echeverría & 
Arce 2014), with prominent interests in retail, water and private health sectors, 
among others. The other two channels are owned by international corporations. 
The U.S.-based Turner Broadcasting System (Time Warner) owns Chilevisión and 
the Mexican businessman Remigio Ángel González owns La Red.  
TV programming is oriented towards entertainment genres, most of them 
nationally produced. According to a report by Anatel (2014), 74 per cent of TV 
consumption in 2013 was of nationally produced programming. When looking at 
genres, entertainment is prominent, although news products captured a 
respectable 27 per cent of all TV viewing. However, across all the journalistic 
programmes aired by TV stations, only 9 per cent are identified by Anatel as 
“politics”, while subjects such as sports, crime and soft news are more prominent. 
Similar patterns of programming are found across TV stations,  while the news 
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agendas of TV bulletins have been identified as highly uniform by empirical 
studies (Valenzuela & Arriagada 2009).   
Concentration in the radio industry takes a different shape. More than 1,000 radio 
stations spread throughout the country, but ownership is concentrated in 5 
relevant media groups with 80.8 per cent of national audience and advertising 
(Initiative 2011). The more important are Ibero Americana Radio Chile, owned by 
the Spanish group Prisa, together with Grupo Dial and 13 Radios. The latter two 
groups represent recent examples of cross-platform property: Dial is owned by 
the media conglomerate Copesa, an influential actor in the newspaper industry, 
and 13 Radios belongs to the Luksic Group, owners of Canal 13 TV station. As 
argued by Ramírez (2009), the existence of numerous regional and local radio 
stations across the country tends to hide the fact that both profits and content 
production are heavily centralised in Santiago-based companies, which broadcast 
standard content nationally, and leave restricted space to local actors. Therefore in 
this case, concentration is less pronounced in terms of ownership distribution, but 
significant in terms of audience reach and power to attract advertising. 
 
Newspapers: The market structure of the newspaper industry shares some 
commonalities with the radio market. There are 109 registered periodicals in the 
national territory, including daily newspapers, weeklies and publications of 
various periodicities (ANP 2012). Of this total, the members of the so-called 
duopoly of the Chilean press own 23 newspapers, in the case of El Mercurio, and 5 
newspapers in the case of Copesa. In spite of this relatively disaggregated 
ownership structure, the power of these two players -in terms of influence and 
advertising capture- is widely recognised, actually configuring a newspaper 
42 
 
market frequently described as oligopolistic and politically hegemonic (Sunkel & 
Geoffroy 2002; Monckeberg 2009; Couso 2012). Newspapers with national reach 
are the elite-oriented El Mercurio and La Tercera, political evening newspaper La 
Segunda, tabloid newspapers LUN and La Cuarta, free distribution newspapers 
Publimetro, La Hora and Hoy x Hoy, and three business-oriented publications 
(Estrategia, Pulso and Diario Financiero). All but three8 of these titles belong either 
to El Mercurio SA (El Mercurio, La Segunda, LUN, Hoy x Hoy) or Copesa (La Tercera, 
La Cuarta, Pulso, La Hora). In practice, these groups control around 80 per cent of 
readership and advertising in the national market (Monckeberg 2009), 
maintaining an unchallenged dominant position. 
El Mercurio SA is the oldest news media company in Chile and a prominent actor 
within the public debate in contemporary times. Owned by the powerful Edwards 
family, El Mercurio was founded in 1900 with a mission of exerting political 
influence in the tradition of the greatest European newspapers (Herrero 2014). As 
noted by Waisbord (2012), El Mercurio has often represented the prototypical 
case of a newspaper closely identified with authoritarianism, given the close ties 
between the newspaper owners and the dictatorship. Despite connections with 
the latter, the Edwards family initiated the editorial business with the aim of being 
“the guardian of the Republic” (Herrero 2014) and on repeated occasions have 
declared their intention to represent institutions above political allegiances. This 
certainly contentious assertion has been, nonetheless, at least partially endorsed 
by studies that suggest the political coverage of El Mercurio as less biased than 
that of La Tercera (Navia et al. 2013). For decades, El Mercurio was the only elite-
                                                          
8
 Publimetro (Metro International Group), Estrategia (Editorial Gestion) and Diario Financiero (Claro 
Group) are the three national titles published outside the groups Copesa and El Mercurio. The first one 
is a free distribution newspaper with limited production of original journalistic content; the other two 
are financial publications.   
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oriented newspaper in the country. This changed in the early 2000s when the then 
middle-market La Tercera, now the property of the Saieh Group (Monckeberg 
2009), decided to rebrand itself and compete for elite audiences, initiating a 
successful transformation. Both newspapers have been described as a two-headed 
monopoly (Gonzalez-Rodríguez 2008) for their similar views on political and 
economic subjects.  
In terms of readership and circulation, the market leader is the tabloid LUN (see 
Figure 5). In the elite-oriented segment, El Mercurio has sustained its leadership, 
closely followed by La Tercera, and, as argued by Couso (2012), the relevance of 
these newspapers should not be underestimated, as long as a high proportion of 
politically relevant news is generated in their pages.  
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New media: A discussion of the Chilean media system would not be complete 
without mentioning the impact new media have had, at least partially, in injecting 
dynamism to an otherwise rigid market structure (Franco 2009; González-
Bustamante & Soto Saldías 2015). On the one hand, most traditional media outlets 
have expanded into the digital world, either duplicating their contents or 
generating complementary platforms. On the other hand, and relevant to this 
analysis, a new array of actors have appeared who function on online media 
platforms only (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012).  
According to Alexa.com, in the top ten of the most visited websites in Chile there 
are three news websites: BioBio.cl, associated with an independent radio station of 
the same name; LUN (the online version of El Mercurio SA-owned tabloid) and 
Emol (the main news website associated with El Mercurio)9.  
In the realm of news, it is worth noting the development of a few journalism 
projects that have successfully opened up spaces for media diversity (Gonzalez-
Bustamante & Soto Saldias 2015; Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012). Particularly 
relevant to politics are the online newspaper El Mostrador, founded in 2000, and 
the investigative centre Ciper, created in 2007 and sponsored by Copesa. In a press 
environment with very limited resources for investigative journalism, these 
projects were started with the aim of filling information gaps, addressing topics 
normally absent in traditional media outlets (Skoknic 2013). As noted by Couso 
(2012), once news is broken online first, many of these stories are later 
incorporated into traditional media output, widening the news agenda with 
stories that more openly question political and economic power. Telling in this 
                                                          
9
 BioBio was 5
th
, LUN the 6
th
 and Emol 7
th
, according to the ranking elaborated by Alexa. This 
information was consulted in www.alexa.com in February 2015.  
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respect is a study about the use of the social media platform Twitter among 
Chilean politicians (Fábrega & Paredes 2013), which shows that although 
traditional media keep feeding the political conversation, historically powerful 
media outlets, such as El Mercurio and La Tercera, are not necessarily those most 
frequently mentioned in social media political networks. Instead, other web-based 
news organisations such as El Mostrador, The Clinic or El Dínamo or news websites 
associated to radio stations, such as BioBio, ADN, or Cooperativa are more 
frequently mentioned. The latter lend support to the idea that a greater number of 
actors are intervening in the elaboration of the mediatized political agenda, 
drawing power away from traditional media players.  
 
2.3. The endless transition: from authoritarian to transitional 
enclaves  
The democratic transition in Chile began in 1990 when the first democratic 
government assumed power after defeating Dictator Augusto Pinochet in a 
plebiscite held in late 1988. There is no agreement as to the date when the end of 
the transitional process can be marked, and both politicians and academics differ 
in their assessments. Patricio Aylwin, the first president elected following the 
military regime, ventured to suggest in a press conference held on August 9th 
1991, only a year after he took office, that the transition had come to an end, a 
polemic assertion even at the time (Walker 1992). Ricardo Lagos, who was 
President from 2000 to 2006, made a similar declaration in 2005 after passing a 
series of reforms that removed from the constitution a number of non-democratic 
elements inherited from Pinochet. Some academics have accepted the latter 
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milestone as the formal beginning of a post-transition era (Siavelis 2009). Others 
tie the transition to the first democratic government only, but claim that 
authoritative vestiges remain in place, and that Chile experiences an imperfect 
(Garretón & Garretón 2010) or semi-sovereign democracy (Huneeus & Cuevas 
2013).  
One of the obstacles to a clear definition of the end of the transition derives from 
the way in which the idea of transition is understood. As argued by Godoy (1999) 
limiting the idea of transition as a transfer of command from old authorities to 
newly elected ones is overly simplistic. On the other hand, though, it can be argued 
that all democracies are perfectible, or even more, that the ideal of democracy is 
different from the way in which democracy is actually realised (Dahl 1998). 
Therefore, a society could be indefinitely transitioning towards that ideal moment 
in which full democratisation is achieved.  
Looking at some of the more commonly used definitions of transitions to 
democracy can illuminate the conundrum. Munck and Leff (1997) defines 
transitions as follows: 
Transitions are periods of regime change [that] are formative or founding 
moments. As such, they set a society on a path that shapes its subsequent 
political development. (Ibid: 343) 
Godoy (1999) expands the notion of regime change to include a minimum of 
procedural conditions that have to be met, over a period of time: 
So, in conclusion, our answer to the question ‘what is the transition’ is as 
follows: It is the process through which the minimum procedural conditions 
for democracy to enter the phase of consolidation and deepening are realised. 
(Ibid: 88) 
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What both definitions have in common is a process-oriented approach to the 
concept of transition. Taken together, it is possible to understand transition to 
democracy as a process, or rather multiple processes, conducive to the moment in 
which democracy enters a phase of consolidation. At the same time, the mode of 
transition defines the main features of the resulting democracy. For the purpose of 
analysing contemporary democracy in Chile and better understanding the 
institutional space where political elites are currently located, three main spheres 
of the transitional process will be discussed below: (1) legal-procedural; (2) actor-
based dimension, concerned with the composition of political elites, and (3) civic 
dimension:  
2.3.1. Legal-procedural dimension 
 Within the academic community, the legal and procedural framework has been, 
by far, the most discussed dimension of the transitional process. This is not, 
however, the result of the disciplinary fixations of political scientists but a natural 
consequence of the way in which the terms of the Chilean transition to democracy 
was negotiated and, in great measure, defined by the military regime. 
The Constitution of 1980, approved in a fraudulent10 plebiscite (Garretón & 
Garretón 2010), remains in force and is the main stumbling block to claiming a 
complete overcoming of authoritative vestiges. This Constitution sets the tone, 
terms and the timeline of the transitional process, with the explicit goal of creating 
a “protected democracy”, in which the Armed Forces acted as “guarantors” of the 
institutional order (Godoy 1999). This explains why an intense management of 
                                                          
10
 The Constitution of 1980 was approved in what is widely recognised as a fraudulent plebiscite held 
under dictatorship, where political opposition was virtually invisible and had no resources to campaign, 
while the official position was widely disseminated, even with the acquiescence of the news media 
(Huneeus 1999). 
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civic-military relations was necessary during the first transitional governments 
(Cavallo 1998). 
This institutional framework inherited by the military regime has been commonly 
referred to as “authoritarian enclaves”, which have proven difficult to remove due 
to the conditions required for reform, according to the same Constitution. Among 
the more controversial points derived from this legal framework was the 
placement of Dictator Augusto Pinochet as a non-elected member of the Senate for 
8 years. He was one of 9 (out of 38) designated Senators identified in the 
Constitution, including 4 members of the Armed Forces. The Constitution also 
imposed military tutelage on representative institutions and established a system 
of supra-majorities that assured minimal changes to this design. This was 
reinforced by the introduction of the binominal electoral system that has left 
parties with significant vote shares without representation (Garretón & Garretón 
2010; Luna & Mardones 2010; Huneeus & Cuevas 2013). 
Together, these distorting factors have shaped a sui-generis form of restricted 
democracy, even as elections were held regularly in the country.  As argued by 
Munck and Leff (1997), the democratic authorities opted for maximising their 
chances of gaining power acting within a legal framework designed by the 
dictatorship. As a result of this “accommodationist strategy” the transition 
inherited a “constrained pattern of elite contestation that obstructs democratic 
consolidation in Chile” (Ibid: 347).  
Many of the authoritarian enclaves designed by the military regime have been 
eliminated through subsequent processes of negotiation and reform that 
nonetheless have taken decades. In 2005, designated senators were eliminated 
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and the President regained authority over the military. In 2015, the controversial 
binomial system was finally replaced by a proportional system, though the effects 
of this change are yet to be seen.11  
As can be appreciated from this description, most of these so called enclaves have 
been gradually removed – with the exception of the 1980 Constitution itself, which 
has been reformed and therefore continuously legitimised by democratically 
elected authorities. This difficult change has been identified as one of the pending 
challenges for the Chilean democracy in the twenty-first century (Munck 2010; 
Huneeus & Cuevas 2013).  
2.3.2. Actor-based dimension 
A second entry point to understanding the process of the transition to democracy 
with particular relevance for this study is to look at the composition and main 
features of the political elites that have led the public sector during the past 25 
years.   
The recovery of democracy in 1990 was greatly facilitated by an agreement 
reached between elite factions that purposely reorganised their relationships, and 
willingly entered into a bargaining process leading towards democratisation – a 
process that has been described in the literature as an ‘elite settlement’ (Higley & 
Gunther, 1992). This pact between the main political leaders of the country, both 
those who supported the dictatorship and those who opposed it, delivered 
                                                          
11
 The Law 20050, promulgated in August 2005, introduced changes such as the end of designated and 
life Senators (the latter was the case for former presidents) and improved the representative nature of 
Congress. In relation to the military role in the political institutional design, this law ended the role of 
“institutional guarantors” for the Armed Forces, restricted the makeup of the National Security Council 
(COSENA) and the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as ended the non-removable 
status of military chiefs. In turn, the law modifying the electoral system was promulgated in April 2015 
(Alvarez 2015). This ended with Law 18.799 (1989), which modified Law 18.700 (1988), both 
promulgated by Augusto Pinochet.  
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political stability and has long been praised as the key for success in the Chilean 
transition process. Cavarozzi (1992) argues that “elites’ bargaining 
predispositions became a political resource that helped bring about the successful 
settlements of the late 1980s” (Ibid: 235).  
Because the incoming centre-left coalition had very little ground for agreement 
with the centre-right political parties in matters of economic and social policy, this 
settlement was mostly focused on procedural matters (Cavarozzi 1992). In other 
words, the pre-democracy efforts towards transition were oriented to defining the 
rules of the political game that would come afterwards, rules that – as discussed 
previously – seriously hampered the reformist abilities of the new authorities, and 
enabled a tight control of the process for the old elites, even if they were out of 
government (Munck & Leff 1997).  
As described above, the party system has been structured around two stable 
coalitions (Nueva Mayoría, former Concertación, and Chile Vamos, former Alianza). 
Together, they have formed a fairly small group of decision-makers who 
frequently interact, facilitating cooperation in policy-making processes (Aninat et 
al. 2006). An additional contributing factor for elite cooperation is the social 
homogeneity showed by elites in power (Espinoza 2010). Joignant (2009) 
conducted a study that aimed to identify the main features of governmental elites 
during the period 1990-2010, surveying actors who served in the four 
governments of the Concertación12.  His findings showed that 60 per cent of the 
group came from the Metropolitan Region (Santiago and surroundings), the vast 
majority had a university degree (97 per cent) and postgraduate studies were 
                                                          
12
 The governments of the Concertación-era were led by Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei 
(1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010).  
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mostly conducted abroad (67 per cent). Maybe most revealing is the fact that more 
than 60 per cent of the group attended private schools, mostly Catholic (while only 
around 10 per cent of the general population is enrolled in primary and secondary 
private education). Additionally, women held only 19 per cent of key positions 
during the period analysed. As stressed by Joignant, this socio-demographic 
information reveals a strong presence of shared cultural patterns among the 
governmental elite: attached to Santiago, university-educated, male-dominated 
and mostly affluent.  
Two strong features define the character of the Chilean polity. The first is a deeply-
rooted aversion to conflict, epitomised in the “democracy of agreements” (la 
democracia de los acuerdos) and expressed in an on-going discourse on consensus 
(Godoy 1999; Silva 2004; Aninat et al. 2006; Siavelis 2009). The second is the 
sensitivity towards economic policy (Aninat et al. 2006), expressed in actions that 
reinforce the untouchability of Pinochet’s economic model (Siavelis 2009; 
Huneeus & Cuevas 2013), and a conservative fiscal policy based on international 
trade. As a result of the latter, it is possible to understand the prominent role 
played by the so called ‘technopols’ within the political elite, a group of politicians 
often educated in U.S.-based universities that played a crucial leadership role, 
bridging political parties and economic elites (Joignant 2009) and invoking 
technical knowledge to legitimise their leadership (Delamaza 2013). 
The points previously discussed lend support to the idea that the political culture 
developed during the transition has successfully served the end of generating 
consensus among factional elites (including economic elites), as well as providing 
a framework for political and economic stability. However, this set of institutional 
52 
 
arrangements has also been conducive, according to some scholars (Siavelis 2009; 
Luna & Mardones 2010) to establishing an elitist political culture that may be 
analysed as a contributing factor to the disconnection between elites and citizens. 
Siavelis (2009), who considers the end of the transition in 2005, develops a 
persuasive argument for what he calls the “transitional enclaves”, a post-
transitional configuration, derived from the previous political cycle and which 
would impede political transformation. What is striking in his analysis is the fact 
that these new enclaves are not formal or enforced by law, as most authoritarian 
enclaves were, but are instead replicated through practices and beliefs shared by 
political elites. Besides the previously mentioned tacit pact of avoiding 
fundamental changes or even discussions of change on the pillars of the economic 
model, the other transitional enclaves identified by Siavelis point to tight party 
control of politics through the allocation of public positions by party-mongering, 
centrally-controlled candidate selection, as well as informal strategies of 
policymaking outside Congress involving opaque agreements with extra-
institutional actors.  
These practices unfold in the context of decreasing citizen identification with the 
party system, a lack of popular support that seriously weakens political parties’ 
representativeness, together with candidate selection processes, allocation of 
positions in the public system and policymaking (Godoy 2003; Siavelis 2009; Luna 
& Mardones 2010).  
As Godoy (2003) argues, political parties have had great difficulty in properly 
exercising their role as intermediaries between civil society and state bodies. 
Instead, they have invested their power in recreating the system through which 
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privileges and resources are distributed among the same political elite, becoming 
self-referential institutions. Luna and Mardones (2010) pose a similar hypothesis, 
stating that the “milieu of elitism and exclusionary practices that shape the inner 
workings of the coalition's major parties” (Ibid: 110) have led the country to a 
“competitive oligarchy” scenario, in which the party system is competitive but not 
representative of a citizenry increasingly estranged from institutional politics.13  
Another important contributing factor shaping the Chilean political culture is the 
strong centralisation of the country. The Metropolitan Region, whose main urban 
centre is the city of Santiago, accounts for around 40 per cent of Chile’s national 
population14 and it is the political and administrative centre of the country. 
Historic demands for political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation have 
increased in recent years, and although some progress has been made in this 
direction, political control remains strongly rooted in central authorities (PNUD 
2014).  
The fact that most of these practices are informally enforced does not make the 
process of overcoming them any easier. On the contrary, most of these implicit 
arrangement emerged and were justified against a difficult process of transition to 
democracy, during which certain compromises were accepted for the greater good 
and long-awaited political stability. Today though, these justifications fade in the 
                                                          
13
 According to the CEP survey, in November 2014, 57 per cent  of the population declares not having 
identification with any of the main political coalitions; 12 per cent  does not know and only 32 per cent  
declares sympathy for some of these groups (the Alianza gets 10 per cent  and the Nueva Mayoría 22 
per cent ). 
14
 According to INE (National Institute of Statistics), the projections of population for the Metropolitan 
Region during 2015 are 7+ millions of inhabitants, out of 18 million estimated for the national 
population.    
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face of a new political cycle, during which the citizenry have started to actively 
criticise the political elites and their arrangements.15 
 
2.3.3. Civic dimension 
Deactivation and depolitisation of civil society was one of the trademarks of the 
transitional process in Chile. Silva (2004) contends that this process answered 
primarily to the repressive nature of the dictatorship together with the economic 
policies enforced during the period. Indeed, during the military regime the public 
discourse favoured individual over collective efforts. While politics were 
invisibilised, and any form of collective action was actively discouraged and 
repressed, a neoliberal discourse promoting individual work as the main tool for 
social mobility was successfully established. The privatisation of the citizen was 
therefore actively pursued, together with the encouragement of consumption as 
an alternative to social participation (Silva 2004; Delamaza 2013).16 This 
deactivation, nonetheless, continued with the arrival of democracy and not only by 
inertia. It was, again, promoted from above although with a different justification.  
This time, governing elites embraced the discourse of consensus in the name of 
national reconciliation, social peace, political and economic stability (Silva 2004).  
                                                          
15
 Multiple surveys conducted during 2014 and 2015 confirm a trend towards decreasing levels of trust 
in political institutions and politicians. Among others, a survey conducted by GFK Adimark in April 2015 
shows a downward trend that situates the Government with 64% of disapproval and Congress with 79% 
of disapproval. Another study published by the Conflict and Social Cohesion Studies Centre (COES) in 
March 2015 shows that only 2.7% of the population declares trust in political parties and 8.6% in 
Congress.  
16
 There was a brief yet relevant exception to this process of deactivation that occurred in the period 
1983-1986, when the deep economic crisis experienced by Chile sent people to the streets clamouring 
for democracy. According to Delamaza (2013) this was a spontaneous and not strategic encounter 
between the social and the political spheres, which created space for the emergence of opposition 
leaders.  
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Delamaza (2003) contends that wide social participation was not realised after 
1990 because the transition was conducted within the existent institutional 
framework and never challenged the previous socioeconomic order.  
Thus, the expectation of broad popular participation was not met after 1990, 
resulting in the prominence of political and economic elites who negotiated 
the terms of the transition (with participation of the armed forces). The anti-
dictatorship social movement was deactivated and not replaced with 
participatory forms of a new type (Delamaza, 2003: 14). 
Different analyses concur, stating that with the arrival of the new century, Chilean 
society diversified and atomized, and traditional spheres for social and political 
conflict became privatised (health, pensions, education, etc.).  At the same time 
that society embraced consumerism– despite the deep and persistent economic 
inequalities and precarious work conditions of wide sections of the population – it 
moved away from politics, which maintained a distinct elitist bias (Delamaza, 
2003, 2013; Godoy, 2003).  
The distance between politics and civil society derives from what has been widely 
recognised as a representation crisis, in which party politics lose contact with the 
civic sphere and, therefore, their popular foundation (Godoy, 2003; Silva, 2004; 
Luna & Mardones, 2010). The Chilean chapter of the United Nations Development 
Programme refers to the crisis of representation as “a failed link between society 
and the political system” (PNUD, 2004: 258), reflecting both the lack of 
representativeness of electoral mechanisms and the elites’ lack of empathy with 
rapid social change.   
Political parties in particular are, therefore, questioned on their ability to mediate 
between society and the state, which can be correlated to a decreasing 
participation in electoral politics (Luna & Mardones 2010). Godoy (2003) argues 
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that this has inverted the traditional process of political legitimation: instead of 
becoming channels for the transmission of social demands towards higher 
political spheres, political parties would receive a retrospective legitimacy at the 
polls. 
[…] what is happening in reality is that decisions are taken at the level of the 
Presidency and political and economic elites, and descend through political 
parties to receive an ex post factum legitimation. (Godoy, 2003: 27) 
There are different signs that lend support to the thesis of failure in the 
intermediation role played by the political party structure consolidated during the 
transition process. The first is the recurrent use of anti-elite party messages in 
political campaigns. In 2005, Michelle Bachelet won the presidency with the (only 
partially fulfilled) promise of a citizen government that would bring into power a 
new generation of people (Valenzuela & Dammert 2006; Luna & Mardones 2010). 
Similarly, Sebastián Piñera won office for the centre-right in 2010, with the slogan 
of “el gobierno de los mejores” (the government of the best ones) and a cabinet only 
loosely linked to political parties and populated, instead, by people with 
professional trajectories in the private sector.  
The second sign of failure in the intermediate function of political parties has been 
the re-articulation of social demands expressed in massive street mobilisation, 
especially during 2011.17 These demands have been articulated outside and 
against traditional party structures around issues including public and free 
education, civil rights, the relationship between development and environmental 
conservation, and abuses of the bank system, among others. As argued by Segovia 
                                                          
17
 2011 was the year in which the student movement took to the streets clamouring for the end of 
profit in all levels of the education system and demanding a greater role for the state, sustaining strikes 
and massive protests for most of the year. According to Segovia and Gamboa (2012), during 2011 a 
variety of social movements reconnected with the tradition of street rallies in a scale not previously 
seen during democracy.  
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and Gamboa (2012) these mobilisations reveal the increasing autonomy of civil 
society and party politics’ inability to understand and lead the political process 
(Segovia & Gamboa 2012). They indicate, as well, that Chilean civil society is 
regaining confidence in its ability to influence collective and political organisation, 
positioning policy issues in the national debate, and on the agendas of political 
elites. Mayol (2011), contends that because the transition to democracy was 
designed and implemented at an elite level, society did not experience the process 
as such. Instead, social mobilisation was, for long, either repressed or sublimated. 
When finally expressed during 2011, Mayol argues, social unrest surpassed the 
boundaries of the institutional dam that protected the political class. In doing so, 
this process could indicate the realisation of a long-awaited social dimension to 
the democratic transition.  
This new politicisation of civil society cannot, however, be equated to a trend of 
increasing participation. That process is still unravelling, and the outcomes of the 
protests have not always been successful (Segovia & Gamboa 2012), with a 
lingering risk of a return to the comfort zone of passivity (Mayol & Azocar 2011). 
What seems more permanent, though, is the questioning of political elites that has 
come through these movements, and a deep distrust towards politics and political 
institutions (PNUD 2015). 
2.4. Modernisation vs. concentration: two tales on transitional media  
This section will pay attention to two competing narratives that have dominated 
analysis on the development of the Chilean media in democracy, that of 
modernisation and that of concentration. This analysis is paramount to 
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understanding the context for the process of mediatization of political actors in 
the Chilean context.  
The liberalization drive triggered by the commercialisation of the media provides 
the basis for a hypothesis of the early modernisation of the news media in Chile. 
This hypothesis contends that the military regime indirectly promoted the 
modernisation of the communications system (inadvertently undermining the 
authoritarian tradition) by means of increasing its coverage, leaving the industry 
open to private agents and boosting advertising (Tironi & Sunkel 1993). This 
position recognizes the interdependency between the media and the political 
systems, and highlights the role played by the media in the “process of forming a 
basic consensus on pluralist democracy and open market economy” (Ibid: 216). 
Because the commercialization and modernisation of the media happened before 
the arrival of democracy, the argument follows, the system did not experience 
great alterations with the regime change. 
In short, the transformation of the communications media – their 
modernization and emancipation from political control – had already taken 
place prior to changes in the political scene, so that the political transition did 
not bring about an abrupt break with the past.  (Tironi & Sunkel, 1993: 294) 
Thus, the tale of modernisation stretches to state that before the transition the 
media were already emancipated from political control, a contentious point that 
requires careful assessment. During democratic governments, the structure of the 
media was indeed not greatly altered by the state, as a result of a policy of non-
intervention that encouraged the incorporation of new private actors into the 
system, particularly big business groups (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002). This does not 
mean that the media system remained static or untouched. Instead, it became 
increasingly dependent on market forces. Some of the more vocal critics of the 
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modernisation tale, in the Chilean case, state that the evolution of media markets 
in democracy reveals the extent to which the Concertación’s governments 
conflated democracy with market choice, actually debilitating the public sphere 
(Bresnahan 2003), and erroneously expecting that the market would guarantee 
pluralism and free speech (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002). 
In order to critically analyse the tale of modernisation from the perspective of 
democratisation, two dimensions identified by Voltmer (2013) as standards to 
judge the performance of transitional media systems will be further analysed in 
the local context: diversity and independence. As noted by Voltmer, both of these 
concepts are pillars of normative media theory. As such, they tend to be elusive 
and teleological, in the sense that, rather than being ends in themselves, they serve 
broader ends for the correct functioning of democracy (Ibid). These concepts, 
particularly the idea of media independence/autonomy, will be further discussed 
in the next chapter as crucial to the debate about the mediatization of politics. For 
the purpose of this analysis, media diversity will be understood as the availability 
of multiple media channels delivering multiple contents to multiple audiences 
(McQuail 2010), therefore encouraging the circulation of a plurality of voices 
(Voltmer, 2013).18 Independence, in turn, will be understood as the ability of the 
news media to act according to their own standards, and therefore free from 
political pressures, including proprietorial pressures (Stromback 2008; Voltmer 
                                                          
18
 Media diversity is recognised as one of the pillars of normative media theory and usually discussed in 
connection to the expectations placed upon the media within democratic systems. McQuail (2010) 
discusses diversity as a neutral concept referring to variety, choice and change; and distinguishes 
between external diversity (media systems where multiple potentially polarised communication 
channels coexist) and internal diversity (media systems where communication channels embrace values 
of neutrality and balance and commit to articulate multiple voices). Karppinen (2013), in turn, warns 
about the risks of conflating abundance of media channels and greater consumer choice with the 
achievement of a plural and equal agora where opportunities of communication are equally distributed. 
As such, media diversity becomes a necessary quality of pluralistic democracies, yet how to assess the 
achievement of the principle of diversity remains a contested matter in media policy.    
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2013).  Finally, the contested nature of the Chilean journalistic field will be 
reviewed.  
2.4.1. On media diversity in democratic Chile 
One of the paradoxes resulting from the Chilean democratic process was that 
cultural momentum did not arrive with the regime change. As highlighted by 
Voltmer (2013), it is usual to see an outburst of advocacy media during 
transitional processes, under the assumption that relegated social and political 
groups will be eager to seize the opportunity of press freedom after overcoming 
authoritarian environments.  This was not the case in Chile. On the contrary, the 
oppositional press that had developed under dictatorship19 came to an abrupt end, 
and community and local media were seriously debilitated (Sunkel & Geoffroy 
2002; Bresnahan 2003; Leon-Dermota 2003). This apparent contradiction has 
been explained as the convergence of numerous causes, including the end of 
foreign subsidies, the movement of some media owners into government, the loss 
of readership, poor business management and a strong official discourse on 
consensus enforced by incoming political elites, who considered an adversarial 
press a threat to the transitional process (Leon-Dermota 2003).   
What did happen during democracy was an increasing concentration of media 
markets, as outlined in section 2.1. This happened first as a result of legal changes 
to TV ownership structures.20 As a result of these regulatory changes, the industry 
mutated from being state and university-owned to incorporate private capital. The 
                                                          
19
 Prominent political magazines performed important roles as opposition voices to Pinochet during the 
‘80s, especially Hoy, Cauce, Análisis, APSI and the short-lived newspaper La Epoca (1987-1998). Already 
during democracy, at least three print newspapers have failed to sustain a viable editorial and 
commercial project: Fortin Mapocho, El Metropolitano and Diario Siete (for more details see Sunkel and 
Geoffroy, 2002 or Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 2008).  
20
 TV Law of 1989.  
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radio industry experienced a similar process with the arrival of international 
conglomerates, while the press remained captured by the duopoly integrated by 
the Edwards family and Copesa, companies that were financially supported by the 
dictatorship (for an overview of this process see Sunkel & Geoffroy, 2002; 
Gonzalez-Rodríguez, 2008 or Monckeberg, 2009; for a regional analysis see 
Mastrini & Becerra, 2006; for a description of concentration in radio markets see 
Ramírez, 2009).  
Although the process of concentration has been identified as a global trend 
(McChesney 2010), a notorious feature particular to Chile is the ideological 
homogeneity of the more relevant media outlets as socially conservative and 
economically liberal (Otano & Sunkel 2003). Together with a strong centralisation 
(where Santiago-based media become national media) this has prompted serious 
concerns about the uniformity of the media offer, on the one hand, and the sub-
representation of social and political sectors of the population on the other 
(Gonzalez-Rodríguez 2008; Couso 2012). Concentration of media ownership 
together with ideological biases become, therefore, an actual threat to freedom of 
expression. A recent report on Human Rights in Chile develops the idea in the 
following way:  
Whether the media are concentrated by the state or by a small group of 
individuals, the damage caused to the exercise of freedom of expression is the 
same. In both cases society sees violated the quantity and quality of 
information it receives, which according to inter-American standards implies 
an affectation of social, collective and democratic dimensions of freedom of 
expression. Subsequently, the state has the obligation of guaranteeing the 
plurality of voices. (UDP, 2010: 157)21 
 
                                                          
21
 Own translation from Spanish. 
62 
 
2.4.2. On media independence 
When analysing the issues surrounding the implementation and practice of 
independent news media, the first problematic feature of the Chilean media 
system during the transition is the existence of regulations that seriously 
hampered the exercise of an independent press. In 1998, Human Rights Watch 
elaborated a report which states that, despite Chile’s return to a democratic 
regime, some of the country’s laws, institutions and practices were below 
expected standards. 
One of the fields in which this deficit is critically expressed is the state and 
protection of free speech. In fact, this report concluded that such freedom is 
subject to restrictions that perhaps do not have an equivalent among Western 
democracies. (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 12) 
Leon-Dermota (2003) contends that the Chilean political and media systems do 
not derive from the radical free speech British model but from the continental 
version. As a result free speech is not seen as an absolute value, and in this 
conception honour might legally precede public interest. As highlighted by 
González-Rodríguez (2008), a legal framework that restricted journalistic practice, 
contrasted with the absolute freedom reigning in media markets. Before the 
promulgation of the Law on Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Practice 
of Journalism (2001), generally known as the Press Law, the damage to the honour 
of a public authority was considered not a civil but a criminal offence. The Press 
Law of 2001 ended the special protective status granted to the President, 
ministers, members of Congress, judges and commanders of the Armed Forces, 
used both under dictatorship and during democracy to prosecute journalists.22 
                                                          
22
 Some of the more notorious cases were those of the banned book Diplomatic Impunity (Francisco 
Martorell, 1993), and The black book of the Chilean justice (Alejandra Matus, 1999). For the latter, Chile 
was sued in the Inter-American Human Rights Court.  
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Despite this, there are other provisions within the Chilean regulatory framework 
that still criminalise insults under the penal code, discouraging adversarial 
coverage (Bresnahan 2003; Cabalin-Quijada & Lagos-Lira 2009). 
Having a vocal policy of non-intervention, the Chilean state has actually played a 
role in shaping the media environment, both by actions and omissions.  A well-
known case is the financial support received by newspaper chains El Mercurio SA 
and Copesa under the military regime. In the early 1980s, during times of severe 
financial crisis in Chile, both companies were rescued by the state through the 
acquisition of debt. These debts were repeatedly renegotiated, with very 
favourable terms for the companies, and finally were sold to private banks during 
the last days of the dictatorship for a fraction of the original amount. The regime’s 
allies orchestrated these transactions in order to “safeguard” these news 
organisations from possible state-interventions, causing fiscal damage worth 
US$25 million. Additionally, the regime secured a flow of public advertising 
towards these companies, since part of the previous debt was alleviated through 
an agreement of future public advertising exchanges23 (for a detailed description 
of these events see Leon-Dermota, 2003; Monckeberg, 2009; Herrero, 2014). 
During the Concertación years, around 50 per cent of public advertising kept 
flowing towards El Mercurio SA, a policy defended on the basis that decisions on 
publicity allocation were made specifically over circulation criteria (Herrero 
2014). Thus, state policies have favoured two politically influential media outlets 
with open allegiance to the political right and neoliberal economics, to the 
                                                          
23
 According to Monckeberg (2009), just before the new elected authorities entered into government, 
Copesa alleviated the debt with the State Bank through 71.447 UF in agreements of state publicity, an 
amount that in the case of El Mercurio went up to 112.600 UF. In current exchange values, this exceeds 
2 and 4 million US dollars respectively.   
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detriment of independent actors that have called, in vain, for state support over 
the past decades.  
In addition to state regulations and financial aid, there is a third intervening factor 
in the relationship between politics and the media in Chile in recent times, one 
that is certainly more difficult to measure, but equally prominent in recent 
analysis. The effective discourse on political consensus that permeated institutions 
during the nineties and early noughties might have had an additional impact on 
the political disengagement of news organisations. Otano and Sunkel (2003) 
suggest that after the recovery of democracy various topics, ranging from human 
rights violations to economic policy, were placed off limits under a tacit agreement 
between news organisations and stories were only considered “journalistically 
correct” if they did not jeopardise the fragile political stability. The notion of what 
is “journalistically correct”, the argument continues, was enforced through direct 
political pressures on news organisations, as well as acts of naturalised self-
censorship (Otano & Sunkel 2003; Leon-Dermota 2003).  
Other scholars go further, arguing that the deactivation of an adversarial press 
was the result of a conscious policy of abandonment of the media to the rules of 
the market. Robert Mc Chesney (1999) notably elaborates on the Chilean case as 
an emblematic example of neoliberal policies “hollowing out” democracy, 
contributing to political apathy by depicting social demobilization as a desirable 
outcome and a sign of social peace and economic progress.  
In sum, by creating an environment highly responsive to investors on the one 
hand, and restrictive conditions to the development of the press on the other, the 
state has not played the neutral role it has claimed, but actually contributed to the 
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impoverishment of the media and the prevailing lack of diversity in editorial 
projects (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Leon-Dermota 2003; Bresnahan 2003). 
2.4.3. Chilean journalism: in search of professional identity  
As a natural correlate of the political deactivation that characterised the transition 
to democracy in Chile and the disappearance of politically active news 
organisations, the transitional press has been described as mostly submissive and 
respectful towards political elites (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Leon-Dermota 2003). 
Studies based on surveys and interviews with journalists warn of an uncritical 
stance towards sources (Santander 2013), conformism and a serious lack of 
confidence. These are signs of a weak professional culture that would give way to 
political and economic pressures (Gronemeyer 2002). This is, of course, a situation 
with variation across the whole Chilean journalistic field. Investigative journalism 
has played a limited but important role in recent years, particularly after the turn 
of the century and with the exposure of a number of political scandals (Cordero & 
Marin 2006).  
Three lines of analysis stand out in the existing literature about prevailing 
journalistic cultures in Chile, which directly inform the relationship media 
professionals have established with political elites in recent years: a tendency to 
“officialism” in reporting, permeability to political and economic pressures and 
precarious labour conditions within the profession.  
The first line of analysis identifies some practices that are constitutive of a certain 
professional inertia that remains relatively unchanged and resilient to changes. 
This line of analysis does not look for answers outside journalism, but rather 
inwards in order to highlight the “officialist” nature of the trade, a situation that 
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has seen little if any variations over the years.  This thesis finds support in a study 
conducted by Faure et al. (2011), where randomly selected news articles are 
analysed in periods of ten years starting in 1971. The study highlights the high 
stability of professional practices in Chilean journalism over the last decades, 
despite deep political and social transformations experienced in the country 
throughout that period. In the different periods studied, the average of sources per 
news is slightly above one, and 80 per cent of the total sources are official. Thus, 
frequent complaints about the passivity of the transitional press (Sunkel & 
Geoffroy 2002; Leon-Dermota 2003; Otano & Sunkel 2003) can at least be partially 
explained by well-rooted practices of socialisation in newsrooms that have existed 
for generations, such as a high dependency on press conferences and other 
information subsidies, and relationships of cooperation within competitors news 
organisations, both leading towards uniformity of contents (Otano & Sunkel 
2003). Leon-Dermota (2003) emphasises that Chilean journalists do not see 
themselves as advocates of public interest, which explains a non-adversarial 
journalistic practice. Additionally, there is little sense of the profession as a 
collective. This would be expressed in the very low participation of journalists in 
professional organisations (Otano & Sunkel 2003; Mellado 2012).  
The second line of analysis points towards high political and economic pressures 
that would limit the autonomous practice of journalism. The Worlds of Journalism 
project, in which Chile was one of the surveyed countries, positioned Chilean 
journalists as those who perceived the highest economic pressures of the whole 
sample (Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011), above countries such as China and Russia. 
Political pressures also ranked highly, a finding that the authors explained by the 
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fact that in Chile “politics and the media are heavily intertwined” (Ibid: 418). 
Consistent with the previously discussed point, Chilean journalists ranked low for 
professional influences. According to these studies, pressures would be expressed 
through different routes, frequently through the commercial or managerial section 
of news organisations, as well as from politicians, authorities or other third parties 
(Otano & Sunkel 2003; Sapiezynska et al. 2013). Connecting this permeability to 
external influences, a common finding in recent studies is the naturalisation of 
such pressures. These are internalised as normal aspects of the work in news 
organisations and lead towards practices of self-censorship or self-regulation, a 
defensive reaction of journalists anticipating possible negative reactions 
(Gronemeyer 2002; Otano & Sunkel 2003; Lagos & Cabalin 2009; Faure et al. 
2011; Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011; Lagos & Cabalin 2013). This situation further 
contributes to a low professional consciousness about the risks of 
instrumentalization (Santander 2013). 
Finally, the third line of analysis highlights the precariousness of journalistic 
labour in Chile. Low salaries, low professional status and limited job 
opportunities24 contribute to an adverse scenario for the normative demands 
placed upon journalists from academic circles, as eloquently put by Lagos and 
Cabalin (2013): 
(…) the figure of the reporter linked to public affairs, to concerns about the 
processes of democratic construction and the development of a certain  
intellectuality, is overwhelmed by low salaries and precarious work 
conditions; the vertigo of scale news production in a framework of brutal 
competition for advertising and audiences, in addition to the gradual loss of 
prestige of the media in general, and the profession, in particular. (Ibid: 11)  
                                                          
24
 Journalism became a popular career choice around the turn of the century, which encouraged the 
increase of related degrees. According to Lagos and Cabalin (2013), they counted 30 Journalism 
Departments in Chile in 2011, and more than 40 programs of study for the training of future journalists.  
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A survey carried out among journalists working at the national level between 
2008-2009 shows that among journalists working full-time, 39 per cent received 
salaries ranging between US$1000 and US$2000 per month, with 31 per cent of 
journalists earning less than US$1000. In addition, 35 per cent supplemented their 
income with additional part time jobs in corporate communications or university 
education (Mellado 2012).  
The three lines of analysis outlined above are often found together. It is not 
difficult to see how they mutually reinforce each other, configuring a political, 
social and organisational environment, reinforced in well-rooted practices that 
had hindered rather than promoted the role expected from the field in the process 
of democratisation.  
2.5. Conclusions 
This background chapter has outlined the status of the political and media systems 
in Chile, paying particular attention to dimensions of the democratisation process 
that are relevant to understanding the local political culture.  
Central to this analysis is the recognition that the quality of the political and 
economic model built over the last two decades is currently being called into 
question. This questioning transcends the legal-procedural dimension, where it is 
certainly possible to evidence how authoritarian enclaves have been progressively 
removed in order to offer greater guarantees of representativeness to the 
population. Still, political elites who have guided the process and who still 
populate the public sector appear deeply questioned in their ability to mediate 
between the state and society at large. In addition, recent events lend support to 
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the idea that civil society has regained a vocation to impact political processes, 
mainly by challenging the elite and their arrangements.  
With regards to news media institutions, the diagnosis is similar. Important 
regulatory changes such as the Press Law of 2001 or the Transparency and 
Information Access Law of 2008 have created a regulatory framework that 
formally protects access and dissemination of public information. Nonetheless, 
these changes have not necessarily translated into a better assessment of the 
democratic performance of news organisations. This is initially explained because 
of structural conditions: a prominent commercial orientation and patterns of 
media ownership that have not favoured political diversity or pluralism. 
Additionally, while the journalistic field has experienced a process of 
professionalisation, at the same time it appears responsive to pressures and a 
professional group with feeble working conditions.     
The analysis of the transitional process evolves, therefore, to incorporate second-
generation problems of democracy, highlighting democratic deficits that pose new 
challenges. Crucial in this regard is recognizing that the configuration of the news 
media system, together with the ways in which political elites communicate with 
the public, is also one of these challenges, one that is usually overlooked.  
The relationship between politics and the media appears therefore as a 
relationship between two institutions under scrutiny, particularly in terms of their 
ability to represent the interest of the majority of Chileans. In this context, how 
can research better understand the process of adaptation of political elites to the 
centrality of mass media? In the next chapter, the theoretical foundations of the 
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mediatization theory will be discussed, in order to define an argument about the 
mediatization of political elites in Chile. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEDIATIZATION OF POLITICS:  
LOGICS OF ACTION, AUTONOMY AND CONTROL 
As already stated in the Introduction Chapter (sections 1.1 and 1.3), this thesis 
adopts an institutionalist understanding of mediatization. The institutionalist 
approach is a variant within a wider debate on the idea of mediatization, an 
emergent theory that conceptualises and studies the media as vectors of social 
change (Hjarvard 2008; Schrott 2009; Hepp et al. 2015). The institutionalist 
variant of mediatization pays particular attention to journalistic news media as 
institutions with more or less stable sets of rules, interacting with political 
institutions that operate according to different sets of rules.25 In this vein, this 
study focuses on how the mediatization of political elites has developed in Chile, 
understanding this process as the result of the interactions between actors 
inhabiting both institutional domains. This chapter develops a theoretical 
framework to understand this relationship. 
In order to advance the argument about the mediatization of political elites in 
Chile, the first section of the chapter (3.1) establishes the theoretical foundations 
of the mediatization of politics process, paying special attention to the process of 
emergence of the news media as a social institution (Thompson 1995; Hallin & 
Mancini 2004). Later, it argues that an institutionalist perspective appears well 
suited to the inspection of relationships between the news media and political 
                                                          
25
 Some of the main proponents identified within this tradition and regular contributors to current 
scholarship are Mazzoleni & Schulz (1999), Schulz (2004), Strömbäck (2008), Kunelius and Reunanen 
(2011), Hjarvard (2013), Esser (2014), Asp (2014).  
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actors, by paying attention to the institutional frameworks or logics of action that 
inform actors’ interactions (Friedland & Alford 1991; March & Olsen 2006), as 
well as bridging micro, meso and macro levels of analysis (Thornton et al. 2012; 
Hjarvard 2013). 
The second section of the chapter (3.2) discusses four key dimensions of the 
mediatization of politics debate: (1) institutional logics of action, (2) the concept of 
institutional autonomy, (3) institutional resources and (4) the adaptive responses 
of political actors and institutions. Out of this discussion, a working definition of 
mediatization of politics will be formulated as: 
 
 
 
Using this definition as a baseline, the third section (3.3) of the chapter will argue 
that there are elements lending support to the idea that the communication 
practices of Chilean political elites have become mediatized. Nonetheless, some 
under-explored areas will be identified, in particular those related to the adaptive 
practices of political elites, activated as a result of this process. This is the specific 
research gap this thesis will address. 
The main contention of the chapter is that the framework provided by 
mediatization theory is useful to understand recent changes in Chilean politics, 
and to analyse political elites’ relationships with the media as a subject that has 
been seriously under-explored.  
 
Mediatization of politics is the process activated within 
political institutions as a result of increasing institutional 
autonomy of the news media (1) and the necessity of 
mediated visibility (4), in which the actions and decisions of 
political actors, organisations and institutions are adjusted (3) 
to news media logics (2). 
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3.1 What is the mediatization of politics: theoretical foundations  
Mediatization has emerged as a theory about the transformative power of the 
media in different spheres of social life. As such, mediatization research is focused 
on the interrelation between changes in media and communication, on the one 
hand, and changes between and within societal fields, on the other hand (Hjarvard 
2008; Schrott 2009; Hepp et al. 2015). At a general level, mediatization is an 
integrative concept that offers a guiding analytical framework for looking into the 
relationship between media and social change (Couldry & Hepp 2013).  
The extensive theoretical debate about mediatization developed with particular 
intensity over the past decade has recognized at least three emergent approaches 
to understanding this societal process. They share some general assumptions 
about the way the media transform social interaction. However, they differ from 
each other in terms of how they understand ‘the media’, as well as in their reliance 
on distinct theoretical frameworks. These approaches are the culturalist 
perspective, the material perspective and the institutionalist perspective, the 
latter more commonly used within Political Communication and Journalism 
Studies (for a discussion of these approaches, see  Couldry & Hepp 2013; Lundby 
2014). This thesis adheres to an institutionalist understanding of mediatization 
theory, which sees the media as an institution that has acquired increasing 
centrality and autonomy in society, triggering changes in their interactions with 
other social institutions. Stig Hjarvard (2008, 2013) defines mediatization as 
follows:  
By the mediatization of culture and society we understand the process 
whereby culture and society to an increasing degree become dependent on 
the media and their logic. This process is characterised by a duality, in that 
the media have become integrated into the operations of other social 
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institutions and cultural spheres, while also acquiring the status of social 
institutions in their own right. (Hjarvard, 2013: 17) 
This emerging theoretical framework allows for an observation of what Schrott 
(2009) defines as “the mechanism of institutionalization of media logic in other 
societal subsystems” (Ibid: 42). A similar concern is expressed by Thompson 
(1995), when discussing the process of ‘mediaization’ as one concurrent with 
modernity and conducive to aesthetic, organisational and technological operating 
forms of the media to shape social interactions between institutions.  
When this framework is applied to the intersection of politics and the media, 
mediatization of politics refers to the process by which political actors and 
institutions become increasingly dependent on the media and their logic, a process 
based on dependence on communication resources that would bring about 
changes in the way politics is organised and conducted (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; 
Bennett & Entman 2001; Meyer 2002; Strömbäck 2008; Hjarvard 2013; Esser & 
Strömbäck 2014). 
The development of the debate about the mediatization of politics is relatively 
recent and often associated with the work of Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) and 
their thesis on mediatized politics as “politics that has lost its autonomy, has 
become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously 
shaped by interactions with mass media” (Ibid: 250). As such, the mediatization of 
politics should be clearly distinguished from the mediation of politics, the latter 
referring to the media as a nodal point, bridge or conduit between sources, events 
and audiences. Mediatization theory, instead, acknowledges that the media 
institution is not ineffectual but imposes rules of representation on politics and, in 
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doing so, produces some “spill-over effects on political processes, institutions, 
organizations and actors” (Esser & Strömbäck 2014: 6). 
It is important to recognize that core questions posed by the debate about the 
mediatization of politics stem from a longer tradition in Political Communication 
research that seeks to understand how political practices and processes are 
modified through interaction with communication processes. Already in 1965, 
Douglass Cater discussed what he understood as a shift in the way power is 
exercised within the U.S. Government as a consequence of the prominent role 
acquired by political reporters in Washington DC, a shift that went “to the very 
core of policy formulation” (Cater, 1965: 11), turning the news media into a de 
facto fourth branch of government. This offers an early example within a thread of 
Anglo-American research that explores the interactions between the media and 
political institutions, and the consequences of these interactions for the exercise of 
politics and the quality of democracy (cf. Seymour-Ure 1974; Altheide & Snow 
1979; Linsky 1986).  
In recent years, this debate has certainly expanded, as a result of what has been 
interpreted as the increasing centrality of media and communications within 
different aspects of politics. This new intensity of media presence in society 
(Hjarvard 2008) is expressed through metaphors about the displacement of 
politics towards the media domain (Blumler & Kavanagh 1999; Mazzoleni & 
Schulz 1999): the ‘submission’ (Hjarvard 2008), ‘infiltration’ (Entman 2008) or 
‘colonization’ of politics (Meyer 2002; Street 2005) by media rationalities. These 
assumptions have bred concerns and questions about the quality of public 
communication (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Bennett & 
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Entman 2001; Meyer 2002), as well as debates about whether these reactions 
among political institutions should be described with a vocabulary that denotes a 
certain degree of passivity on the part of actors and institutions that are usually 
motivated by particular interests, and are able to exert influence in news 
organisations (Deacon & Stanyer 2014; Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014). 
In colloquial use, the word ‘mediatization’ is often equated with what is staged (a 
media event) or spin-doctored in the interest of attaining publicity. In such a 
conceptualization, the word is used as a pejorative. However, there is agreement 
among scholars in stating that mediatization is a normatively neutral concept, and 
therefore any normative implications of the process of mediatization in politics 
should be contextually discussed with empirical antecedents (Hjarvard, 2008; 
Strömbäck, 2008; Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012). As with other complex societal 
processes, mediatization is multi-dimensional, and can be potentially observed 
across a range of practices; and it is multi-level, as consequences of mediatization 
might also be discussed and observed at a micro, meso or macro level (Schrott 
2009; Hjarvard 2013; Marcinkowski 2014). 
The mediatization debate has not been exempt from criticism, particularly on the 
basis of the media-centrism that suggests and the apparent all-encompassing 
nature of the concept (Deacon & Stanyer 2014). Recognizing that mediatization is 
a concept that may be used as an umbrella for a variety of observations, I agree 
with Hepp et al. (2015) in claiming that mediatization theory has proved fruitful 
for bridging disciplines, rearticulating important questions about the media and 
their transformative potential. For the study of mediatization of politics in 
particular, it is possible to observe how a coherent body of literature has emerged 
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to guide empirical enquiry that shares a common analytical perspective to analyse 
the interactions between political and media institutions (cf. Mazzoleni & Schulz 
1999; Schulz 2004; Strömbäck 2008; Esser & Strömbäck 2014).  
Reflections about how to improve and refine theoretical understandings and 
empirical enquiries guided by mediatization theory have come both from scholars 
who have been active contributors to the debate (Esser and Strömbäck 2014; 
Hepp at al. 2015), as well as from external voices. In this last group, Deacon & 
Stanyer (2014) stand out as the most vocal critics of mediatization research and 
have engaged in a dialogue with ‘mediatization converts’, expanding on some of 
the problems and challenges this concept may present. They develop three main 
areas of criticism that will be briefly addressed below and further expanded in this 
chapter: the extent to which the media are considered causal agents of socio-
political change, how that process of change is to be understood and what 
attributes are assigned to the concept of mediatization.  
Regarding the first point, Deacon & Stanyer (2014) question how causation and 
power are dealt with in mediatization research. In doing so, they criticise the 
media-centrism of mediatization theory and how the narrative about 
mediatization strongly suggests that media actors have gained power in relation 
to other social actors, in spite of this accrual of power not being fully 
acknowledged, defined or explained. Furthermore, they claim that by transferring 
innate power to the agents of mediatization, the field would tend to overlook that 
mediatization processes interact with other societal processes. I strongly agree 
with these concerns, which become all the more evident at the time of locating 
political actors as research subjects and acknowledging that most of their media-
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oriented actions are strategic in nature, as has been discussed elsewhere 
(Elmelund-Praestekaer at al. 2011; Stromback & Van Aelst 2013; Marcinkowski & 
Steiner, 2014).26 
Deacon & Stanyer’s (2014) second area of criticism relates to how the process of 
change associated with mediatization can be understood, considering that not all 
research conducted under this paradigm offers diachronic or comparative 
perspectives. As a result, they pose the question about where to locate the 
beginning of this process and how to offer a solid foundation or description of 
mediatization processes. This thesis is based on a synchronic study, and therefore 
does not seek to compare or measure mediatization levels over time as a primary 
objective. Having said that, mediatization is here understood as a process, 
although not necessarily a linear one. Instead, it is a process resulting from the 
interactions between media and political actors and strongly interwoven with a 
particular social and political context. Furthermore, the assumptions of linearity in 
mediatization processes will be discussed against the framework of differentiation 
theory in section 3.1.1.  
Finally, the third area of criticism raised by Deacon & Stanyer (2014) is that of 
how the concept of mediatization has been constructed and the risk of it becoming 
a pseudo-universal. For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of mediatization of 
politics is primarily understood as a guiding framework for an exploratory enquiry 
about the interactions between the institutions of media and politics in the Chilean 
context, where media refers to journalistic news media, and politics refers to 
traditional political actors, such as members of Parliament, Government and 
                                                          
26
 I will further discuss my position regarding how power relations are to be better understood in the 
relationship between media and political actors in section 3.2. 
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political parties. By locating this study within the mediatization framework, 
empirical enquiry is then directed towards an exploration of political actors 
interactions with the news media as well as those potential ’spill-over effects’ 
(Esser & Strömbäck 2014: 240) on political actors associated with the increasing 
autonomy of the news media institution.  
From a functionalist angle, the mediatization of politics is seen only as an 
analytical perspective made possible by the institutional differentiation of the 
media, and not a superordinate process of social change (Marcinkowski & Steiner 
2014), as catchphrases such as “media democracy” (Meyer 2002) or warnings 
about “the mediatization of everything” (Livingstone 2009)  would seem to imply. 
The interdependencies between media and politics are well established in the field 
of Political Communications (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Wolfsfeld 2003), 
therefore it is not realistic to understand the relationship between media and 
politics as unidirectional. Certainly, the mediatization of politics implies a 
direction of change (where media becomes a vector of change onto politics), and 
that is a chosen analytical perspective. That is the case, nonetheless, as a result of 
what is perceived both for the research community and political actors 
themselves27 as an expanding phenomenon, expressed in the institutionalisation 
of media logics within the whole spectrum of political institutions. An 
institutionalist lens allows research to answer questions about reactions to the 
media from within political institutions, included the relevance attributed to the 
news media by political actors, which in the Chilean case is on the rise (PNUD 
2004, 2015). 
                                                          
27
 Some studies that emphasize the high responsiveness of political elites to the media across different 
societies are Davis 2003; Davis 2007; Walgrave 2008; Van Aelst & Walgrave 2011; Reunanen et al. 2010; 
Kepplinger 2007. 
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Before moving towards an operationalisation of the concept, some of the more 
influential traditions that have informed the institutionalist variant of 
mediatization will first be discussed, in order to theoretically ground the chapter’s 
main argument.  
3.1.1 Differentiation theory and the mediatization of politics 
The process of mediatization of politics is often introduced and explained within a 
narrative of modernisation. That is to say, both the increasing importance of the 
mass media and the consequent reactions in the political system are explained 
against a historical framework strongly influenced by differentiation theory 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008; Schrott 2009; Hjarvard 2013). 
Differentiation theory emerges from the work of sociologist Emile Durkheim 
(1893), who identifies the increasing specialisation of human activity as a major 
social trend in The Division of Labour in Society. This work analyses emerging 
changes in social organisation resulting from the fragmentation of human labour 
into a “host of special disciplines, each having its purpose, method and ethos” 
(Ibid: 2). These ideas served to articulate a narrative of modernity as a process of 
increasing social fragmentation of labour.  
Hallin and Mancini (2004) produced one of the more frequently referenced 
discussions of contemporary media systems against the framework of 
differentiation theory. They develop a compelling argument for the use of this 
approach to better understand recent changes within the media, especially the 
separation between mass media and party politics observed in most European 
countries in the second half of the twentieth century, and the differentiation in this 
case is primarily explained as the result of processes of professionalisation and 
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commercialisation that have driven changes within media systems since. This 
narrative is also an integral component of the social theory of the media developed 
by Thompson (1995), who describes the media as a constitutive part of modernity 
and whose institutional differentiation has triggered profound changes in patterns 
of communication and social interaction, a process he labels the “mediaization of 
culture” (Ibid: 46).  
It is important to note that differentiation theory relies on two central 
assumptions that are integral to institutionalist descriptions of mediatized politics. 
First, the differentiation of the mass media implies an important degree of 
institutional (or system) autonomy. Second, in close connection to the foregoing, 
the mass media system is able to develop (and export) an operational logic of its 
own to other societal systems.  Both media autonomy and media logic will be 
discussed in greater detail later in the chapter, however it is important to briefly 
unpack these concepts now.  
Thinking about the media through the prism of differentiation theory implies 
imagining the media as a social subsystem that is functionally independent from 
its environment. That is to say, following Luhmann (2000), as a system that is in 
charge of defining its structure, organisation and own operational standards. The 
history of the news media in Western democracies during the 20th century 
involves a process of differentiation, especially from political parties and other 
influential groups, a process that is concurrent with the development of 
commercial media markets and the professionalisation of journalism (Thompson 
1995; Hallin & Mancini 2004; Hallin 2005) and political communication (Negrine 
1996; 2008). Professionalisation becomes a key driver of the process of 
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differentiation, a process that is certainly not unique to the news media but 
common to other societal domains at the time (Dimaggio & Powell 1983). As a 
result of this historical development, claims for the autonomy of the media are 
usually grounded precisely on the expansion of commercial media together with 
the spread of professional standards in the exercise of journalism (Mazzoleni & 
Schulz 1999; Hallin 2005). 
This narrative about the modernisation of media and communications underlies 
the more important descriptions of mediatized politics. In a nutshell, the 
observations that lend support to the argument about the mediatization of politics 
are grounded in the historical differentiation of the mass media as social 
institutions, together with their increasing centrality. The main contention of the 
theory is that this ongoing and intensified societal process would activate visible 
transformations in the institutional domain of politics, whose actors have to 
accommodate media languages and formats in order to improve chances of 
visibility in a mediatized democracy. 
Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) emphasise that this dependence on media resources 
is “connatural to modern politics”, and situate the beginning of the process during 
the first age of political communication systems, a phase that Blumler and 
Kavanagh (1999) locate after World War II, when political communication appears 
strongly aligned and subordinated to political institutions. Gradually, this status 
quo would shift in favour of the media institutions, as long as they gained 
increasing autonomy in establishing the terms of what is communicated and how.  
Likewise, the four-stage model of mediatized politics developed by Strömbäck 
(2008) follows a rather historical rationale: the first phase of mediatized politics 
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would be reached when politics becomes mediated, that is to say when the media 
becomes the main channel of communication for the dissemination of political 
information, “a pre-requisite for the successive stages of mediatization” (Ibid: 
236). The second stage in Strömbäck’s model corresponds to a movement of the 
media towards greater independence from political power, a process driven by 
commercialisation and professionalisation that culminates when the media begins 
“to be governed according to the media logic, rather than according to any political 
logic” (Ibid: 237). Finally, the third and fourth phases of the model would be stages 
of greater media autonomy from political institutions. During these, political 
actors and institutions have to incorporate media requirements, such as formats, 
languages and news selection criteria, for their communicational activities, until 
they eventually lose control over media contents (third stage), and the media logic 
become “a built-in part of the governing processes” (Ibid: 240), naturalised by 
political actors (fourth stage). As Strömbäck himself warns, the four-stage model 
he proposes is based on the development of Western democracies from the period 
starting after World War II and, although each of the model stages are not 
identified with specific time periods, it is possible to observe a clear time 
progression both in the narrative constructed to describe the process, as well as in 
the references supporting the description of each phase.   
This model has been quite influential in the literature about mediatization of 
politics since its publication but has not been free from criticism, especially on the 
grounds of the implicit linearity that it entails (Lundby 2009; Hepp 2012; Hjarvard 
2013). I argue that the linearity of this idea is actually problematic on two 
premises. The first one, fairly simple but not unimportant, refers to the 
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complications of an analytical model that is historically and geographically 
grounded. It is certainly possible to use a historical perspective to research and 
describe mediatization processes.28 However, an analytical framework based on a 
specific set of historical developments is also of limited transferability to other 
geographical or cultural contexts.29 The second problem is the implicit assumption 
about the ever progressing direction of mediatization, which becomes a 
modernising force of sorts. In their work on comparative media systems, Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) discuss at certain length the risks of understanding the 
relationship between media and political systems from an evolutionary 
perspective; that is to say, as a normative preference towards ever greater 
differentiation of the media from politics. They emphasise the complexity of these 
relationships and the existence of elements that may eventually counterbalance or 
constrain the development of this process, such as variations among political 
systems, national legal frameworks or contingent political trends. These concerns 
have been echoed in the debate on the mediatization of politics, where arguments 
have been made for avoiding conceptualisations that see mediatization as an 
advancing universal force (Hepp 2012; Lundby 2009). Commenting on the 
limitations of the model proposed by Strömbäck, Hjarvard (2013) stresses that 
“empirical analyses of changing relationships between media and politics not only 
have to consider variations in a general pattern of mediatization, but the process 
                                                          
28
 One example of historical analysis about mediatization of politics can be found in the works of Wifjes 
and Voerman (2009). In a recent defence about the development of mediatization studies, Hepp et al 
(2015) welcome the emergent field of mediatization history, in particular of those analyses that 
incorporate historical perspectives on the introduction of new technologies and the transformation of 
social interactions.   
29
 Few empirical works exist applying the framework of mediatization to non-Western contexts. To the 
analysis of mediatization processes in India, Downey & Neyazi (2014) develop an alternative framework 
focused on actors (political actors, media actors and mediatized publics). To discuss the mediatization 
of politics in Venezuela, Block (2013) develops a culturalist approach, based on the concept of media 
hegemony.  
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of mediatization of politics itself may be dependent on systemic characteristics in 
a particular context” (Ibid: 45).  
It is fair to say that the emerging mediatization of politics theory has attempted to 
incorporate some of this criticism, highlighting the fluidity of the process and 
nuancing early ideas, to reinforce the concept of complementarity among different 
dimensions (Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011; Esser & Strömbäck 2014). 
3.1.2. New institutionalism and the mediatization of politics  
As already outlined, the institutionalist variant of mediatization of politics is 
grounded in the understanding of the media as an autonomous social institution, 
which shows important degrees of inter-organisational homogeneity due to the 
spread of common patterns of formal and informal rules that guide actors’ 
behaviour (Sparrow 1999; Schudson 2002; Cook 2005; Benson 2006).  
Developed as a theoretical framework to understand and explain institutional 
change (March & Olsen 1989), an institutionalist approach locates the analysis of 
the mediatization process at the meso-level. Institutions mediate the impact of 
macro level forces on micro-level action, bridging between individuals, 
organisations and society (Friedland & Alford 1991; Ryfe 2006). An institutionalist 
analysis allows for the location of empirical enquiry on mediatization research 
within the boundaries of specific institutional domains. Going down the ladder of 
abstraction that often characterises the debate on mediatization, the new 
institutionalism offers a locus to understand how institutions change and react to 
the environment by paying attention to practices, and how identities and interests 
are institutionally shaped (Friedland & Alford 1991; March & Olsen 2006).  
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Thinking about the mediatization of politics as a process of institutional change, 
therefore, implies thinking about how two different institutions – politics and the 
media – interact and mutually influence each other. March and Olsen (2009) 
identify the clash between divergent institutional norms as a catalyst of change 
dynamics, that can be understood “in terms of the organization, interaction, and 
collision among competing institutional structures, norms, rules, identities and 
practices” (Ibid:14). The tension between competing institutional logics has 
indeed been central in the development of an extensive research programme in 
the field of the sociology of organisations, which pays special attention to shifts in 
dominant institutional logics as well as complex institutional environments in 
which a plurality of logics coexist (Thornton et al. 2005; Reay & Hinings 2009; 
Lounsbury & Boxenbaum 2013). 
Before discussing how the new institutionalism informs mediatization research, it 
is important to look at how institutions are defined and understood within this 
tradition. An institution “is a web of interrelated norms – formal and informal – 
governing social relationships” (Nee & Ingram 1998), therefore producing and 
monitoring what is consensually considered expected behaviour within certain 
domains.  These usually unstated rules are resilient to change, and therefore 
constrain as well as enable social action. For March & Olsen (2006): 
An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organised 
practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are 
relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively 
resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and 
changing external circumstances (Ibid:3) 
Different definitions agree on the existence of rules, both formal (explicit and 
enforced by sanction) and informal (implicit and based on convention) as 
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constitutive elements of institutions. These rules – or logics of appropriateness – 
are seen to guide behaviour by orientating and legitimising action, transferring 
structure to daily life (March & Olsen 1989; March & Olsen 2006).  
The work of Timothy Cook (2005) offers one of the most compelling arguments 
for thinking of the media as an institution. He explores the premises identified by 
the new institutionalism as constitutive elements of institutions, in order to argue 
that the news media qualify as an institution based on the extended prevalence of 
homogenous news production routines, unspoken and implicit procedures widely 
shared across news organisations: 
This transorganizational agreement on news processes and content suggests 
that we should think of the news media not as a set of diverse organizations, 
or even a batch of individual institutions, but collectively as a single social 
institution. (Cook 2005: 64)  
Cook’s argument is, therefore, mostly based on a sociological understanding of 
institutions, in which actors’ behaviour is explained by identity-based rationales, 
in this case professional rationales that underlie the inner workings of different 
news organisations.  This vision of the news media institution certainly competes 
with alternative understandings of the media as mostly infused by commercially-
based rationales (Sparrow 1999; Bourdieu 2005). These different understandings 
of the news media resonate with longstanding tensions within neo-institutionalist 
scholarship between a normative, identity-based approach to explaining action 
within institutions and a rational market-based approach (for a discussion see 
Ryfe 2006; Landerer 2013; Asp 2014). The former approach is represented by 
March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness, which developed a framework for the 
understanding of human action with clear normative undertones. The latter 
approach, in contrast, is illustrated by authors such as Nee and Ingram (1988) 
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whose work aims to understand how institutions shape the parameters of choice 
and economic action. It can be argued that these alternative analytical 
perspectives are complementary, not only because arguably different logics 
inform and guide action in different circumstances (March & Olsen 2009), but also 
because news organisations are both market and non-market organisations (Asp 
2014) that are guided by profit and audience maximisation, as well as informed by 
an orientation to the public interest.  
Within the debate on the mediatization of politics, far less effort has been applied 
to defining the borders of the political institution, than those of the media 
institution. This is partly justified because the study of political institutions 
(generally in the plural) has a long and established scholarly tradition within 
Political Science.30 Conversely, the institutional differentiation of the media is a 
relatively new process, and the product of an increasing awareness that the media 
have become an autonomous force and, some contend, a constitutive part of 
politics (Schudson 2002; Cook 2005). 
The main contention of the mediatization of politics theory is that there has been a 
shift in the balance of these mutual influences (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999). As many 
authors have argued, the state strongly shapes the media institution by means of 
subsidies, regulation and, probably more important, frequent and institutionalised 
exchanges between media professionals and official sources (Blumler & Gurevitch 
1995; Cook 2005; Wahl-Jorgensen 2014). However, the differentiation of the 
media becomes associated with a more autonomous control of the main resource 
                                                          
30
 Contemporary political institutions are parliaments, government cabinets, judiciaries, bureaucracy or 
political parties. For an overview of how theories for the study of political institutions have evolved 
together with political institutions, see Von Beyme (2006). 
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controlled by the media institution, that of society’s collective attention (Hjarvard 
2013; Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014).  
Ultimately, the process of mediatization of politics reflects the struggle of political 
actors to attain such collective attention, a struggle especially important when 
high levels of alienation from political institutions appear to be the norm across 
Western democracies.31 As expressed by Hjarvard (2014) mediatization is a 
process “spurred by both the development of the media and the dynamics of a 
variety of other institutions in which social agents try to make use of the media’s 
resources for their own purposes” (Ibid: 223).  
3.2. Main dimensions of mediatized politics: towards a working 
definition   
This section of the chapter explores the main dimensions of the mediatization of 
politics. A survey of different definitions of the concept in the literature allows for 
the identification of four constitutive dimensions of the process. These are (a) the 
idea of media logic (b) the notion of media autonomy, (c) the discussion about the 
resources controlled by the media and (d) the adaptive responses of political 
actors. Some of these have received more attention than others, but certainly none 
have been univocally approached.   
                                                          
31
 Certainly statistics of approval towards institutions vary across countries and are responsive to 
context. However, there is strong evidence to suggest a general trend of alienation from political 
institutions. According to Gallup, in February 2015, 75 per cent of the U.S. population disapproved of 
the way Congress was handling its job and only 20 per cent approved. According to Eurobarometer, in 
August 2014, European national governments would be trusted by an average of 29 per cent of each 
nation’s population, and national Parliaments by an average of 30 per cent. According to 
Latinbarometro, the approval rating for presidents across Latin America has decreased. The average 
regional approval for the Presidency in 2013 was 49 per cent, following a 4 year decrease. Chile is 
located at the bottom of the list, with 29 per cent approval.  
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As an illustration, and in order to offer a visual overview of the way in which this 
discussion has been conducted, the table below collects some of the more 
commonly referenced authors participating in the mediatization of politics debate 
and the way they approach the four identified dimensions: 
 
Dimensions of mediatized politics 
 
(a) Media logic  
 
- As a framework to present and interpret social affairs (Altheide & Snow 1979) 
- As the modus operandi of the media (Thompson 1995; Hjarvard 2008) 
- As informed by news values and professional standards (Strömbäck 2008; Asp 
2014) 
- As rules of the game, guiding behaviour, driver of structuration ( Schrott 2009; 
Asp 2014; Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014) 
- As the prominence of market-oriented logic (Landerer 2013) 
- As composed by professional, commercial and technological dimensions (Esser 
& Strömbäck 2014a; Esser 2013)  
 
(b) Media autonomy 
 
- What grants to media the status of social institution (Hjarvard, 2008) 
- Semi-independence from politics (Strömbäck, 2008)  
- The outcome of functional differentiation of the media (Marcinkowski & Steiner 
2014) 
 
(c) Media’s resources 
 
- Public attention as main resource controlled by the media (Kunelius and 
Reunanen, 2012, Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014) 
- Social agents try to make use of the media’s resources for their own purposes 
(Hjarvard, 2014)  
 
(d) Reactions in politics/ political actors 
 
- Politics has lost autonomy (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Schulz 2004), and has 
become increasingly dependent on communication resources (Hjarvard 2013) 
- Political actors and institutions adapt to the media logic (Mazzoleni & Schulz 
1999; Meyen et al. 2014, Strömbäck, 2008). The media logic is institutionalized 
in politics (Schrott, 2009) 
- Media trigger increasing spill-over effects on political processes, institutions, 
organisations and actors (Esser & Strömbäck 2014a) 
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In the following sections, these dimensions will be discussed through 
consideration of the aforementioned literature and additional literature on new 
institutionalism, in order to develop a working definition that will guide empirical 
research on the mediatization of Chilean political elites.  
3.2.1. On the logics of action and news making   
The concept of media logic is core to discussions of the mediatization of politics, 
and is arguably used with great flexibility across media-related studies. The 
convergence between media and politics has been often explained in terms of a 
power confrontation between both spheres, and typically expressed in the idea 
that the media logic has overpowered the political logic in political institutions 
and organisations as a result of mediatization processes. While media logic has 
also been a contested term32, it acquires greater strength and theoretical 
coherence within a new institutionalist framework. In this tradition, the logics of 
action are integral to descriptions of institutionalisation. They are 
“representations or constraints that influence action in a given domain” (Dimaggio 
& Powell 1983: 277); “material practices and symbolic constructions”, “organising 
principles” or bases for action, “available to organizations and individuals to 
elaborate” (Friedland & Alford 1991: 248-249). 
The term ‘media logic’ was first introduced by Altheide and Snow (1979), and later 
elaborated under the influence of an institutionalist framework, through which 
mediatization is understood as a process within late modern societies (Thompson 
                                                          
32
 The concept ‘media logic’ has been criticized for its generalising nature, on the grounds that 
presenting a single media logic as inherent to the process of mediatization is a claim of dubious 
usefulness, that hides or blurs the range of differentiated effects associated to mediatization (see 
Couldry 2008; Hepp 2012; Lundby 2009). I would argue that this disagreement stems from a different 
understanding of ‘the media’ to be studied in different traditions of mediatization research. The idea of 
institutional media logics might be at odds with technology-driven or culturalist approaches to 
mediatization research.   
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1995; Hjarvard 2008). Different authors have used variations of the term, 
preferring ‘media logic’ (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Hjarvard 2008; Schrott 2009; 
Korthagen & Klijn 2012), ‘news media logic’ (Strömbäck & Esser 2009; Asp 2014), 
‘mass media logic’ (Meyen et al. 2014) or ‘news logic’ (Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014). 
These differences are not entirely arbitrary. Instead, they can be read as attempts 
to better delineate or narrow down the spectrum of properties attached to the 
concept.  
Hjarvard (2008) contends that “the logic of the media refers to the institutional 
and technological modus operandi of the media, including the ways in which 
media distribute material and symbolic resources and make use of formal and 
informal rules” (Ibid:105). The logic of the media in this definition derives directly 
from the elements that define social institutions, such as material and symbolic 
resources, as well as explicit and implicit rules guiding individual and 
organisational action (Dimaggio & Powell 1983; March & Olsen 1989; Friedland & 
Alford 1991). In this sense, the logic of the media corresponds to the organising 
principles that guide action within the media as an institution. Nomenclatures 
such as news media logic and mass media logic basically emphasise the fact that 
“the media”, in this understanding, are “socio-technological organizations and 
institutions” (Esser & Strömbäck 2014) that present important degrees of 
homogeneity in their goals, routines and institutional arrangements (Cook 2005).  
Operationalizing the logic of the media has, nonetheless, proved a far more 
challenging task. Most accounts collapse multiple dimensions into the notion of 
media logic.  Meyer (2002) refers to media routines (what is news and how is 
presented), media economics and a distinct notion of time as the key guiding 
93 
 
principles dominating news media organisations. Esser (2013) and later Esser and 
Strömbäck (2014) link media logic to the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 
2006), or rules that organise the media institutional sphere, and contend that this 
is a construct formed by professional (journalistic criteria), commercial 
(economically motivated rationales) and technological (medium-specific 
conditions) elements shaping news production. Asp (2014) focuses on 
professional norms and standards in which both market and non-market 
considerations have to be incorporated by those who operate within the media 
institution. Landerer (2013) takes a greater diversion to reconceptualise 
mediatization as the dominance of market-oriented logics in both the media and 
politics.  
I argue that both the news media and political institutions are pluralistic 
institutional environments. That is to say, hybrid institutions in which multiple 
internal logics have to be balanced on a daily basis. The tensions between 
professional and market considerations have been widely acknowledged in 
journalism studies. As previously discussed, both commercialisation and 
professionalisation are key drivers for the emergence of the media as a modern 
institution, and several authors acknowledge that commercial influences often 
dominate the operations of modern media (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Hallin 2005; 
Strömbäck 2008; McManus 2009; Landerer 2013), which has resulted in the 
erosion of professional journalistic logics (Franklin 2005; Hallin 2005; Davies 
2008). This tension is also the basis for the bleak evaluation made by Bourdieu 
(2005) on the state of the journalistic field, which he regards as highly 
heteronomous, that is to say pretty much permeable to political and economic 
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pressures. He contends that, as a result of this situation a certain journalism 
“increasingly dominated by commercial values, is expanding its domination over 
other fields” (Bourdieu 2005: 33). 
This macro-level analysis of the commercialisation of the media is not at odds with 
the conceptualisation of the news media as a distinct social institution which, as 
Bourdieu (2005) contends, cannot be explained only by exogenous factors, and 
whose spaces of autonomy are often built against commercial logics. 
It proves to be useful, in this regard, to look at the development of institutional 
theory beyond media studies, where empirical research at the meso and micro-
level of interactions has been conducted to inquire how organisations and 
individuals accommodate and select competing institutional logics in hybrid 
environments (Pache & Santos 2012), or how professional logics are balanced 
against market logics in a variety of industries (Thornton 2002; Thornton et al. 
2005). On the one hand, these studies show that institutional logics shift over time. 
On the other hand, they establish how complex modern institutions operate under 
multiple, sometimes contradictory, internal logics.  
News media logic will be understood here as a theoretical construct that 
encompasses professional, commercial and technological considerations shaping 
news production within modern media. Defining news media logic as a theoretical 
construct has the objective of acknowledging the hybridity and complexity of an 
institutional logic built upon a variety of inputs. This definition is grounded in an 
institutional logics perspective, which recognises variation in the salience of the 
different components of institutional logics (Lounsbury & Boxenbaum 2013; 
Thornton et al. 2005). Being a hybrid logic encompassing professional, commercial 
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and technological considerations, the news media logic is certainly not monolithic, 
but open to variations between media organizations, as well as over time. For 
example, between media organizations that operate with a public remit versus 
commercially-oriented news organizations; or within media organizations 
operating on different technological platforms. From the perspective of a study 
that locates political actors as its main research subjects, what becomes more 
important is understanding how actors understand and interact with this external 
logic, rather than measuring their ‘levels’ of media logic, which would become a 
problematic endeavour.  In this respect, it is useful to look at how the media logic 
has been operationalized and/or measured in previous research, especially how 
any measurement attempt necessarily implies a simplification and fragmentation 
of the concept of media logic outlined above. On the one hand, most studies aimed 
at observing media logic in media contents, often resort to an additional 
conceptual tool, that of media interventionism (Strömbäck & Esser 2009), and 
hence pay attention to the ability of journalists to distance themselves from 
politicians and embracing interpretive styles of reporting (Strömbäck & Dimitrova 
2011; Cushion & Thomas 2013; Mellado & Rafter 2014; Negrine & Bull 2014). On 
the other hand, those studies aimed at observing how political actors relate to the 
news media logic generally do not attempt to measure levels of media logic but to 
understand political actors’ perceptions (Strömbäck 2011; Elmelund-Praestekaer 
et al. 2011) or uses (Kunelius & Reunanen 2011) of the media. Those who have 
presented quantifications of the media logic in studies focused on actors have 
done so by reducing the media logic to some of its components or assumed 
consequences, such as political actors’ audience-oriented practices (Landerer 
2014) or the negative coverage of policy issues (Korthagen & Klijn 2012). 
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As it can be noted, the definition of news media logic guiding this study recognises 
news making as the embodiment of the news media logic from the perspective of 
daily practice; the “organizing principle” (Friedland & Alford 1991) of the media 
institution. In this regard, it follows Thorbjornsrud et al. (2014), who favour the 
term ‘news logic’ in their study about the mediatization of bureaucracies, 
highlighting that “the rules of the news can be regarded as being premised on 
what new institutionalism labels a logic of appropriateness: they tend to be 
regarded as self-evident, given, natural and therefore not the object of 
deliberation” (Ibid: 7). New institutionalism elaborates rule-following as the basic 
logic of action within institutions. For March and Olsen (2006), these rules are 
“prescriptions based on a logic of appropriateness and a sense of rights and 
obligations derived from an identity” (Ibid: 7) to a community, which shows a 
distinctive ethos, practices, and expectations. News production is also based on 
mostly implicit rule-following; unspoken procedures, routines, assumptions and 
values “that are rarely explicit and must be found between the lines – in what 
actors and activities are reported or ignored, and in how they are described (Gans 
1979: 39-40). These daily routines, selection criteria and decisions about 
newsworthiness “are embodied and inseparable from the daily work routines, 
which are understood to be the ‘natural’ way to gather news” (Cook 2005: 76). 
Thinking about news making as the embodiment of such a news media logic does 
not imply a focus on text or format. It is a way of making this logic observable in 
concrete interactions between political institutions, organisations and individuals. 
The main driver of mediatization within the institutionalist framework is “the 
tension or interaction between the expanding media and other institutions with 
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their different logics” (Lundby 2014: 10). As a result, empirical enquiry demands 
the identification of the logics of action that organise interactions in the political 
domain, which is the focus of the next subsection. 
3.2.1.1. On the logics of action and political decision making  
Applying the same analytical framework to study the political institution (in the 
singular) is not completely unproblematic. Political institutions (in the plural) are 
often the object of detailed study, which explores the distinction of a variety of 
institutional settings ranging from political parties to legislatures, governments to 
bureaucracies, and constitutions to judiciaries (see Rhodes et al. 2006).   
The object of this work is the study of the mediatization of Chilean political elites, 
which can be characterized as a group of individuals holding positions in a variety 
of political institutions –national government, Congress and political parties 
(hereafter referred to as ‘party politics’). As such, political elites are members of 
organised groups with a vocation of political power that have led some of the main 
political institutions in the country. As discussed in the previous chapter, Chilean 
political elites show a relatively homogenous social composition (Joignant 2009; 
Espinoza 2010; Cordero & Funk 2011) and have dominated public positions under 
two stable political coalitions since the recovery of democracy. Grouped together, 
party politics is a pluralist institutional environment, informed by and accustomed 
to regular conflict among a variety of internal and external institutional logics.33 
                                                          
33 In the Chilean case, one of the more salient tensions within the political elite in the post-authoritarian 
period has been that between the so-called professional politicians and those politicians with strong 
technical backgrounds, generally economics. This tension elevated the importance of the “technopols”, 
a group that held key positions and acted as brokers between these different factions (Joignant 2009; 
Delamaza 2013). 
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Indeed, it is an institution whose mission is to manage and search for solutions to 
such conflicts, through deliberation and binding decision-making.  
Following Meyer (2002), Esser (2013) identifies three main dimensions of 
political logic: policy, politics and polity aspects. The first one is described as the 
production side of politics and the search for long-term solutions to politically-
defined problems. The second one is characterised as a power-oriented facet, 
concerned with self-presentation and the constant effort to gain acceptance. The 
third one relates to the institutional framework of a given political system, which 
limits the actions of actors (Meyer 2002; Esser 2013). 
Similarly to the abstraction of news media logic, it is possible to appreciate that 
political logic is also a hybrid that collapses into one concept a variety of 
dimensions that might be more or less salient in specific institutional settings, 
political organisations or periods of time (for example,. elections vs. non-electoral 
times). Therefore, political logic is an abstract construct that encompasses 
political, policy and polity considerations shaping political decision making 
processes in modern democracies.  
In early conceptualizations of the mediatization of politics, the clash between 
media and political logics has often been portrayed as a matter of either/or, where 
one logic advances to the detriment of the other (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; 
Strömbäck 2008; Schrott 2009).  Certainly, there are important tensions between 
media and political rationalities due to differences of timing and priorities; a 24/7 
news cycle and constant media scrutiny appears clearly discordant with years-
long policy cycles and episodic, fragmented and archetypical media coverage 
clashes with lengthy, sometimes erratic and demanding bargaining processes in 
99 
 
multi-actor settings (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Meyer 2002; Cook 2005; 
Strömbäck 2008). 
Acknowledging these tensions, the underlying assumption that the mediatization 
of politics is a zero-sum game when more media logic implies less political logic 
has received wide criticism (Hepp 2012; Thesen 2013; Downey & Neyazi 2014; 
Marcinkowski 2014; Hepp et al. 2015). I argue that this criticism is justified by the 
very nature of the political logic, which includes a power-oriented facet 
demanding persuasion and visibility. This per se political facet of politics is not 
separate from but integral to policy-making and the polity within which it 
operates. In other words, political actors’ ability to influence policymaking is 
dependent upon their ability to attain visibility, mobilise support and remain in 
power (Stone 2012). Acknowledging the agency of political actors and the 
interests they carry into their relationship with the media implies recognizing an 
important performative dimension of politics that cannot be regarded as a media 
effect. Instead, it is a dimension of politics that often finds great synergy with the 
news media logic, and anticipates a tendency towards the institutional coupling of 
media and politics34, the implications of which require further empirical study. 
In this regard, research traditions such as agenda-setting35 tend to conceptualise 
political actors as much more active and strategic in their relationship to the 
                                                          
34
 Luhman refers to the “structural coupling” between media and the political system, a macro level 
interdependency that reflects a constant loop of discomfort. Politics benefits from media publicity but 
is, at the same time, “irritated” by the media. In this understanding, “the same communications have at 
once a political and a mass media relevance” (Luhmann 2000: 67). 
35
 The portion of agenda-setting research that is most relevant for this study is that of agenda-building, 
which pays attention to the process of message construction (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007) by 
examining the influence of political sources in the making of news agendas (Tedesco 2011; Cobb & 
Elder 1971). The most common agenda-setting function of the mass-media, though, is an area of 
enquiry initiated after the publication of McCombs & Shaw (1972) which refers to the transfer of 
salience between the agenda of the media and that of public opinion. McCombs (2014) himself seldom 
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media than mediatization research suggests (Thesen 2013; Van Aelst et al. 2014), 
especially during processes of agenda-building, where attention is paid to the role 
played by political sources, comprising individual actors and organised groups, in 
the shaping of the media agenda (Cobb & Elder 1971). In this situation the media 
are often seen as a resource used by these actors and one of the main targets of 
political PR (Tedesco 2011; Knotts Martinelli 2011). 
3.2.2. The issue of media autonomy  
Mentions of increasing autonomy for the news media institution, and decreasing 
autonomy for political institutions, as a result of mediatization processes are a 
second major theme in the literature (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Schrott 2009; 
Strömbäck 2011b). The aim of this section is to revisit the grounds on which these 
claims are made, arguing that an unacknowledged tension regarding the meaning 
of the news media’s institutional autonomy has transformed this issue into a 
matter of contention.  
From a functional perspective, the autonomy of the media relates to the ability of 
the media to differentiate themselves from other systems in its environment and 
emerge as an independent, and therefore observable, system. This argument is 
supported by systems theory, in which the autonomy of a given system does not 
imply self-sufficiency (systems are not separate from the environment) but rather 
“self-reproduction, self-organization, structural determination and, along with all 
these, operational closure” (Luhmann 2000: 23). According to this argument, the 
media are functionally different –and therefore autonomous – since the media 
 
uses the term agenda-building, but nevertheless discusses the role of news sources as one intervenient 
element in the construction of news, to which he adds the agendas of other media outlets and 
journalistic news values (Ibid: 113).  
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perform some social functions that are unique to the system and different to the 
functions performed by other systems (Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014). For 
Luhmann (2000), the general role of the mass media system is the construction of 
social reality.36 Systems theory stresses the interdependency of different societal 
systems. And therefore, autonomy becomes functional, and depends on the ability 
of the system to reproduce over time, maintaining its symbolic borders:  
The impossibility of external control and influence does not mean that 
societal systems are isolated from each other or self- sufficient. A (social) 
system is not called autonomous if or because it is entirely independent from 
its environment; rather is it autonomous if it is able to select certain areas in 
its environment from which it gets certain impacts and at the same time is 
able to shield from influences of other environmental areas. (Görke & Scholl: 
2006, 647) 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the institutionalist stance on mediatization 
also derives from differentiation theory, therefore the greater independency or 
autonomy of the media (both terms are used interchangeably by scholars) is the 
result of processes of modernisation (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Hjarvard 2008; 
Strömbäck 2008) and of institutionalisation. The media “becomes a social 
institution in their own right” (Hjarvard 2008: 113), an institution invested with 
autonomy by means of defining formal and informal rules (such as media 
regulations and routines of news production), managing material and symbolic 
resources (such as advertising and steering of society’s collective attention) and 
presenting important degrees of homogeneity in their practices and operational 
criteria (Dimaggio & Powell 1983; Benson 2006; Hjarvard 2013). 
                                                          
36
 In “The reality of the mass media”, Luhmann (2000) distinguishes between three components of the 
media system: news and in-depth reporting, advertising and entertainment. He contends that the code 
–or unity of difference- of the system as a whole is information/ non-information. News/non-news is 
the selection criterion of the first of these components.   
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Historical analyses show that the media’s institutional autonomy has been driven 
by parallel processes of professionalisation and commercialisation (Thompson 
1995; Hallin & Mancini 2004). These processes allow the emergence of the media 
institution as autonomous, but do not insulate the media from external pressures, 
particularly politics and the market. In this respect, the work of Bourdieu has been 
key to avoiding an evolutionary understanding of institutions, since it visualizes 
field autonomy as a permanent struggle, where change is not unidirectional 
(Champagne 2005; Bourdieu 2005). Taking this into consideration, media 
autonomy will be understood here as a constant struggle rather than a fully 
achieved pre-condition of institutional existence. References to the semi-
autonomous media field (Benson 2006) or the semi-independent media institution 
(Strömbäck 2008; Hjarvard 2013) reflect this paradox. As stressed by Strömbäck 
(2008) the semi-autonomy assumption translates, in practice, into the ability of 
the press to self-define parameters of political content and especially to offer some 
resistance against political influence in the news.  
This paradox is certainly not unique to media sociology. In democratic theory, 
autonomy is defined as “to be not under the control of another” (Dahl 1982: 16), 
and therefore opposed to or complemented by control. Dahl prefers to speak 
about “relative autonomy”, under the premise that an institution can neither 
control everything nor lose control of everything. 
An organization is relatively autonomous if it undertakes actions that (a) are 
considered harmful by another organization and that (b) no other 
organization, including the government or the state, can prevent, or could 
prevent except by incurring in costs so high as to exceed the gains to the 
actors from doing so. (Dahl 1982: 26) 
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This definition introduces an important element in considering a normative notion 
of autonomy that is complementary yet different to the notion of functional or 
institutional autonomy. In order to be considered autonomous, an organisation 
should be potentially damaging to another without risking external intervention 
or, in other words, should be able to assert some external force on another 
institution without becoming vulnerable by doing so. When analysed from the 
perspective of differentiation theory, autonomy is treated as mostly functional and 
power relations are often under-explored. Conversely, when analysed from the 
perspective of democratisation, media autonomy usually acquires a normative 
dimension and power relations become more apparent. Dahl’s definition of 
autonomy is more clearly connected to values of independence and the public 
service orientation of journalistic professionalisation, and therefore opposed to 
the instrumentalisation of the news media by states, political parties, oligarchs or 
corporations.  
This distinction is important because questions about the autonomy of the media 
from the perspective of democratisation often rely on a certain type of news media 
autonomy, mostly or prominently based on professionalisation and commitment 
to social responsibility. Questions about the autonomy of the media from the 
perspective of mediatization (related to the institutionalisation of the media), 
however, are less concerned about the quality of media autonomy and 
acknowledge media institutional autonomy as the outcome of their interactions 
with other social institutions. This is why it has been repeatedly defined as a 
normative neutral concept (Kunelius & Reunanen 2012; Hjarvard 2013). However, 
news media autonomy is continuously disputed, and as it is historically and 
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contextually-defined, it is therefore bounded by a specific set of variables. A media 
system where autonomy derives mostly from commercial rationales will be 
different from a media system whose autonomy is more firmly rooted in 
rationales of public orientation (see Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011). The quality of 
media autonomy will have an impact on the quality of the mediatization of politics. 
However, these are normative implications of a process that is considered non-
normative. 
3.2.3. About media resources   
A third relevant strand for this discussion about the mediatization of politics is 
that of the resources controlled by the media institution. This is an area not fully 
integrated into recent theoretical and empirical studies under the mediatization 
framework (for an exception see Kunelius & Reunanen 2012), but nonetheless 
identified as a driver of this process. This is to say that assimilation of, or 
adaptation to, news media logics within political institutions is not happenstance 
but a reaction to the greater relevance of media visibility across institutional 
fields. Attention to the nature of these resources and the impact they have in the 
political domain helps illuminate the question of why the mediatization of politics 
is such a pervasive phenomenon in contemporary societies. 
Institutions control and allocate both material and symbolic resources (Dimaggio 
& Powell 1983; March & Olsen 1984). They are embedded in structures of material 
resources (financial, technological, organisational) that make action possible 
(March & Olsen 2009) and, at the same time, they allocate resources that enable 
and constrain actors. One of the premises of the mediatization concept is that 
politics has become dependent on some of these media-controlled resources and 
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is reliant on them to perform some of its functions (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; 
Hjarvard 2008).  
The management of visibility through the media is a long-standing and binding 
feature of modern politics and the starting point for a whole industry of press and 
communications management (Cater 1965; Gans 1979; Negrine 1996; Blumler & 
Kavanagh 1999; Seymour-Ure 2003; Cook 2005). This field-level reaction to media 
management is, indeed, a testament to the mediatization process itself and, 
according to Marcinkowski (2014), a response to the notorious lack of public 
attention that democratic politics receives in contemporary societies. 
This viewpoint is resonant with Thompson’s (1995, 2005) discussion about the 
new form of visibility created by changes in contemporary media and 
communications. The evolution and expansion of the media landscape has 
transformed mediated visibility into a crucial arena for the steering of societal 
attention, one that can hardly be ignored:  
The inability to achieve visibility through the media can confine one to 
obscurity – and, in the worst cases, can lead to a kind of death by neglect. 
Hence it is not surprising that struggles for visibility have come to assume 
such significance in our societies today. Mediated visibility is not just a vehicle 
through which aspects of social and political life are brought to the attention 
of others: it has become a principal means by which social and political 
struggles are articulated and carried out. (Thompson 2005: 49) 
Starting with the questions of ‘why does mediatization happen?’ and ‘what is the 
resource controlled by the media?’, Kuenlius and Reunanen (2012) re-define 
mediatization in relation to that resource, which they identify as the controlling of 
public attention: “[mediatization is] the increasing influence of public attention (as 
the generalised medium of the media) in other fields and institutional domains” 
(Ibid, 12).  
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Thompson (1995) refers to this capacity as the symbolic power of the media 
institution, a form of capital that is not merely figurative but may have material 
consequences, for example changing the course of events and decisions or 
influencing actions. In this respect, the transferability of media capital into other 
forms of capital (such as economic or political) is one of the more promising 
avenues for mediatization research. Kunelius and Reunanen (2012) emphasise 
that media visibility might become a desirable and even indispensable resource in 
different subsystems. Driessen's (2013) study on celebrity, which he defines as an 
accumulation of media visibility, points in a similar direction by stressing how 
celebrity capital migrates to other social fields and is transformed into an intra-
fields form of capital. 
Certainly, media visibility is a double-edged resource that might have positive and 
negative impacts on political actors (Thompson 2005), but it is precisely because 
of this that news media logics are increasingly migrating and being translated into 
different institutional domains. Ultimately, the news media’s ability to point at and 
render issues visible is assumed to have consequences in the political field and 
broader society. 
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3.2.4. Adaptive responses: submission or attempts at control?  
A final common thread in the literature is the adaptive responses of political 
institutions, organisations and actors to the institutionalisation of media logics in 
the political domain (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Schulz 2004; Hjarvard 2008; 
Strömbäck 2008; Schrott 2009; Esser 2013). The identification and understanding 
of these reactions have indeed been the main objects of empirical study in the 
field.  
It is possible to observe some tension between media-centred approaches to 
mediatization, especially common in macro-level conceptualisations of the process 
in which political actors are described as submitting to the media logic (Mazzoleni 
& Schulz 1999) or being governed by the media logic (Strömbäck 2008), and 
actor-centred approaches under which political actors are seen as making active 
use of the media for their own purposes (Stromback & Van Aelst 2013; 
Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014).  
At an empirical level, media-centred approaches usually focus on analysing 
variations in media content, through longitudinal or comparative analyses that 
might show degrees of mediatization, in terms of the news media’s greater ability 
to define their own content (Kepplinger 2002; Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011; 
Cushion & Thomas 2013). Actor-centred studies, instead, have focused on 
understanding the processes of mediatization from the perspective of political 
actors, as well as the implications of mediatization for political institutions 
(Kunelius & Reunanen 2011; Strömbäck 2011a; Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014). Schulz 
(2014) exposes the main features of the latter approach as: 
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the actor-centred perspective implies two prepositions: first, political actors 
and organizations anticipate that the media will operate in a specific way and 
adapt to the opportunities and constraints media usage entails; and second, 
political actors and organizations proactively take account of the media and 
try to capitalize on media performances for their political purposes. (Ibid: 62) 
 
Certainly, an actor-centred approach implies agency on the part of political actors 
and organisations, anticipation of the needs of the news in the planning of public 
interventions and media-oriented actions (Kernell 1997; Cook 2005; Davis 2009), 
what Esser (2013) describes as self-mediatization, or the reflexive reaction of the 
political system to changes in their media environment. However, unintended 
consequences of mediatization are also part of the process (Marcinkowski & 
Steiner 2014).  Some empirical work has shown these tensions; for instance, how 
public agencies prioritise attention to cases that have received media coverage at 
the expense of others which have not (Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014), or how policy 
networks might struggle to reach agreements when they are subjects of negative 
media coverage (Korthagen & Klijn 2012).  
An institutional approach distinguishes and attempts to bridge this duality 
between strategic action and structural conditions (DiMaggio 1997; Thornton et 
al. 2012). Taking this into consideration for the study of the mediatization of 
politics implies recognition that political actors bring both identities and interests 
to their communication activities, but they are certainly embedded in 
organisations and institutions that shape those actions (Friedland & Alford 1991; 
Thornton et al. 2012).  
As discussed in the previous section, media and political logics of action are 
understood as hybrids that do not necessarily contradict each other; they are not a 
zero-sum game and therefore they cannot constitute a dimension that varies along 
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a continuum between poles (more media logic vs. less political logic). According to 
this argument, political actors are not subsumed by institutional media logics; they 
do not and cannot surrender the political logic. Instead, institutional logics become 
available to individuals and organisations (Friedland & Alford 1991) and are 
drivers of institutional change (Thornton et al. 2005). March and Olsen (2009) 
acknowledge this plurality of logics of action which will prevail depending on 
context, and have also been acknowledged as constitutive of contemporary 
political communication (Chadwick 2013). From an institutionalist perspective 
then the question is not whether political actors submit to the news media or 
attempt to control them, but rather which logics of action prevail in actors’ 
everyday practice and under what circumstances do news media logics prevail 
over others? 
3.2.5. Towards a working definition of mediatization of politics   
So far, this chapter has theoretically grounded the concept of mediatization of 
politics within a neo-institutionalist framework that understands the news media 
as a distinct social institution, which operates according to formal and informal 
rules, distributing material and symbolic resources, the most important of which 
is visibility.  
Building on Meyer (2002) and Esser (2013), it has been established that the news 
media is a complex modern institution whose members’ behaviours are 
constrained according to organising principles or logics of action, primarily 
professional and commercial rationales. News media logic is an abstract construct 
that accounts for this plurality of logics shaping news production. Likewise, party 
politics describes a complex institution, whose members’ actions are constrained 
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according to organising principles or logics of action, primarily policy, polity and 
political rationales.  Political logic is an abstract construct that accounts for this 
plurality of logics shaping political decision-making.  
The mediatization of politics is a theoretical perspective that enables the 
observation of the ways in which news media logics are adopted within political 
institutions and how they are assimilated, resisted or negotiated against different 
logics of action, aiming to understand processes of institutional change in party 
politics driven by increasing autonomy in the news media field.  
In an actor-centred approach to mediatization research, then, the main object of 
study, as well as a sign of mediatization, is actors’ responses to the news media 
logics. These responses or adaptive practices are conceived primarily as strategic 
actions triggered by the necessity of mediated visibility but also as reactions to 
wider institutional change. As a result, it is acknowledged that the aggregated 
effects of these actions might translate into unexpected outcomes for political 
actors, organisations and institutions.  
Four main dimensions of the mediatization process were discussed in connection 
to new institutionalist scholarship: (1) logics of action, (2) media autonomy, (3) 
media resources and (4) political actors’ adaptive responses.  This discussion 
allows the elaboration of the following working definition of mediatization of 
politics: 
 
 
 
 
Mediatization of politics is the process activated within 
political institutions as a result of increasing institutional 
autonomy of the news media (1) and the necessity of 
mediated visibility (4), in which the actions and decisions 
of political actors, organisations and institutions are 
adjusted (3) to news media logics (2). 
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This working definition encompasses the four dimensions outlined thus far, 
locating mediatization research in the realm of practice and institutional change, 
as actors’ adjustment to news media logics become the main object of study. 
Among the limitations of this definition is the fact that it still relies on the abstract 
news media logic as the staple conceptual device to explore institutional change in 
politics as a response to actual or perceived media centrality. Finally, this 
definition highlights the interconnection of the different dimensions of the 
mediatization process: the degree and the grounds on which media autonomy 
claims are made will shape institutional logics of action, as well as political actors’ 
responses and attempts at controlling media content. 
3.3. Are Chilean political elites mediatized?  
This section of the chapter will develop an argument to establish that Chile has 
experienced a process of mediatization of politics. It does so by exploring the ways 
in which media and politics have interacted in recent years using the working 
definition introduced above. Chapter 2 recounted historical events that form the 
background of these dynamics, whereas this section will pay specific attention to 
information and data generated after the turn of the century to limit the scope of 
analysis and better approach the current state of affairs in the relationship 
between Chilean political elites and news organisations.  
As was briefly mentioned in the introduction, an important indication of the 
perceived power of news organisations among political elites can be found in the 
surveys of elites analysed in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
reports of 2004 and 2015. In the first survey, the news media are identified as the 
most powerful institution in the country. Not only that, but elites also ranked the 
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news media at the top of the ranking as the most conflictive institution, and one 
that is perceived as having too much power (PNUD 2004). As highlighted in the 
UNDP report, these results reveal how elites question the legitimacy of such 
perceived media power. As an example, in the same survey political parties are 
ranked as the second most conflictive institutions in the country but, in contrast to 
the media, they are not considered as having too much power. Another interesting 
piece of data from this report is the difference between the perceptions of the 
media held by the elite and by general society. The general survey positions the 
news media considerably lower in the ranking of powerful institutions, in sixth 
place. In explaining this difference, the report offers the following reflection:  
In part, this is because the media today are governed according to their own 
operational criteria; thus, editorial lines cannot be administrated only 
according to the designs of the owner. The fact that the media compete for the 
interest and fidelity of audiences that do not belong to the elite, makes the 
media as whole to increase their autonomy against them. This reality is 
experienced by many people of power as a cause of concern, because it 
undermines its traditional capacity to easily influence the public agenda 
(PNUD, 2004: 259). 
Ten years later, in 2014, the situation was not very different. Again, an elite survey 
positioned the news media as the most powerful institution in the country, and 
their perceived mean of power (translated into a score 1-10) increased from 8.6 to 
9.2 (PNUD 2015). What these reports suggest is the existence of an institution (the 
news media) that is increasing its autonomy in relationship to political elites. As a 
result, they are increasingly in a position to self-define their operating rules and 
impose rules of representation on the political arena. 
3.3.1. The ‘modern’ Chilean news media and the quality of autonomy  
Following the path outlined early in the chapter, the process of mediatization of 
politics presupposes the differentiation of the news media, as a “social institution 
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in its own right” (Hjarvard 2008: 113). Shifting attention to context as a 
determining aspect of how the process of mediatization develops is important to 
briefly analyse the main features of the differentiation of the Chilean media 
institution. Some of these aspects were introduced in Chapter 2, but they will be 
briefly discussed here to bring them into conversation with the theoretical 
framework of mediatization that has been developed thus far. 
The first relevant aspect of differentiation of the Chilean media – that is to say, 
their emergence as a modern social institution – is that it appears less responsive 
to endogenous factors and more responsive to the actions of exogenous forces. In 
other words, professional or industry-related interests did not develop 
incrementally over the second half of the 20th century. Instead, as Sunkel & 
Geoffroy (2002) identify, the Chilean news media institution was strongly shaped 
by the actions of the military dictatorship and later by the state, via both 
regulations and subsidies. 
The Chilean media system can be located within Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
comparative systems as relatively close to the polarized-pluralist model (Leon-
Dermota 2003; Mellado & Humanes 2014), a system whose main features are 
strong political parallelism, strong state intervention and weak 
professionalisation. Certainly, the transferability of the model onto the Chilean 
context is not perfect, but this can guide analysis, and explain a certain 
configuration that has made the post-dictatorship Chilean news media vulnerable 
to strong political and economic pressures (Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011). These 
features, shared by other Latin American countries, led Márquez-Ramírez & 
Guerrero (2014) to put forward the “captured-liberal model”, a predominantly 
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liberal commercial model that, nonetheless, challenges assumptions about its 
liberal basis by favouring specific economic and political interests.  
When discussing the formation of media systems under differentiation theory, 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) identify four crucial aspects that become the main 
dimensions of their comparative models: developments of media markets, 
professionalisation, political parallelism and state intervention. An analysis of 
these dimensions in the Chilean context might shed light on the way the 
institutions of media and politics have interacted in recent years, opening the 
gates to the mediatization of politics. 
In Chile, the development of media markets has been strongly interlinked with 
state-sponsored media policy (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002), creating a paradox: the 
strong commercialisation through which the differentiation of the media is 
derived is, to a great extent, a reaction to state-intervention, in circumstances 
where these dimensions are usually opposed (as found in the Liberal model). 
When discussing the development of media markets as a comparative dimension, 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) mostly concentrate on comparing press circulation 
indices that reflect the reach of the media among the population. Understood in 
this way, it is possible to see how the process of commercialisation initiated by the 
state favoured the expansion of media industries and the reach of greater 
audiences, especially through the development of broadcast infrastructure (Tironi 
& Sunkel 1993). At the same time, the process of commercialisation has enabled a 
strong concentration of media industries, each of which appears dominated by a 
few prominent actors (Mastrini & Becerra 2006). Furthermore, media 
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concentration in Chile has favoured a certain ideological homogeneity and the sub-
representation of wide sections of the population (Bresnahan 2003).  
With regards to the dimension of state intervention, then, it is possible to observe 
a decisive influence in the area of market regulations, particularly by means of 
opening the television industry to private agents and encouraging concentration 
of ownership (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002). Also connected to state regulations, and 
decisive to the relationship between media and politics, has been the enforcement 
of a legal framework that seriously restricted the work of the press by 
criminalising criticism of the authorities, a framework that only changed in 2001 
(UDP 2010).  Finally, an additional source of state intervention has been the 
transfer of public subsidies to El Mercurio SA and Copesa37, favouring the 
development, growth and strength of the print-press duopoly (Monckeberg 2009; 
Herrero 2014).  
Political parallelism is defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as the extent to which 
the news media reflect political divisions in society, evidenced in links between 
news organisations and political parties. In the strict sense of party-press 
parallelism (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995), this indicator was very high in Chile up to 
1973, as practically every political party owned or was strongly linked to some 
newspaper or magazine (Tironi & Sunkel 1993). These links, though, were 
violently cut with the arrival of the military regime. However, the situation that 
                                                          
37
 There is little public information about state advertising in the Chilean news media. In 2005, a special 
commission was created in Congress with the aim of identifying the criteria used by public agencies 
when making decisions about where to place advertisements. This, after a private investigation carried 
out by Fucatel (Observatorio de Medios), revealed that 77 per cent  of public advertising in print press 
was directed to the groups El Mercurio SA and Copesa, while 50 per cent  of the advertising on TV was 
placed in the state-owned TV channel TVN. The commission judged that neither the public interest nor 
the market rationales behind these decisions were clear, and recommended regulations for the 
management of public advertising. To date, these recommendations have not been enforced.   
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followed was one of severe political control, enforced by means of censorship, 
interventions and threats (Tironi & Sunkel 1993). Now in a democracy, media 
emancipation has been a slow process and there is evidence lending support to the 
idea that news organisations integrated political logics to their operations, 
especially in the first decade of the transitional process. Authors such as Otano & 
Sunkel (2003) and Leon-Dermota (2003) discuss the regressive nature of these 
logics of action, which would often prevail over news judgements with the aim of 
preserving the fragile transitional political balance. Political parallelism in Chile is 
still high (Mellado & Humanes 2014), but no longer in the form of party-press 
parallelism. Other indicators of political parallelism, such as press partisanship 
and the relevance of party affiliation for career advancement in the media, are less 
clear in the Chilean context. Chilean journalists do not identify with a tradition of 
advocacy and editorial involvement, and support neutrality and objectivity in their 
professional practice (Mellado et al. 2012). Therefore, the political parallelism of 
the Chilean press today is not blatant partisanship but, rather, is reflective of the 
proximity between the news organisations and certain political camps and 
economic interests; this is evidenced in the strong links between the media, 
political and economic power (Bresnahan 2003; Couso 2012; Mellado et al. 2012).  
Finally, the dimension of professionalisation is often discussed through key 
indicators, such as the professional autonomy enjoyed by journalists, the 
emergence of distinct professional norms and the prevalence of public service 
orientation (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Brüggemann et al. 2014). With regards to 
journalists’ autonomy in Chile, this is an area where empirical studies have 
identified important deficits, including a situation in which values of objectivity 
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and autonomy are cherished at a theoretical level but easily compromised in day 
to day practice (Gronemeyer 2002; Mellado & Humanes 2012; Santander 2013), 
leaving the field especially vulnerable to economic and political pressures (Lagos 
& Cabalin 2009; Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011). However, cross-longitudinal analysis 
shows a certain movement towards greater journalistic independence in the 
elaboration of political content (Mellado & Humanes 2014). Professional norms 
have been established through formal university education, especially since the 
1960s (Mellado 2009), and through an exponential increase in university degrees 
in journalism and specific to the professional title of journalist, with more than 40 
programmes at a national level (Lagos & Cabalin 2013). Still, it is difficult to speak 
about professional homogeneity with teaching strategies characterized by 
heterogeneity and fragmentation (Lazcano 2009) and low levels of professional 
associativity (Mellado et al. 2010). 38 Finally, there is little evidence of engagement 
with values of public orientation in Chilean journalism, and available studies show 
a rather weak engagement with this ethos. In a comparative study, Mellado et al. 
(2012) showed that Chilean journalists considered the function of providing 
information to facilitate citizens’ political decisions as less important than their 
Brazilian and Mexican colleagues do.  
This brief discussion offers an initial means for understanding how the news 
media have been shaped as a social institution in Chile over the past few decades, 
characterised by strong commercialisation, significant degrees of state 
intervention and political parallelism, as well as weak professionalisation. A closer 
inspection shows that all the dimensions analysed here point to potential threats 
                                                          
38
 According to Mellado et al (2010), only 11.4 per cent of journalists were registered in the main 
national professional association (Colegio de Periodistas).  
118 
 
to the institutional autonomy of the media, exposing the shortcomings of the “tale 
of modernisation” that identifies commercialisation as the main driver of media 
independence. Yes, the Chilean news media emerge as a relatively autonomous 
social institution as a result of the commercialisation encouraged during the 
1980s and since. However, it is an institution operating with strong limitations. As 
in other countries in the region, a model of media structures with dubious 
democratic character reflects a legacy of power inequalities (Waisbord 2012). In 
spite of this, the news media institution as a whole has incremented its social 
relevance and developed an operational logic of its own (PNUD 2004; PNUD 
2015), which allows the mediatization of politics to be observable.  In the next 
section, the events that have made Chilean politics permeable to the logics of the 
news media will be established.  
3.3.2. Political elites and party politics media-dependency  
One of the main triggers of the mediatization of politics in Western democracies is 
the widespread representation crisis experienced by political parties, which has 
increased the need for adapting to a changing communication environment in 
order to retain some degrees of control over public debate (Stromback & Van Aelst 
2013; Esser & Strömbäck 2014; Marcinkowski 2014). As introduced in Chapter 2, 
the Chilean party system has undergone an incremental loss of social legitimacy, 
due to entrenched political practices aimed at the self-reproduction of political 
elites (Siavelis 2009). The weakness of the intermediary functions played by party 
structures have led to a crisis of representation and a deficient linkage between 
representatives and civil society (Godoy 2003; Luna & Mardones 2010) that has 
contributed to the centrality of the media as a surrogate political intermediary. 
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The representation crisis has seriously worsened over the past few years, linked 
to a loss of trust in the institutions of representative democracy, such as Congress, 
political parties and the government (PNUD 2014), which have suffered great 
deterioration in their public evaluation since the turn of the century39. 
Together with losing their attributes as an expressive institution of civil society 
(de la Maza 2003), political parties initiated during the transition a process of de-
differentiation or amalgamation (Silva 2004), in response to the prevailing 
neoliberal consensus through both tacit and explicit agreements of off-limit topics, 
such as human rights violations or the basis of the economic model (Siavelis 2009; 
Huneeus & Cuevas 2013). This process reinforces and feeds into the deactivation 
of civil society, paving the way for the emergence of personality-driven leadership, 
and the consolidation of politics as a media happening (Silva 2004). Godoy (2003) 
discusses how political elites, faced with the volatility of the electorate, are forced 
to use media resources in order to capture adherents, and later in order to regain 
lost legitimacy.  Therefore, in line with what Marcinkowski and Steiner (2014) 
postulate, it is the need to regain visibility and recover public attention – the main 
resource controlled by the media (Thompson 1995; Kunelius & Reunanen 2012) – 
that pushes the political system to adopt news media logics of action. 
Political actors’ increasing dependence on media resources has often been 
observed as a reaction to the representation crisis. Silva (2004) discusses how, 
from the 1990s onwards, the mass media have “taken over” the intermediation 
role traditionally played by political parties in Chile, pushing politics to be 
                                                          
39
 Data collected by the cross-longitudinal survey Latinbarometro, conducted bi-annually, shows that 
trust in Government fell to 34 per cent and 32 per cent for the years 2011 and 2013 respectively. During 
the first decade of the 21
st
 century, this indicator oscillated between 44 per cent and 65 per cent (PNUD 
2014).  
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“increasingly dominated by the mass media in general, and television in 
particular” (Ibid: 71), forcing political elites to acquire new languages and 
communication strategies. In a media environment dominated by television, 
access to mass media then becomes fundamental political capital, especially 
during elections (Arriagada & Navia 2010).  
Similar to the Anglo-American and European traditions (e.g. Blumler & Gurevitch 
1995), the mediatization of politics in Chile has been associated with a decline in 
the quality of public communication, a complaint about the subordination of 
politics to the mass media (Arancibia 2002), depletion of content resulting from 
the adoption of logics of spectacle (Weibel 2010) and the commodification of 
political messages (Silva 2004). More importantly for the present analysis, this 
development is associated with two parallel processes; firstly, the increasing 
autonomy of the media to determine their own contents and; secondly, the 
professionalisation of political communication techniques across political 
institutions.  
Cordero and Marin (2006) discuss how transformations in the political culture 
and the news media combine to create new conditions of media visibility and 
enable the emergence of a new genre, that of the political media scandals.40 These 
acquire a new dimension after the turn of the century, as a result of the emergence 
of a more inquisitive form of journalism and the breaking of scandalous political 
                                                          
40
 Some of the early political scandals of the transition are documented in Cavallo (1998). They include a 
case involving the son of Augusto Pinochet, who received cheques for more than three million dollars 
from the Armed Forces (Pinocheques case, 1990); a case of political espionage between members of the 
right-wing party Renovacion Nacional (Piñeragate, 1993), and the denunciation of drug trafficking inside 
Congress made by a former minister of the dictatorship, Francisco Javier Cuadra (1994).  
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stories initiated by the media.41 A sense of greater autonomy of journalists from 
political actors (Lagos & Cabalin 2013) also encourages this shift in the 
relationship between media and politics.  
Empirical studies lend some support to the idea of a news media institution that is 
starting to define its own operational and selection criteria. Porath (2007) shows 
that TV news agendas maintain a very low correlation to those of political actors 
during electoral campaigns. The apparent emancipation of the TV industry from 
politics is not, however, as clear in the press, where 90 per cent of political stories 
are initiated by politicians (Mellado & Rafter 2014). Nevertheless, one strategy 
used by print journalists to distance themselves from politicians is decreasing 
space devoted to direct quotations from politicians, who have seen their 
possibilities of reported direct speech diminish in the pages of both elite and 
popular newspapers (Mellado & Humanes 2014). 
These new signs of media autonomy are perceived with some concern by political 
elites; 62 per cent  of politicians believe that the news media control the public 
debate agenda, instead of political actors, and are helping to create a noxious 
image of politicians, as distant, unreliable and inefficient (ICSO/UDP 2004). The 
latter helps to explain why political elites start perceiving the media as a powerful 
actor (PNUD 2004; PNUD 2015).  
A major reaction to this increasing anxiety around the power of the media is the 
professionalisation of media management and political communication 
techniques. This process of professionalisation appears to be driven by the 
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 Some prominent cases that span media attention during the first decade of the 21
st
 century were 
cases involving politicians and sexual abuse (Spiniak and Lavanderos case), as well as cases of 
corruption inside public agencies, such as the MOP-Gate case (Cordero & Marin 2006).  
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electioneering industry. Professional polling services are integrated not only 
within campaign periods but to day-to-day government decision-making 
(Huneeus 1999; Cordero 2009), and the entire political party spectrum 
incorporates political marketing tools such as telemarketing, opinion polls and 
focus groups, along with the services of local and foreign consultants (Espíndola 
2008). 
In 2004, 75 per cent of politicians acknowledged having some form of 
communication advisor (ICSO/UDP 2004) and, as a result, together with the 
presence of press and communication officers, the routine production of 
information subsidies has been incorporated into the politician-journalist 
relationship (Santander 2013). Likewise, the Government’s monthly expenditure 
in press management and communication staff has been estimated at more than 
US$2 million (Aravena 2009), giving an indication of how communications and 
press management have been transversally integrated into most public agencies. 
3.4. Concluding remarks and locating the research gap 
This chapter has theoretically grounded the concept of mediatization of politics 
within an institutionalist approach by exploring the elements that allow a 
characterisation of the news media as a social institution. In order to do so, two 
main theoretical strands were reviewed. First, differentiation theory and the 
modernisation narrative that inspect the emergence of the news media institution 
in contemporary societies (Thompson 1995; Hallin & Mancini 2004); and 
secondly, a neo-institutionalist perspective for the study of the news media in 
their interactions with the political domain (Cook 2005; Hjarvard 2008; Asp 
2014). Building on institutionalist literature (Dimaggio & Powell 1983; Friedland 
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& Alford 1991; March & Olsen 2006; Thornton et al. 2012), four main dimensions 
of the process of mediatization of politics were analysed in order to establish a 
working definition of the concept that incorporates: logics of action, media 
autonomy, media resources and adaptive responses. These revisions stressed the 
importance of understanding news media and political logics as hybrid logics of 
action (Meyer 2002; Esser 2013) that can potentially clash as well as reinforce 
each other.  
Additionally, it was established that autonomy of the news media institution is not 
understood here as an absolute pre-condition for the mediatization of politics to 
happen but as an on-going struggle to defend its borders (Bourdieu 2005). 
Following Thompson (2005) and Kunelius and Reunanen (2012), visibility is 
identified as the main resource controlled by the media, which explains political 
actors’ adaptive responses as reflecting a need for attention (Marcinkowski & 
Steiner 2014), which generates some level of dependency on communication 
resources, favouring the institutional coupling of media and politics. 
By applying the analytical framework developed within this chapter to the Chilean 
context, antecedents that lend support to the idea that Chilean politics has 
experienced a process of mediatization since the recovery of democracy have been 
introduced. Taking into consideration the literature discussed above, the 
mediatization of politics in Chile appears driven by both the deteriorated image of 
politics and the emergence of more adversarial forms of journalism. The main 
field-level reaction to these developments is the growing professionalisation of 
political communication techniques. 
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This process of mediatization has been acknowledged in local scholarship on 
media studies (Arancibia 2002; Cordero & Marin 2006; Porath 2007; Arriagada & 
Navia 2010; Mellado & Rafter 2014) and political science (Godoy 2003; Silva 
2004) as a contextual feature of contemporary Chilean politics, but it has not been 
so far the object of systematic research. Recent studies have interpreted variations 
in political media content in the light of mediatization processes (Mellado & 
Humanes 2014; Mellado & Rafter 2014). However, when it comes to an actor-
centred perspective, that is to say, the analysis of mediatization processes from 
the perspective of political actors and institutions, research is practically non-
nexistent, revealing an important research gap.   
The mediatization of politics framework remains useful for an exploration and 
understanding of recent changes in Chilean politics. The news media emerged as a 
semi-autonomous social institution (Tironi & Sunkel 1993) and political actors 
have been pushed to adapt to this new environment (Silva 2004; Espíndola 2008), 
at least partially as a result of an underlying crisis in the connection between the 
party system and civic society (Godoy 2003; Luna & Mardones 2010).  
At the same time, it is possible to forestall those important contextual features that 
might have played a role in shaping the mediatization of political elites. On the one 
hand, the autonomy of the Chilean media appears questioned on the grounds of 
weak journalistic professionalisation (Gronemeyer 2002) and an important 
degree of permeability to economic and political pressures (Hanitzsch & Mellado 
2011; Lagos & Cabalin 2013; Santander 2013), as well as high levels of media 
concentration (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Mastrini & Becerra 2006; Ramírez 2009; 
Couso 2012). On the other hand, political elites appear minimally inclined to 
125 
 
overcome transitional enclaves expressed in a political culture with important 
democratic deficits and resistant to transformations (Siavelis 2009). Taken 
together, these antecedents configure a specific context for the mediatization of 
Chilean political elites, and demand further exploration, especially with regards to 
how news media logics of action have been integrated, negotiated and resisted 
within the institutional domain of party politics. Additionally, an actor-oriented 
perspective to the study of mediatization of politics demands taking into 
consideration power relations that are often left uninspected within the grand 
narrative of mediatization. The institutional logic perspective appears well 
equipped to connect different levels of analysis, stressing the interplay between 
“individuals competing and negotiating, organizations in conflict and coordination, 
and institutions in contradiction and interdependency” (Friedland & Alford 1991: 
240-241), recognising that agents bring identities and interests into their actions, 
while at the same time being embedded in organisations and institutions that 
enable and constrain those actions (Friedland & Alford 1991; Thornton et al. 
2012).  
The present study seeks to contribute to this understanding of the process of 
mediatization of political elites in Chile, identifying the main features of this 
relationship from an actor-centred perspective and shedding light on the 
implications of the process.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will outline the methodological framework and research methods 
used in this study. The chapter will start by locating the thesis within a 
constructionist understanding of institutions and situating empirical enquiry at 
the meso-level; aiming for the identification and explanation of collective 
understandings within a given cultural arena or social group. In this case, the rules 
of the game shaping interaction between the institutional domains of mass media 
and party politics in Chile; paying attention to “rules, routines, norms and 
identities of an ‘institution’, rather than micro-rational individuals or macro-social 
forces” (March & Olsen, 2006: 16).  Further, it will be argued that theoretical tools 
offered by neo-institutionalist theory (Cook 2005; March & Olsen 2006; Sparrow 
2006), the institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al. 2012) and the 
interpretive approach to the analysis of political elites (Bevir et al. 2003; Richards 
& Smith 2004) offer an appropriate  analytical framework to answer the overall 
question of how Chilean political elites have adapted to the mediatization of 
politics by focusing on three key aspects (a) goals, (b) dynamics of 
autonomy/control and (c) the institutional logics structuring prevalent political 
actors’ media-oriented practices. From this analytical framework, the research 
questions guiding the present study are derived. This chapter then explains and 
justifies the choice of semi-structured elite interview as a research method and the 
identification of three groups of research participants: politicians, press officers 
and journalists working and interacting in the cities of Santiago and Valparaíso, in 
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Chile, in order to conclude with a description and justification of strategies for 
qualitative data analysis.  
The chapter is structured from higher to lower levels of abstraction. Following the 
levels of research design identified by Crotty (1998), it starts by accounting for the 
epistemic stance and core theoretical assumptions of the thesis, from which a 
research strategy and specific research methods are derived.  The first section 
(4.1) develops a methodological framework informed by sociological new 
institutionalism, together with an explanation of the qualitative nature of the 
thesis and its adherence to a social constructionist understanding of knowledge 
generation. The second section (4.2) develops the research problem and research 
questions guiding the study. The third section (4.3) offers a rationale for the 
research design, justifying the choice of an inductive and interpretive study of 
exploratory nature. The fourth section of the chapter (4.4) explains the choice of 
elite interview as the main research method and provides a detailed description of 
the strategies used for data collection and analysis, informed by elements of two 
neighbouring methodological camps:  grounded theory and applied thematic 
analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes by accounting for the criteria used for the 
validation of findings (4.5), as well as the strengths and limitations of the chosen 
methodological approach (4.6). 
4.1. Epistemic stance and core theoretical assumptions 
The concept of institutions that informs this study is influenced by the neo-
institutionalist tradition (see section 3.2.1). As a consequence, it is firmly rooted in 
a constructionist understanding of social reality. That is to say, it shares the view 
that “all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such is contingent 
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upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human 
beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social 
context” (Crotty, 1998: 42). 
Stressing “the endogenous nature and social construction of political institutions” 
(March & Olsen, 2006: 4), the neo-institutionalist tradition acknowledges that 
practices and symbolic constructions are as important as material conditions for 
explaining social structures; and therefore institutions are understood, described 
and investigated in connection to their symbolic and material dimensions, as well 
as their historical context (Friedland & Alford 1991; DiMaggio 1997; Thornton et 
al. 2012).   
Within this tradition, actors’ identities and perceptions are not inspected within a 
psychological space but mostly studied in terms of shared beliefs and collective 
understandings, acknowledging the links between agency, culture and 
institutional change.  Adler (1997) states that “even our most enduring 
institutions are based on collective understandings (…) [which] provide people 
with reasons why things are as they are and indications as to how they should use 
their material abilities and power”  (:322).  
From their emergence, neo-institutionalist theories provoked a shift in the study 
of political institutions, which evolved from a formal-legal approach to a 
behavioural approach (March & Olsen 2006) that places actors and action at the 
centre of empirical enquiry. In other words, what actors do (their practices), 
perceive (their cognitive experience) and how they develop beliefs (structures of 
meaning) do matter and are key factors for understanding how institutions 
develop.  
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Another important strand of literature supporting the study of elite actors’ beliefs 
and interpretations about their positions, interests and actions comes from the 
interpretive tradition in political science, which has made a strong case in favour 
of studying elite actors’ beliefs, not just in order to understand how they think or 
justify their behaviour but also for the explanatory power this variable may have 
in understanding the evolution of political institutions (Bevir & Rhodes 2001; 
Bevir et al. 2003; Richards & Smith 2004). 
These theoretical perspectives naturally dialogue with a constructionist 
epistemology that pays attention to social interactions and their context (Crotty 
1998; Schwandt 2000). A constructionist paradigm emphasises how meanings 
emerge from social interactions and is, therefore, particularly concerned with how 
people understand those interactions. The role of the researcher within this 
paradigm is to interpret or make sense of the meaning others have about the 
world (Rubin & Rubin 2005; Creswell 2007).  
4.2. Research problem & research questions  
I have developed in previous chapters an argument that lends support to the idea 
that politics has been mediatized in Chile. In other words, political actors and 
institutions have adjusted their practices to news media logics in order to improve 
their chances of mediated visibility. Systematic study of this process, nonetheless, 
has so far been neglected, and only acknowledged as a contextual feature of 
Chilean contemporary politics. I argue that this lack of research is especially acute 
when it comes to locating political elites as research subjects, therefore developing 
an actor-centred perspective on the process of mediatization that may account for 
the features of the relationship between mass media and political actors in this 
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national context. Additionally, I have argued in favour of applying the 
institutionalist framework for the study of mediatization beyond European and 
Anglo-American contexts as a strategy for exploring points of strain in the 
literature; namely, how news media and political logics interact, as well as how the 
notion of media autonomy can be better understood in the mediatization of 
politics. 
In contrast to the wealth of theoretical work developed around the mediatization 
debate in recent years, empirical research studies guided by this framework have 
been produced in limited numbers.42 Studies focusing on the analysis of media 
content have mostly concentrated on identifying and measuring indicators of 
mediatization from the longitudinal analysis of texts (Kepplinger 2002; Strömbäck 
& Dimitrova 2011; Cushion & Thomas 2013). Overall, these studies have shown a 
tendency towards greater media autonomy in the way political news agendas are 
presented. In so far as they have become more interpretive, political actors are 
given less space to define media agendas and journalists take the role of primary 
definers of political narratives (for the UK context, see Cushion & Thomas, 2013; 
Negrine & Bull, 2014; on Sweden see Strömbäck & Nord, 2006; for a comparison 
between the United States and Sweden see Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011). In 
contrast, in the Chilean context, longitudinal analysis of political news in print 
have shown a low level of media interventionism; politicians appear to maintain a 
strong influence on news stories and journalists have adopted indirect ways of 
keeping distance from political sources in texts, for example, through diminishing 
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 Some indications of the breadth and speed of this discussion can be found in academic journals’ 
dedicated special editions, such as those published by Communication Theory (2013, volume 23) and 
those published by Journalism Studies and Journalism Practice (2014), as well as numerous edited 
books (see Lundby, 2009; Lundby, 2014; Stromback and Esser, 2014). An important part of this work has 
been predominantly theory-oriented.  
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use of direct quotations (Mellado & Rafter, 2014). A slightly different picture 
emerges from the analysis of TV news agendas, which show greater overall 
distance from political sources (Porath 2007). Taken together, these studies 
reflect how media representations of politics have changed over time. However, 
what studies focused on content generally fail to show is how politicians have 
adapted to this changing environment and have readjusted their bargaining 
strategies over news making, since inferences in this direction remain speculative. 
Additionally, they often cannot properly account for contextual factors moderating 
or accentuating mediatization processes.  
Studies focused on actors tend to show a more complex picture of mediatization 
processes, with scenarios of constraints and opportunities for political actors. 
They generally observe tensions between news media logics and policy-making 
(Reunanen et al. 2010; Landerer 2014) or bureaucratic rationales (Korthagen & 
Klijn 2012; Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014). However, at least some political actors are 
in a position to take advantage of their adaptation to news media logics 
(Elmelund-Praestekaer et al. 2011). What these studies highlight is the fact that 
the mediatization of political actors is not homogenous. First, the ability to use 
media visibility as a resource appears aligned to other power resources (Kunelius 
& Reunanen 2011). Secondly, actors can actively embrace news media logics with 
strategic purposes (Landerer 2014), though not all the outcomes of the process 
respond to strategic objectives, and some are unwanted (Korthagen & Klijn 2012; 
Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014).   
I decided to take an actor-centred approach for this study based on the lack of 
research on this area in the Chilean context. Moreover, this perspective allows for 
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a better account of the ground-level power struggles in the relationship between 
political actors and news organisations, which is an important element to take into 
consideration in the Chilean case considering the prevalent elite-culture that 
dominates the local political ethos (Cordero & Funk 2011). So far, the scarce data 
available about how political elites relate to news organisations and have adapted 
to news media logics in the country comes from surveys, some of them not even 
primarily concerned with the subject. It has been established that political elites 
consider the media as the most powerful institution in the country and question 
the legitimacy of that power (PNUD 2004; PNUD 2015). Somewhat contradictory 
to that finding, parliamentarians have said they trust the media but do not 
consider them a relevant actor for policy-making purposes43. Still, they say that the 
news media have overpowered politicians in the ability to control public debate, 
and have sought professional support for media and communication related 
activities (ICSO/UDP 2004).  Overall, the analysis of these studies shows a complex 
picture that demands further clarification and qualitative insight, especially 
regarding how news media logics have been integrated into everyday political 
practice.  
From this research problem, I derived a general research question to guide a study 
of an exploratory nature approached in this thesis:  
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 Data for the period 1997-2009 from the panel survey conducted by the Observatorio de Elites 
Parlamentarias de América Latina (Observatory of Latin America Parliamentary Elites) shows that Chile 
is one of two countries in the region (alongside Uruguay) in which parliamentarians declare high levels 
of trust in the media together with low levels of influence in political decision-making. This has been 
initially interpreted as a result of a high institutionalisation of political parties (Tagina 2009). 
Interpretation of these results though is complicated; not only because they derive from two questions 
in an instrument not specially tailored to explore politics and media relationships but also because 
trusting the media could be either connected to a positive assessment of their work, or a signal of 
political affinity and lack of adversarial journalism (Waisbord 2006). It seems also reasonable for 
parliamentarians to declare they take into consideration their voters’, political parties’ or group 
interests’ demands more than the media for decision-making purposes. Rather than having great 
explanatory power, these insights offer points of departure for the study of the subject.  
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How have Chilean political elites adapted to the mediatization of politics? 
An emphasis on adaptation seeks to shed light on political elites’ interactions with 
the media and the process of mediatization of politics. As such, it suggests the 
exploration of transformations in the behaviour patterns of a social group in 
response to a changing media environment, in particular, how Chilean political 
elites negotiate their communication practices in relation to such change. From 
this guiding research question, this study is therefore expected to develop some 
insight into how the process of mediatization has developed over time (e.g. 
longitudinally) in recent years. However, being a cross-sectional study, where data 
has been collected at one point in time (see section 4.4) this study’s main 
emphasis is, instead, how political elites have adapted to the institutional news 
media logic in recent years by paying attention to three core aspects of the 
process, which will be outlined below.  
In order to operationalize the guiding research question provided above, three 
related subordinate research questions that point towards more specific areas of 
enquiry are formulated, keeping the focus on political elites as the main research 
subject of the study. These areas are (a) goals of media exposure; (b) media-
oriented practices and (c) dynamics of autonomy-control.  
The exploration of political actors’ goals associated with media exposure finds a 
justification in the micro-foundations of the institutional logics perspective. In an 
attempt to theorize the links between institutional logics, practices, individuals 
and interactions, Thornton et al. (2012) identify social identities and goals as 
aspects that capture the dimension of individual agency or intentionality of action 
within institutional contexts. In other words, goals shape current and future 
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action, answering to individual choices that are nonetheless responsive to the 
environment and, therefore, institutionally shaped. Contrary to March and Olsen 
(2006), who separate identity-based and interest-based rationales for action, 
Thornton et al. (2012) contend that: “rather than viewing identities and goals as 
alternative motivations for social actors, we posit that they both affect cognition 
and action” (Ibid: 87).  In doing so, it is acknowledged that goals are not only 
driven by self-interest but also adjusted to fit social roles and expectations.  
The sub research questions associated with this area are formulated as: 
SRQ1: What are Chilean politicians’ goals when interacting with the news media?  
SRQ2. To what extent is media visibility considered a valuable resource for political 
activity? 
The idea of institutional logics structuring media-oriented practices is connected 
with the aim of exploring the process of mediatization from the perspective of 
practice. As discussed in Chapter 3, the idea of logics of action (Friedland & Alford 
1991; DiMaggio 1997; March & Olsen 2009) is pivotal in the development of neo-
institutionalist theory, and mediatization has been defined as a process of 
adaptation to news media logics of action (Meyer 2002; Esser 2013). The question 
about logics of action therefore is different from the question about “media 
effects” on decision-makers (see Kepplinger, 2007). Instead, it points towards 
understandings of news media logics of action and their accommodation44 within 
daily routines.  
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 This perspective dialogues with theoretical and empirical research about the way political actors 
anticipate the needs of the media for news-making and policy-making processes (Kernell 1997; Cook 
2005; Davis 2007a; Davis 2007b). 
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The sub research questions associated to this area are formulated as: 
SRQ3: How do political elites understand and interact with news media logics of 
action?  
SRQ4: What are the prevalent media-oriented practices among Chilean politicians 
and how are they accommodated in their daily activities?  
Finally, the third subject area is the relationships of autonomy and control 
between political elites and the news media. Questions about who controls whom 
in the media and politics relationship have been longstanding in political 
communication. Since Gans’ (1979: 116) contention about political sources usually 
“leading the tango” in their relationship with journalists, the question about 
control has been the driver of several empirical enquiries (among others, see 
Seymour-Ure 2003; Strömbäck & Nord 2006; Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011; 
Pfetsch & Voltmer 2012), yet some studies lend support to the idea that the 
answer about “who leads” is highly contingent (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2011). I 
argue that the question about “who leads” is ill-conceived, and possible answers 
will be responsive not only to contingency but also to the level of analysis at which 
the question is formulated (macro, meso or micro-level interactions). Having said 
this, a key assumption about the process of mediatization of politics is that 
political actors have lost their autonomy (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999), as long as 
they have become increasingly dependent on communication resources and 
shaped by the media (Bennett & Entman 2001; Meyer 2002; Strömbäck 2008). 
What is more, the mediatization of politics has been conceptualised as a response 
to the need to retain degrees of control over public attention by political actors 
(Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014).  In order to narrow down the scope of the 
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questions about autonomy and explore the contentious issue of autonomy loss 
associated with mediatization processes, then, research questions will be 
formulated in relation to the perceived ability to control media messages among 
political elites, together with the strategies used to this end. 
Additionally, as perceptions about control over media messages are relational, and 
constitute the outcome of exchanges with journalists and news organisations, the 
following sub-research questions incorporate journalists and are formulated as: 
SRQ5: What are the prevalent practices in the trade-off between Chilean politicians 
and journalists? 
SRQ6: What are politicians’ and journalists’ perceptions about their ability to control 
media messages?  
In order to provide meaningful answers to these research questions, a qualitative 
methodological framework will be developed, in order to incorporate political 
elites’ experiences of the mediatization process, as well as perceptions of other 
groups of reference that frequently interact with them in their media-oriented 
activities, most prominently political journalists and press officers.  
4.3. Research strategy: a qualitative interpretive framework  
Given the nature of academic enquiry that has been introduced – concerned with 
political elites’ adaptation to mediatization processes, the meanings attached to 
their interactions with the news media, and the rationales and justification of 
news media logic-following within this group - this study can be naturally located 
within an interpretive research paradigm. As such, it follows a qualitative strategy 
for data collection and analysis, informed by elements of grounded theory 
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(particularly Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 2008; Birks & Mills, 2011) and 
applied thematic analysis (Namey et al., 2008; Guest et al., 2012).  
A qualitative research strategy is better equipped to account for the meanings 
brought by research participants to their actions, and to show how they are tied to 
contextual features (Jensen 2002; Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Creswell 2007). In this 
study, perceptions and practices of political elites are central, as well as are their 
interpretations and reactions regarding the institutional rules guiding news 
making in traditional mass media outlets. Baxter & Babbie (2004) identify the 
study of meanings and shared beliefs about appropriate action (rules) in certain 
social groups as the main drivers of interpretive research in communication, a 
tradition committed to rendering those rules visible.  
Having an exploratory and descriptive orientation, the methodological framework 
used is inductive; it aims to develop an account of the mediatization of Chilean 
political elites, from actors’ experiences. In important ways, the approach followed 
for this study shares the principles of grounded theory development, a 
qualitatively driven methodological strategy in which a general explanation of a 
process, action or interaction is developed, shaped by the views of a large number 
of participants (Creswell 2007; Strauss & Corbin 2008). 
Grounded theory is generally defined as a specific methodology to gather and 
analyse qualitative data in a systematic way with the aim of theory construction 
(Charmaz 2000; Creswell 2007) or, as stated by its more prominent proponents: 
“the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained for social research” 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 2). Crucially, however, the ambition of this study is not to 
generate a whole new theory about the mediatization of political elites, but to 
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understand and explain this process in connection to the Chilean context. As was 
stressed earlier, there has been a wealth of theoretical developments around the 
concept of mediatization of politics in recent years. Nonetheless, some areas have 
been identified as theoretical points of strain in need of further development 
(Esser & Strömbäck 2014). Responding to this invitation, this study explores some 
of these theoretical categories qualitatively, in particular how news media logics of 
action interact with political logics of action, and whether mediatization is 
experienced as a process of autonomy loss by political elites. As such, it follows the 
stages identified by Silverman (2006) as the basics of a grounded theory project:  
(…) an initial attempt to develop categories which illuminate the data; an 
attempt to saturate these categories with many appropriate cases in order to 
demonstrate their relevance; and an effort to develop these categories into 
more general analytic frameworks with relevance outside the setting. (Ibid: 
402) 
In other words, the research process follows a path from participant-generated 
data to researcher-generated data, where the final result is understood as a co-
construction of knowledge between participants and the researcher’s 
interpretations (Charmaz 2006; Bryant & Charmaz 2007). 
Techniques from the tradition of applied thematic analysis were also used during 
some stages of data analysis, and are described in the next section. This approach 
is in many ways complementary and adopts elements from grounded theory 
approaches. Both are conceived as interpretive strategies to analyse texts 
(generally free-flowing texts coming from interviews or similar strategies of data 
collection) that are used for the researcher as proxies for experience, in order to 
elicit participants’ “perceptions, feelings, knowledge and behaviour as represented 
in the text” (Guest et al., 2012). Contrary to grounded theory approaches, applied 
140 
 
thematic analysis has the advantage of remaining open to the use of a greater 
variety of techniques for data analysis and data reduction, which I found a great 
advantage for a big qualitative data set.  
Following the proposition of Guest et al. (2012), this study borrows those 
elements that were judged as more suitable at different stages of the research 
process from each of these neighbouring methodological camps. The credibility 
and validity of findings is facilitated by the transparency and visibility of the 
research methods and procedures followed, which will be detailed in the next 
section.  
4.4. Research methods 
The study conforms to an emergent design; that is to say, some decisions on data 
collection and analysis were taken after entering the fieldwork, in response to the 
interaction with research participants (Creswell 2007). In the following 
subsections, these choices will be explained and justified, including: the use of 
semi-structured elite interviews as a method for data collection, the 
characteristics of the sample including details about research participants and 
how access to them was secured, ethical issues and, finally, procedures followed 
for data analysis. 
4.4.1. Data collection: semi-structured interviews 
Data collection took place in the cities of Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile, during 
May and June 2013. Santiago is the Chilean capital where the central government 
is located, as are the headquarters of all political parties. Valparaiso is located 125 
kilometres northwest of the capital and is home to the National Congress. As a 
result, it is usual for parliamentarians – and political elites in general – to travel 
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regularly between the two locations. During this period, 60 interviews were 
conducted with politicians (N=30), journalists (N=18) and press officers working 
with politicians (N=12). The duration of the interviews varied between 15 and 70 
minutes, with an average duration of 33 minutes. All were audio-recorded and, 
later, fully transcribed for analysis. Additionally, notes were taken after the 
conduct of the interviews for initial assessments on the data obtained. Most 
interviews were conducted in professional settings, including La Moneda (the 
government palace), Congress in Valparaiso, the offices of Congress members in 
Santiago and the offices of political parties and news media organisations. A small 
number of interviews were conducted in other spaces such as cafés, personal 
offices or the family home of the respondent. The benefit of conducting most 
interviews in professional settings was the chance of doing additional observation 
and complementing interviews with informal conversations.   
The decision to conduct interviews as the main research method derives from the 
nature of the research questions that this project asks, as they are associated with 
the realm of perceptions, beliefs and interpretations of the relationship Chilean 
political actors have with traditional news media. The data generated through this 
method for this study could not have been otherwise obtained and analysed.  
As a qualitative research method widely used in social sciences, interviews are 
regarded as an effective tool to produce meaningful data in relation to 
interviewees’ perceptions. In a constructionist paradigm, the production of 
knowledge through interviews is understood as largely constructed and generated 
through the interview process, as a result of the interaction between researcher 
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and research participants rather than something excavated and discovered 
(Mason 2002; Charmaz 2006; Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  
The interviews conducted were semi-structured, following Bryman's (2001) 
description of the method. An interview guide was developed, from which most 
questions were posed to research participants, often using similar wording. 
However, the instrument remained flexible enough to pursue topics of interest 
raised in conversation by interviewees, or to tailor questions to their experience 
and positions.  
Ensuring the production of meaningful knowledge is one of the main challenges in 
qualitative interviewing (Mason 2002; Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). This aim was 
pursued in two different ways. First, aligning the interview questions to the 
research questions guiding the study and, second, assessing the interview 
questions in response to the fieldwork experience. These points will be further 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
Regarding the aim of aligning research and data collection questions, the interview 
guide was developed around the three subject areas that inform the research 
questions: (a) goals and value attached to media visibility, (b) media-oriented 
practices and understandings of news media logics and (c) relationships of 
autonomy and control between political actors and news media. Following this 
general structure, three variations of the interview guide were developed, in order 
to adjust the questions to the experiences of the three groups of reference: 
political elites, press officers and journalists (see Appendix 1). There are very few 
differences between the first two variations (politicians and press officers 
interviews), whereas the interview guide for editors and journalists maintains the 
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same subject areas but incorporates questions tailored to their unique 
experiences with political sources that were obviously not appropriate for the 
other participants.  
Secondly, the interview guide remained flexible. In other words, since the aim of 
the study was not producing standardized answers, it served primarily as a guide, 
yet some questions were tailored to the experience and position of each 
interviewee, with the purpose of obtaining meaningful data; it allowed for asking 
interviewees to expand on statements with personal experiences or comment on 
specific situations in which they might have been involved. Kvale & Brinkmann 
(2009) recognizes data collection and analysis as “intertwined phases of 
knowledge construction”. In qualitative-driven strategies of data collection, the 
information obtained in initial stages of the fieldwork should inform the later 
analysis and, in turn, lead to redefinitions of data collection strategies, such as 
rephrasing or redirecting questions or the choice of interviewees (Rubin & Rubin 
2005; Charmaz 2006).  Fieldwork for this study developed along these lines. For 
instance, some of the interview questions were rephrased after conducting the 
first set of interviews in order to make them clearer or more concrete in later 
interviews. Others, instead, were incorporated in response to relevant themes that 
emerged in the first interviews and informal conversations. The latter point can be 
illustrated with the subject of off-the-record conversations between political elites 
and journalists. After some interviews, it became clear that this was an important 
tool not only for political reporting but also for attempts at control and political 
spin. Thus, asking politicians about their experiences with off the record 
conversations proved to be a useful prompt to explore the topic of control, which 
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was not initially considered. Therefore, the question was explicitly incorporated. 
Another important fieldwork decision was to increase the number of interviews 
with journalists and editors. Initially, interviews with this group of participants 
were conceived as a strategy to validate findings; to check and counterbalance the 
views of politicians. For this reason, the target was between 6-10 interviews with 
media professionals. However, many of these interviews revealed quite 
informative and rich data, so additional interviews with journalists and editors 
were conducted to better reflect a greater variety of positions and experiences 
within this group.  
In summary, while the subject areas remained untouched and the main focus of 
the interviews unchanged, and while most questions included in the interview 
guide were posed to all research participants, the interview guide was used with 
flexibility. Additionally, questions and sample decisions were continually 
evaluated during fieldwork. This approach is congruent with an interpretive and 
emergent research strategy; data-driven and context sensitive (Mason 2002; 
Charmaz 2006). 
The diagram included in the next page illustrates the connection between research 
areas, research questions and data collection questions. 
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4.4.1.1. Some notes on elite interviewing  
An important issue to address in this study was that of the position of research 
participants. From the total of 60 interviews conducted, half of the sample 
corresponds to political elites; parliamentarians, present and former government 
ministers and political party leaders (specific profiles are discussed in the next 
subsection).  
As noted by Harvey (2011), definitions about what constitutes an elite are not 
clear-cut in empirical studies, but most authors agree in describing elites as “those 
who hold important social networks, social capital and strategic positions within 
social structures because they are able to exert influence” (Ibid: 443). Pierce 
(2008: 119) broadly defines political elites as “people who exercise 
disproportionately high influence on the outcome of events or policies”, adding 
that “they may be ministers, MPs, senior civil servants, business leaders, union 
leaders, members of think tanks or financial institutions, learned commentators, 
journalists, local councillors, chief executives, gatekeepers, etc.” (Ibid). Although 
these definitions are flexible enough to consider the whole sample as elite 
respondents, I will use the term with a note of caution, acknowledging that the 
label may not adequately reflect the positions occupied by all research 
participants, particularly all journalists and press officers, and the power 
differentials between them and their political counterparts. While the politicians 
interviewed can be clearly identified as elites, the positions and levels of 
responsibility of journalist and press officer respondents vary greatly; some of 
them occupy senior positions and therefore take on greater decision-making 
activities, while others play supporting roles and can be described as middle-
range employees. Nonetheless, all research participants converge in institutional 
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sites of political power such as Congress, Government and political parties, and 
have direct influence on the way politics is represented in traditional mass media, 
as well as in the reproduction of political communication practices in these 
environments.   
Carrying out elite interviews poses some challenges, particularly related to access 
and status differentials between the researcher and the interviewee (Pierce 2008; 
Harvey 2011; Mikecz 2012). How these issues were addressed before and during 
fieldwork is discussed in the next section. 
4.4.2.   Sampling strategy and research participants   
This study is based on a purposive sampling. This is, by definition, a sampling that 
is “essentially strategic and entails an attempt to establish a good correspondence 
between research questions and sampling” (Bryman, 2001: 334). This is a non-
probabilistic sampling strategy, where members of the studied population do not 
have an equal chance of being selected (Pierce 2008). Mason also uses the term 
“strategic” to refer to a sample “designed to encapsulate a relevant range in 
relation to the wider universe, but not to represent it directly” (Mason, 2002: 124).  
The relevance of the interviewees was assessed in connection to the declared 
objectives of the study and the research questions guiding empirical enquiry, as 
suggested by Bryman (2001) and Mason (2002). 
As discussed in section 4.2, a general research question guiding the study (How 
Chilean political elites have adapted to the mediatization of politics?) was 
operationalized in 6 sub-questions responsive to three areas: goals of media 
exposure and value attached to media visibility; media-oriented practices and 
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dynamics of autonomy-control in their relationship with news organisations. 
Following these questions, the selection of research participants was defined by 
the criteria of experience and knowledge in the area investigated (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009). Primarily, in the case of political elites, active membership in 
Chilean politics at the national level was the first and most important selection 
criterion, favouring actors with actual or recent participation in Government, 
Congress or political parties. In order to validate and complement their views, two 
additional groups of research participants were identified:  press officers working 
with politicians (within the same institutions of Government, Congress or political 
parties) and journalists from national media outlets with experience interacting 
with political sources. As such, all research participants are individuals working 
within concrete institutional and organisational domains: party politics and 
traditional journalistic media. By including the perspectives of these groups of 
reference –politicians, journalists and press officers – a comprehensive 
characterization of political communication practices is developed. Nonetheless, 
the inclusion of politicians and press officers working in different branches of 
government, as well as journalists working in different media platforms is not 
intended for comparative purposes inside groups of reference, but for the 
inclusion of a wide range of perspectives, both for variation and richness (Strauss 
& Corbin 2008), as well as for credibility purposes (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
Although a strict quota system was not followed, an adequate range of 
perspectives was also pursued aiming for variance in terms of research 
participants’ political affiliation, gender, years of experience and positions 
currently held (see Appendix 2 for a summary of participants’ attributes). 
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Summary of Research Participants profiles 
 
1 Politician 1 Deputy 
 
31 Communications 1   Senate 
2 Politician 2 Deputy  
 
32 Communications  2 Senate 
3 Politician 3 Political party board 
 
33 Communications 3 Deputies Chamber 
4 Politician 4 Deputy  
 
34 Communications 4 Deputies Chamber 
5 Politician 5 Assessor, political party 
 
35 Communications 5 Senate 
6 Politician 6 Senator  
 
36 Communications 6 Senate 
7 Politician 7 Senator  
 
37 Communications 7 Senate 
8 Politician 8 Minister 
 
38 Communications 8 La Moneda 
9 Politician 9 Senator  
 
39 Communications 9 Political Party 
10 Politician 10 Deputy  
 
40 Communications 10 Political Party 
11 Politician 11 Senator  
 
41 Communications 11 La Moneda 
12 Politician 12 Deputy  
 
42 Communications 12 Political Party 
13 Politician 13 Deputy  
 
43 Journalist 1 Editor, print press  
14 Politician 14 Deputy  
 
44 Journalist 2 Editor, online media 
15 Politician 15 Assessor, political party 
 
45 Journalist 3 Editor, elite newspaper 
16 Politician 16 Political party board 
 
46 Journalist 4 Journalist, radio 
17 Politician 17 Former Minister 
 
47 Journalist 5 Editor, radio 
18 Politician 18 Deputy  
 
48 Journalist 6 Editor, online media 
19 Politician 19 Former Deputy 
 
49 Journalist 7 Journalist, elite newspaper 
20 Politician 20 Deputy  
 
50 Journalist 8 Journalist, online media 
21 Politician 21 Deputy  
 
51 Journalist 9  Journalist, TV 
22 Politician 22 Senator  
 
52 Journalist 10 Journalist, elite newspaper 
23 Politician 23 Deputy  
 
53 Journalist 11 Journalist, elite newspaper 
24 Politician 24 Assessor, political party 
 
54 Journalist 12 Editor, elite newspaper 
25 Politician 25 Deputy  
 
55 Journalist 13 Editor, print press  
26 Politician 26  Senator  
 
56 Journalist 14 Journalist, online media 
27 Politician 27 Deputy  
 
57 Journalist 15 Senior editor, radio 
28 Politician 28 Deputy  
 
58 Journalist 16 Editor, TV 
29 Politician 29  Former Minister 
 
59 Journalist 17 Journalist, radio 
30 Politician 30  Political party board  
 
60 Journalist 18 Editor, TV 
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It is important to note that most respondents had previous professional 
experience in other positions. For example, 5 of the 30 politicians interviewed 
currently holding positions in Congress or political parties had previous 
experience in government as former ministers or deputy ministers. Most 
journalists and editors interviewed had previous experience in other media 
outlets and, less frequently, in communications and press management positions. 
Most press officers interviewed had previous experience as journalists in news 
organisations.  
The table included in page 149 summarises how research participants will be 
identified throughout the thesis when directly quoted.  
4.4.2.1. Fieldwork challenges: Gaining access to research participants   
The literature on elite interviewing stresses the problem of access to respondents 
and how to maximise possibilities for data collection since this is a group that 
normally suffers from overloaded work schedules (Pierce 2008; Harvey 2011). In 
this respect, the issue of time was pressing for all respondents, and had to be 
factored into the planning of the fieldwork.  
My previous experience as a journalist and as a communications officer gave me 
an accurate picture about the respondents’ changing schedules and priorities. As 
such, I was prepared to be flexible in pursuing interviews. Thus, multiple 
strategies were used in parallel in order to maximise chances of access to 
participants. Personal contacts, networks and snowballing techniques proved 
useful to contact some participants. Nonetheless, while aiming for a balanced 
range of perspectives, this approach had to be complemented and several 
participants were approached without intermediaries. Most interviews required 
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multiple requests before interviews were secured, and it was not unusual for 
agreed-upon interviews to be cancelled at the last minute. Some of these could be 
re-scheduled, others could not.  
Preparation for fieldwork started with identifying potential research participants, 
taking into consideration the criteria already outlined and observing an 
appropriate range of diversity within the studied institutional domains.  
Introductory letters (see sample in Appendix 3) were sent via email in the weeks 
preceding the interviews to an initial group of potential research participants 
(approximately 30), in order to gauge responsiveness levels. The response rate to 
these emails was low, and therefore emails were followed by phone calls, either to 
personal numbers or offices, where personal contact details were not available. 
During fieldwork, 35 additional letters were sent to other potential participants. 
These letters contained a summary of the project and a short explanation about 
why the experience of the respondent would be of interest to the study. The latter 
was generally a reference to their expertise and past and/or present positions, 
following Mikecz's (2012) recommendation about the importance of showing 
awareness of an elite interviewee’s trajectory, for credibility purposes.  
This formal approach, where participants were first approached through email 
and often through intermediaries such as assistants, chiefs of staff or press 
officers, was supplemented by direct approaches to participants or potential 
intermediaries in natural settings. Most people were far more responsive to direct 
approaches. In this respect, Congress in Valparaiso and Congress’s offices in 
Santiago were particularly useful places to reach potential interviewees. Initially, I 
had limited access to the building. Only when interviews were previously 
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arranged was access granted for the floor where the relevant office was located. 
Later, I separately contacted the Communications Offices of the Senate and the 
Deputies Chamber (both spatially and organisationally distinct, in spite of being in 
the same building) and requested permission to be in the press areas45. This was 
granted and that allowed me to circulate freely inside the building for most of my 
fieldwork. This access also allowed the observation of multiple interactions: 
politician-reporter exchanges, press points, press conferences. Additionally, it 
allowed me to contact insiders (press officers, assistants, assessors) that acted as 
gatekeepers facilitating access to new research participants, to directly approach 
politicians, press officers and journalists, to introduce the study and to request 
interviews. Many interviews were arranged in this way and conducted in 
Congress, in spaces such as parliamentarians’ offices, the press room or the 
Congress Café. In addition to Congress, I visited La Moneda three times, several 
political party headquarters in Santiago and some news organisations. 
Fieldwork for this study coincided with the progress of primary presidential 
elections of the Nueva Mayoría political coalition.46 This event allowed me to 
conduct observations and reach potential participants at two particular moments: 
the preparation for a TV debate of one of the candidates and an informal meeting 
between another candidate and people working in the communications sector. 
Since the focus of this study is not electoral, these observations did not directly 
inform the analysis. However, they were privileged spaces to observe interactions 
                                                          
45
 This permission was granted following a formal request backed by the thesis supervisor and an 
explanation of the research project being undertaken.  
46
 The centre-left coalition Nueva Mayoría declared their presidential candidate on June 30
th
 2013. The 
winner of this election, open to both registered members and voters of the sector, was the current 
incumbent, President Michelle Bachelet. 
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between politicians, journalists or communications aides, as well as spaces to 
recruit further research participants.  
Participants were asked to grant a 30-minute interview. In my experience, it 
would not be realistic to ask for more time, and chances were that some of them 
could be extended in situ. As already mentioned, this was approximately the 
average duration of interviews (33 minutes), although the range varied greatly. 
Some interviews ran as long as 70 minutes and some were as short as 15 minutes. 
My decision was to accept and include short interviews if that was the only chance 
of getting an interviewee. Interviews at the shortest end of the spectrum still 
proved informative, and all rendered useful information. Of course, different 
insights and greater levels of rapport were developed in extended interviews and 
this was one of the reasons to stretch the numbers of participants, reaching an 
eventual total of 60 people.  
During fieldwork, preliminary analyses were conducted in the form of notes taken 
after the conclusion of the interviews, in order to identify areas to expand, 
constantly reassess the interview guide, as well as take decisions about who to 
contact next. In this respect, numbers of participants within each group of 
reference were primarily responsive to preliminary analysis of data collected. 
Additionally, a minimum target of 6 and an ideal minimum of 12 interviews per 
group was pursued, following Guest et al. (2006), who identified these numbers as 
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thresholds in the development of qualitative analysis47. This target was achieved 
and surpassed.  
4.4.3. Ethical issues and anonymity of research participants 
This study follows the research ethics guides set by the University of Sheffield, and 
research ethics clearance was obtained before the beginning of the fieldwork. All 
interviews were conducted after informed consent was given and the data 
provided for participants has been treated confidentially.    
As discussed in the previous section, research participants were initially 
approached through an introductory letter, which included details on the nature 
and objectives of the project, sponsor details48 and academic credentials. Those 
participants who were directly approached were given this information verbally. 
Additionally, all participants were informed at the beginning of the interview of 
the main characteristics of the research project and had the chance of asking 
questions. They were also informed about the decision to anonymize interviews in 
the thesis and in the event of the production of related publications. This 
researcher explained that they would be generically identified (e.g. Senator, 
political party board member, editor of elite newspaper, etc.). All participants 
agreed to these conditions and that agreement was audio-recorded, as previously 
specified in the Research Ethics Application Form approved by the Department of 
Journalism Studies.49 
                                                          
47
 In an experimental study, Guest et al. (2006) developed a code book for a qualitative study, analysing 
interviews six by six (till reaching 60). They contend that 73 per cent of the codes were identified after 
the analysis of the first group of 6 interviews, and 92 per cent after the analysis of 12.  
48
 This PhD has been financed thanks to a scholarship granted by Conicyt (Comisión Nacional de 
Investigación Científica y Tecnológica de Chile).  
49
 Ethical approval is on file with Department of Journalism Studies and Research & Innovation 
Services. 
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Some scholars who discuss elite interviewing sometimes leave decisions on 
anonymity to interviewees, privileging the attribution of information unless 
requested by a research participant (Mikecz 2012). More often, however, the 
decision is connected to the eventual sensitive nature of the information provided 
and the protection of research participants (Mason 2002). The choice of 
anonymizing interviews in this study was made upon two premises. First, because 
interviews explored behaviour patterns rather than participants’ interventions in 
specific events, and therefore the offer of anonymity was plausible and there was 
no clear value added by publishing names. Secondly, to encourage participants to 
provide more honest answers, and to avoid interviewees following the PR lines 
often expected in elite interviewing. Among press officers and journalists, the 
option of anonymity was clearly welcomed and facilitated the establishment of 
rapport during the interview process. Among some politician participants, the 
decision to anonymise interviews had a positive effect, as long as they were keen 
to reflect on their relationship with news organisations and openly disclose 
information about their routines, methods and personal relations. Others 
remained relatively constrained and did not share sensitive information despite 
anonymity. In a small number of interviews, participants requested to 
momentarily turn the recorder off, especially when making references to specific 
cases. Examples given under these circumstances were obviously not transcribed 
or coded. On other occasions, participants agreed to being recorded during the 
whole interview but gave examples off the record. These examples are not 
mentioned in the thesis either, in order to protect confidentiality. They offered 
useful insights to support the analysis but are not used to illustrate points.  
156 
 
An additional point to consider is that of language. All interviews were conducted 
in Spanish, and transcripts were also analysed in this language, in order to keep 
direct contact with the way in which participants expressed themselves. Specific 
quotations used throughout the thesis for illustration purposes were translated 
into English by the author and native speakers were consulted on translated 
phrases to ensure natural language clarity. Therefore, although most quotations 
used throughout the thesis are word-by-word translations, on occasions where 
idioms were not easily translatable, preference was given to sense-making rather 
than literality.  
4.4.4. Strategies for data analysis  
Overall, the process of data preparation and analysis extended for approximately 
one year, and was documented in a project journal for audit trail purposes, as 
suggested by Bazeley & Jackson (2013).  
The analysis was conducted using NVivo10, a computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software program (CAQDAS). This software not only facilitated the 
process of coding but, more importantly, contains a variety of functions aiding 
non-linear forms of analysis. It does so by providing tools for linking information, 
modelling, as well as greatly facilitating the efficient retrieval and comparison of 
information using tools such as queries, matrices and word searches (see Bringer, 
2006; Hutchison et al., 2010; Bazeley & Jackson, 2013).  
4.4.4.1. Initial coding and codebook development  
After they were fully transcribed, all interviews were imported into NVivo10 for 
analysis. They were associated with their groups of reference (politicians, 
journalists, press officers) in order to facilitate future queries. All interviews were 
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analysed using successive stages of coding and aiming to develop analytical insight 
grounded in the generated data. The word ‘data’ refers in this context to the 
“textual representation of a conversation, observation and interaction” (Guest et 
al., 2012: 50).  
Coding refers to the process through which textual data generated for analysis is 
de-constructed in multiple units of meaning or incidents – actions, characteristics, 
experiences, explanations – with the aim of assisting analytical thinking about that 
data (Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 2008; Birks & Mills 2011). It acts as a way 
to “define what is happening in the data and begin to grapple what it means” 
(Charmaz, 2006: 46). The initial stage of coding for this study was developed 
following a line-by-line approach, that is to say subjecting a first group of 
interviews (N= 14) to close inspection and developing open, rather than 
hierarchically organised, codes. Each time a code is created it has to be defined, 
aiming for consistency in the future application of that code to different data 
segments (see complete Code Book in Appendix 4). Following this approach, it was 
typical for a paragraph to include more than one, eventually overlapping, codes.  
For example, the following paragraph (from a conversation with the editor of an 
online newspaper) has been coded with 3 different nodes: “symbiosis-synchrony”, 
referring to the convergence between political and journalistic interests; “political 
operation”, referring to a source’s coordinated effort to get media coverage with a 
strategic aim; and “assessing quality of information”, referring to the journalistic 
practice of checking the veracity of the information provided. 
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So there you have an example of someone who is trying to operate and, 
despite that he is trying to operate, the issue is anyway real, is truthful, is not 
an invention and is news. So, what we do in such case is talk to all the sources.  
Journalist 2, Editor, online media. 
In the following example, extracted from the conversation with a senator, the 
paragraph has been also coded into three nodes: “media ownership-
concentration”, referring to the concentration of media property; “triggering 
debate”, referring to the political actor’s aims of seeking media coverage to 
position a topic on the agenda and “acknowledging difficulties”, referring to the 
recognition that such an aim is not always easy to achieve: 
Sometimes we speak about issues that we are interested in positioning in the 
media, which is not very easy because all media here is concentrated, so this 
is not an open thing in which everyone has the same communication 
possibilities. 
Politician 11, Senator.  
The objective of this strategy for initial coding is to stick closely to the data and 
interrogate participants’ experiences instead of applying pre-existent categories 
(Charmaz 2006); “a brainstorming approach to analysis” (Strauss & Corbin, 2008: 
160).  
After coding an initial group of six interviews following this approach, a total of 
115 codes were organised in a tree code in order to facilitate the localization of 
specific codes in the analysis of successive interviews, providing an initial 
framework for data organisation and analysis. Codes were organised into six 
groups or domains, identified with a colour to facilitate visual identifications: 
political actors’ domain (blue nodes), journalists’ domain (red nodes), interactions 
between politicians and journalists (purple nodes), agenda drivers (green nodes), 
contextual features (orange nodes) and actors (yellow nodes). Each domain 
generally contained a handful of categories or higher-level concepts under which 
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lower-level concepts were organised according to shared properties (Strauss & 
Corbin 2008). 
Nodes were constantly revised for consistency, in order to rename, reorganise or 
merge redundant nodes. However, new nodes only occasionally emerged after 
coding the first dozen interviews, confirming the validity of this threshold as a 
point of reference for data saturation (see Guest et al., 2006).  Anticipating this 
scenario, the interviews first coded were those identified (during field work-level 
analysis) as richer in detail and example. Subsequently, analysis moved forward in 
groups of three, intercalating interviews from the different groups of reference 
(politicians, journalists, press officers). Since longer and richer interviews were 
analysed at the beginning of the process, coding of subsequent interviews became 
more straightforward; most codes had already been identified and later 
interviews analysed tended to be those that were shorter. The final number of 
nodes after the completion of initial coding in all interviews was 129. 
Memo-writing was a fundamental tool during data analysis. Memo-writing is 
especially encouraged within the grounded theory tradition as a way to explore 
data and identify relations between nodes – the basis for data analysis and early 
theorisation – as well as a way of monitoring the relationship between emergent 
categories and research questions (Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 2008; Birks & 
Mills 2011).  
The following image shows a screenshot from NVivo with the first stage tree node, 
as it looks when the nodes are not expanded. On the following page there is a 
diagram showing all nodes identified during the first stage of coding, organised in 
six domains identified with a colour to facilitate the coding process.   
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Figure 9: First Node Tree not expanded (see full diagram of nodes in next 
page)  
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4.4.4.2. Data reduction and development of analytical codes 
The second stage of data analysis started after all interviews were coded, in order 
to build an adjusted interpretation of the participants’ views that could provide a 
basis for answering the research questions guiding the study. This stage, which I 
will describe as data reduction50, incorporated a progression of the analysis 
around the identification of core categories and their main properties, which 
provided the basis for findings. 
The main strategies followed, in order to move towards data reduction, were the 
identification of core categories and the analysis of data in clusters of nodes 
related to that category. In order to make this task more manageable, some 
exploratory techniques facilitated by NVivo10 were used, such as comparing 
relative frequencies of codes, exploring co-occurrences and using tools for 
visualizations such as cluster analysis.  
Comparing frequencies among codes provided a first indication about topics that 
were given greater relevance by participants. Therefore, high frequencies51 are 
closely connected to greater salience. Codes with higher frequencies – that is to 
say, themes more commonly discussed by participants – were thoroughly 
analysed, comparing how the different groups of reference approached those 
themes, highlighting similarities and differences where appropriate.  
Codes generated in the first stage were further explored using queries that detect 
                                                          
50
 Data reduction is a concept more commonly used within the tradition of applied thematic analysis 
(Namey et al., 2008; Guest et al., 2012).This stage of analysis receives a variety of names among 
grounded theorists. Following Glaser & Strauss (1967), Birks & Mills (2011) refer to it as intermediate 
coding; Strauss & Corbin (2008) refer to it as axial coding, while Charmaz (2006) distinguishes between 
axial and selective coding.  
51
 Frequencies are assessed not only as to how many times a code was applied but also as to how many 
respondents the code was applied. This was used in order to avoid attributing too much weight to a 
code that was, for example, applied 20 times in just one interview versus another code that was applied 
once in 20 interviews.   
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relevant co-occurrences, that is to say, instances in which two or more codes were 
applied to a “discrete segment of text from a unique respondent” (Namey et al. 
2008). Co-occurrences are a basic indication of relationship between concepts. 
These were first explored creating a general matrix in which all first stage codes 
represented the columns and the rows, in order to have an idea of relevant 
intersections (relationships) between codes. Relevant intersections in specific 
domains were further explored retrieving those segments of text in which codes 
were simultaneously applied, to assist analysis and memo-writing.     
Additionally, other complementary strategies such as cluster analysis were applied 
to detect similarities and relationships. NVivo’s clustering tools can be used to 
assess the similarity of nodes based on word or code similarity, then presented as 
a dendrogram or graph (Bazeley & Jackson 2013). So, for example, in the image 
below it is possible to see that the codes “adapting to the rule of the media”, 
“circumnavigating the rule of the media”, “monitoring the environment” and 
“creating opportunities” were discussed in somehow distinct ways. Instead, the 
code “obtaining visibility” was often discussed together with “enabling- facilitating 
(political) action”, which suggests that the search for media attention is closely 
linked to political objectives. “Defining the rule of the media” was often coded 
together with “(news) trading”, which might indicate that understanding how the 
news media operate is basic in order to attempt positioning topics.  
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This line of analysis can provide a rationale to construct a narrative that is actually 
grounded in data and the views of participants (Guest & McLellan, 2003). 
However, I share the view of Bazeley & Jackson (2013) that these are tools best 
used in an exploratory mode to assist the interpretive effort of qualitative 
research and do not necessarily provide explanatory evidence. Instead, they are 
useful visualizations to spark ideas and point towards relationships that have to 
be manually explored in the raw data.  
After the successive use of these techniques, six prominent clusters were 
identified and analysed: (1) independence-autonomy, (2) trading information, (3) 
strategic disclosures, (4) visibility-public attention, (5) what makes it into the 
news and (6) political communication professionalisation. These clusters were 
individually analysed through memo writing, in order to establish relationships, 
detect differences and, overall, go beyond the descriptive level and move towards 
analytical coding, explanatory models and theoretical insight. Charmaz (2006) 
refers to this process as clustering, a prewriting technique that aims to produce a 
Figure 11: Nodes clustered by coding similarity   
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tentative map of relevant categories.  
A discrete tree node, integrating 12 analytical codes, was the final outcome of the 
second stage of analysis, illustrated as:  
 
The organisation of these codes reflects the main relationships mapped through 
the exercise of clustering and memo-writing. Findings have been organised and 
presented using this tree node as a basis.  
4.5. Validation of findings  
The validity of findings in this study has been established at the different stages of 
the research process, aiming for coherence between research aims and outcomes, 
as well as the production of findings that are empirically grounded and yet able to 
enter into a dialogue with existing literature.  
Validity in qualitative research is grounded in establishing coherence between 
objectives, theoretical perspectives and research methods (Kvale & Brinkmann 
Figure 12: Second Node Tree 
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2009; Birks & Mills 2011), as well as the relevance and appropriateness of findings 
in relation to the research questions posed (Pierce 2008). As such, validity relies 
on a continuous process involving questioning data and checking interpretations 
against data, as well as transparency in the procedures used (Charmaz 2006; 
Strauss & Corbin 2008; Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  
Some of the steps taken in order to increase the validity of findings in this study 
already outlined in this chapter can be briefly summarised as follows: 
- At the stage of research design, the decision to incorporate groups of reference 
different from political elites was taken with the aim of securing a variety of 
perspectives, as well as providing an opportunity to validate findings via 
comparison of participants’ accounts about the areas under study. Having 
comparison groups (Glaser & Strauss 1967) or multiple sources of information 
(Guest et al., 2012) has been highlighted as a measure for improvement in the 
credibility of theoretical insights in qualitative research.  
- This concern was later pursued during the stage of data collection through the 
sampling of political and media actors that reflected different political affiliations, 
as well as experiences in different institutions, political areas and media platforms. 
At this stage, the questionnaire was also adjusted in response to first assessments 
on the conduct of interviews.  
- At the stage of data analysis, a project journal was created with the aim of 
ensuring that an audit trail was maintained. Documenting decisions along the 
research process had the primary aim of being as transparent as possible about 
the path taken, an important condition for credibility in qualitative research 
(Rubin & Rubin 2005; Birks & Mills 2011). Developing a code book also helped to 
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maintain consistency during the coding process; which was later complemented 
with the use of software-aided techniques for the exploration of data, which 
guided interpretation, ensuring that findings were grounded in research 
participants’ experiences. 
Corbin & Strauss (2008) contends that credible findings are “trustworthy and 
believable if they reflect participants', researchers', and readers' experiences with 
a phenomenon but at the same time the explanation is only one of many ‘plausible’ 
interpretations possible from data” (Ibid: 302). Certainly, the validity of a 
qualitative and interpretive study cannot rely on replicability; however some 
avenues to gauge credibility of findings include exposing them to the judgment of 
experts (Pierce 2008). This has been a complementary validation route within this 
study, through the exposition of findings in international conferences.52 These 
different steps taken seek for consistency of research findings and, therefore, 
reliability of the study as a whole. 
4.6. Strengths and limitations of chosen approach 
The choice of approaching the research problem outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter using an interpretive strategy based on conducting interviews is 
consistent with the research questions that this study seeks to answer, which are 
focused on a qualitative understanding of the process of mediatization, from an 
actor-centred perspective.  
Qualitative interviewing is a research method particularly suited to grasping 
experiences, motives and opinions, and assembling multiple views in order to 
                                                          
52
 Among others, findings of this study were presented at the ECREA TWG Mediatization Conference, 
Rethinking the mediatization of politics, LSE (April 2014); ICA Annual Conference (2015), IAMCR Annual 
Conference (2015). 
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portray complex social processes and the way meaning is negotiated (Rubin & 
Rubin 2005). Additionally, this allows an exploration of the role contextual 
features play in rather abstract processes (Mason 2002) such as the mediatization 
of politics, an issue of pivotal relevance for this study. For the study of political 
elites in particular, interviewing is a long-tested method, appropriate for the 
exploration of elite mind-sets as well as how dominant powers and institutions 
shape those understandings (Richards & Smith 2002; Pierce 2008). 
This study certainly has important limitations that have to be acknowledged. 
Firstly, because of its research design, this project can only attest to an 
interpretation based on the views of a group of participants in a single moment in 
time. As such, it cannot comprehensively account for changes in the relationship 
between Chilean political elites and the media over time. Qualitative research can 
certainly offer some insights for longitudinal research. In particular, how 
individuals negotiate change and how social transformations relate to specific 
contexts (Holland et al. 2006). In this study, this aim is developed by exploring 
how political elites have negotiated change in the Chilean media environment in 
recent years. Nonetheless, this study has not been designed to provide evidence of 
longitudinal change in the mediatization process, let alone measure levels of 
mediatization over time.  
Secondly, this study focuses on specific groups of actors, political elites and news 
media actors, therefore paying attention to the relevance that the traditional 
journalistic media paradigm still may hold.  It does not delve into the logics of 
action that new media may be imposing on actors. These limitations, nonetheless, 
contribute to the aim of gaining explanatory power by delimiting the object of 
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enquiry to certain temporal parameters and certain actors. Finally, due to the 
nature of the research design guiding this study, there is no intention of measuring 
levels of mediatization. Some scholars have suggested that mediatization theory is 
especially suited to comparative research (Strömbäck 2011b) and even that it has 
to be conducted in a comparative framework (Meyen et al. 2014). The 
underpinning concept behind such statements is that the expected outcome of a 
study on mediatization should be whether a certain group, institution or country 
is more or less mediatized compared to others or compared with themselves at 
different moments of time. This is certainly a valid expected outcome of 
comparative research, but certainly not the only means of analysing mediatization. 
Far from it, this study was conceived upon the idea that mediatization research, 
and mediatization theory, can benefit from asking different questions such as how, 
why and under what circumstances are political elites mediatized, and what that 
means for the on-going debate on the subject. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CIRCUITS OF ELITE COMMUNICATION  
 
The mediatization of political elites in Chile has not occurred in a vacuum nor is it 
the mere reflection of global trends. Instead, it is a process that is responsive to 
the operational logics of a specific media environment and a specific political 
culture. The literature about relationships between political and media actors 
recognises that these are context-dependent (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; 
Berkowitz 2009) and therefore shaped by political, social and geographical 
variables. Likewise, the institutional logics perspective highlights that, as well as 
institutions being historically contingent, individuals and organisations are 
embedded in specific cultural contexts (Thornton et al. 2012). Recognising this is 
relevant for situating the interactions between political elites and traditional news 
media in a more concrete environment, inhabited and dominated by particular 
media actors.  
This chapter establishes the context in which political elites in Chile relate to 
traditional news media, identifying the main features of a prevailing political 
communication micro-culture that binds politicians, press officers and journalists 
together. This micro-culture is examined in terms of its communication practices, 
which are linked to physical and mediated spaces in which specific groups of 
institutional actors interact, all of which constitute what will be called ‘a circuit of 
elite communication’. This circuit will be described within the chapter in relation 
to actors (politicians linked to party politics, press officers assisting them and 
journalists linked to news media outlets of national coverage), physical spaces (La 
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Moneda and central-level government agencies, political parties, Congress)  and 
news media outlets that together configure an information environment relevant 
for the actors involved. Additionally, this circuit is shaped by personal and 
frequent interactions of the actors involved. The analysis of interviews allows 
description of this as a micro-culture heavily dominated by traditional players, 
exclusive and self-referential, which is nonetheless struggling to deal with a 
renewed informational environment, which has seen an expansion granted for the 
proliferation of digitally-native news organisations and social media. 
Looking into this micro-culture follows, on the one hand, the interest expressed by 
the neo-institutional tradition and the institutional logics perspective  for the 
exploration of identities, practices and beliefs (March & Olsen 2006) to better 
understand how the culture carried by institutions and networks of actors 
activates certain behaviours in individuals and groups (DiMaggio 1997). On the 
other hand, it follows a renewed interest in the study of elite cultures in media 
studies, as they are understood as spaces where communication practices have 
significant repercussions on society (Davis 2003; Davis 2007b; Corcoran & Fahy 
2009). 
Section 5.1 outlines how the relationship between political elites and news 
organisations has supported a micro-culture that reinforces and feeds the elite 
closure that characterises Chilean social (Torche 2005) and political organisations 
(Godoy 2003; Luna & Mardones 2010).  In spite of recognizing the increasing 
fragmentation of the news media environment and the eruption of some 
influential media actors operating in digital platforms, research participants 
highlight the closed and self-referential nature of the political communication 
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community. This community is therefore characterised as inhabiting a micro-
culture, based on frequent exchanges and intensive relations, which still heavily 
gravitates towards the elite press. Additionally, the disconnections between the 
political press and the general public are acknowledged, stressing two main 
points. First, the primary role this political beat has in configuring a space of inter-
elite communication. Second, how the arrival of new media actors represents a 
challenge of legitimacy not only for political elites but also for traditional media 
players, as long as the micro-culture of elite communication as a whole sees its 
ability to control public attention diminished. 
The second part of the chapter recognizes that the circuit of elite communication 
is not an open space where all actors have equal chances of mediated visibility. 
Instead, some structural sources of differentiation are identified, which research 
participants stress as determinant in defining access to the media. The super-
visibility of the Executive power, the cleavage of national versus regional 
leaderships and the political biases of dominant media players are identified as 
structural barriers in the relationship between political actors and the media. 
These sources of differentiation are closely connected to features of both the 
political and media systems, and appear directly aligned to monetary, professional 
and time resources available to actors for the management of mediated visibility.  
Finally, a typology of mediatization is developed taking into consideration 
institutional and individual resources devoted to media management. The 
identification of these ideal types highlights that the mediatization of political 
actors, that is the degree to which political actors adapt to news media logics of 
action, is dependent upon both the availability of institutional resources and their 
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own definitions regarding the value of mediated visibility in the construction of 
political leadership. Thus, the extent to which some actors appear more 
mediatized than others in their communication strategies is a combination of 
structural conditions and individual practices.    
 
5.1 The elite micro-culture: excluding and bounded by the elite 
press   
Constant communication, frequent information exchanges and similar patterns of 
media consumption and information monitoring reinforce the self-referential 
nature of the political communication community, a group integrated by political 
and media actors who converge around spaces relevant for the conduct of 
institutional politics, especially La Moneda, Congress and political parties, and 
around a delimited circuit of elite communication, comprised of certain 
organisational media actors.  
Looking at the relationships between political and media actors through the lens 
of the neo-institutionalist tradition (Dimaggio & Powell 1983; March & Olsen 
1984), it is possible to infer that by their convergence within a micro-culture that 
has fairly recognisable limits, these communities have developed norms and rules 
to guide their interactions. 
For a start, interaction within these groups of actors is guaranteed due to their 
convergence in concrete spaces. In Congress, journalists and politicians share 
multiple common spaces and that is why is often referred to as a ‘dream setting’ 
for political reporters. The building is divided spatially between two separate yet 
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interconnected sections, the Senate and the Deputies’ Chamber, and accredited 
journalists circulate freely through most sectors of the building, including the 
hallways and the cafeteria located right outside each chamber. All 
parliamentarians are, therefore, easily accessible on a one-to-one basis. Although 
journalists have a dedicated press room in each chamber, during legislative days 
most journalists spend far more time in the hallways, talking directly to politicians 
or their press aides. Casual interactions between journalists and politicians in La 
Moneda, the presidential palace, are certainly less frequent, as direct access to 
ministers and public servants is more restricted and often limited to rushed 
questioning and answering when authorities cross the building’s patios, or in 
exceptional cases to previously agreed meetings. In spite of the difference between 
parliamentarians and ministers, access to political sources is not perceived as a 
problematic issue. On the contrary, the interactions between politicians, press 
officers and journalists are described as fluid, intense and frequent. 
Certainly, the proximity between political and media actors is not only restricted 
to physical interactions. It is also built on the back of myriad informal 
conversations – face to face, over the phone, through instant messaging 
applications – and constant monitoring of published and unpublished information. 
Politicians, as well as press officers and journalists, comment on the reflexive 
nature of the political communication community, and how information moves at 
great speed, through both formal and informal channels, partially determining the 
course the news agenda will take as well as future interventions of political actors. 
During this process the political news agenda is shaped and negotiated, together 
with interpretive frameworks to understand events:  
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-XO:  How often do you talk to journalists or editors? 
- A lot, a lot, for various reasons, because one is usually exposed to this 
editorial niche; you enter a certain circuit. And therefore, it is not only 
about providing different information, but even to discuss and compare 
[information] you have regular contacts with journalists. 53 
Politician 29, Former Minister. 
 
The most important part [of our job] is to know how the ground is, and 
we manage the ground: talking to the media, knowing which lines of work 
they are following; monitoring. That's us (…) and during the day I monitor 
websites, I’m all day talking to journalists; all day long, it’s awful.  
Communications 12, Political Party. 
 
Everything changes very fast; it is very fast. You're stuck on an issue and the 
next day; no, the next hour, it changes. Everyone knows what everyone else 
does. And everyone knows what everyone says.  
Journalist 9, Journalist, TV. 
 
Proximity, speed and regularity of contacts are some of the issues highlighted in 
the above quotations. Davis (2003, 2007, 2009) is one of the scholars who has 
advocated paying attention to the micro-level politics of the political sphere itself, 
and the “mediated reflexivity” that characterises most of politicians’ and 
journalists’ interactions, as their relationships are “institutionalised, intense and 
reflexive as both sides have come to incorporate the other within their everyday 
thinking, decision-making and behaviour” (Davis 2009: 215). 
At the time of identifying the informational limits of the circuit of elite 
communication, most research participants recognise that the increasing 
fragmentation of the information environment has made the task of monitoring 
information increasingly demanding. Patterns of media consumption certainly 
                                                          
53
 In most quotations some segments have been highlighted using bold. This emphasis has been added 
by the author, with the aim of directing the reader’s attention and facilitating interpretation. When 
emphasis is added by the respondent, this will be signalled.  
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vary individually. However, specific media platforms are brought to the 
foreground as relevant for the vast majority of political journalists and politicians, 
playing the role of delimiting the territory of relevant information. At a national 
level, the press (particularly El Mercurio, La Tercera and La Segunda) is considered 
a non-negotiable part of the day for most research participants. Additionally, some 
radio stations are recognised as having a relevant role in the political beat 
(Cooperativa, BioBio, ADN and Agricultura). Limited time on free reception TV is 
partially counterbalanced by 24-hour news TV channels (TVN 24 Horas and CNN 
Chile) with limited audiences, but focused impact. In the digital domain, the 
newspaper El Mostrador and the website of investigative journalism Ciper.cl are 
often mentioned as relevant players, plus other journalistic projects functioning 
from digital platforms only (for example El Dínamo, The Clinic.cl). In the area of 
social media, Twitter is mentioned by approximately half of the sample (and one 
third of the interviewed politicians)54 as an important source of information, 
especially useful for taking the temperature of the political moment.  
Distinctions by medium also apply, and TV in particular is situated in a separate 
category by politicians and press officers because of its broad reach and potential 
mass impact. Regional and local media are also discussed and approached in 
different terms. As with TV, they are conceived of as outward-facing spaces of 
communication; that is to say, oriented to audiences located outside the circuit of 
elite communication.  
                                                          
54
 The news media outlets included in the description of the informational limits of the elite political 
communication culture are those most frequently mentioned by research participants, as an indication 
of those common sources of information prominently considered in the formation of political news 
agendas. Nevertheless, there are other news media outlets that could be considered as actors within 
this circuit, such as Qué Pasa magazine, the financial press (Estrategia, Pulso, Diario Financiero), 
political TV programs (Tolerancia 0, Estado Nacional) or most recent digitally native additions such as El 
Libero.  
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With the limited space that political coverage currently has on free-to-air TV55, the 
elite press is generally recognised as the gravitational centre of the political 
communication micro culture, despite this section of the news media being 
perceived as disconnected from the general public. This community of actors is 
well aware of the elitist bias of political journalism. It was common for research 
participants to describe their environment using words that denote isolation and 
being disconnected from broader society, such as ‘microclimate’, ‘capsule’, 
‘bubble’, ‘little world’ and ‘reality show’, a narrative that reinforces the idea that 
the circuit of political news is mostly understood as a space for inter-elite 
communication, an idea typically illustrated in the following quotation, from a 
Senator:  
- (…) through the media you're talking to other politicians and the media 
themselves; it is sort of encapsulated with regards to the citizenry 
- XO: Would you say that the citizenry is left out then? 
- It is completely left out. This is like a reality [show]; here in Congress is a 
reality [show] and the same in La Moneda, between journalists and politicians 
(...) One of the most interesting issues here, and one that surprised me so 
much when I started in politics, is this encapsulation.  
Politician 26, Senator.  
 
This prevalent narrative of encapsulation resonates with arguments about the 
historical role of the news media as a forum for communication among elites 
(Schudson 2002; Davis 2003; Wolfsfeld 2003; Corcoran & Fahy 2009), but more 
critically, it points to an inward-facing circuit of elite communication, integrated 
by a limited number of people, where relations are mostly personal and 
membership granted by means of successive interactions: 
                                                          
55
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, press programmes represent 27 per cent of all TV programming. 
However, political subjects account only for 9 per cent of these productions (therefore slightly more 
than 2 per cent of total programming) (Anatel 2014).  
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Sure, the media market is small and the political market is small, and then the 
relationships are direct. [You know] everybody, everybody, because you 
also go every week to Congress, where you will see them all and they will see 
you all day long; [then you have] La Moneda, political parties and that would 
be about it. There aren’t many places for reporting, and they are small.  
Journalist 12, Editor, elite newspaper. 
 
The idea of encapsulation appears reinforced by the centrality of the agenda 
setting power the elite press is perceived as having for the political conversation, 
in spite of the quite generalized acknowledgment that these newspapers are not 
widely read by the vast majority of citizens.56 It is frequent for politicians and 
political journalists alike to state matter-of-factly that El Mercurio and La Tercera 
(and to a lesser extent the evening newspaper La Segunda) are a daily starting 
point, acting in practice as proxies of the political agenda itself.  
It is the first thing that you as a journalist, editor, director or owner will read. 
They are extremely influential. The duopoly of the press exists and is 
tremendously influential. And, besides, they are good newspapers.  
Journalist 9, TV. 
 
Absolutely, absolutely. They set the agenda, they build it. So you read the 
editorial pieces of El Mercurio and there's the agenda. And La Tercera is the 
same thing; same.  
Politician 21, Deputy. 
 
I would like it if other news media had the same ability to generate public 
opinion, because in a way La Segunda, El Mercurio and La Tercera set the 
agenda for the rest of the media.  
Politician 22, Senator. 
 
                                                          
56
 In their paper versions, El Mercurio, La Tercera and La Segunda print 149,000 87,000 and 27,000 
copies respectively. Considering online and paper readership, those numbers are calculated as 450,000, 
347,000 and 98,000 respectively (Achap, 2013).   
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The sensitive spots that alert us. Of course, it is inevitable to start the day with 
El Mercurio and La Tercera (...) but really relevant. Starting the day without 
La Tercera and El Mercurio is like starting the day without shoes for us.  
Communications 12, Political Party. 
 
The generalized assumption is that most eyes, within the circuit of elite 
communication, will be on these newspapers daily, since they are a coveted forum 
for defining political positions and send signals to both political allies and 
enemies. Access, however, is highly competitive and, of course, not guaranteed. In 
the words of one research participant: “El Mercurio is the newspaper of elites; left 
and right” (politician 24). This status provokes some tensions among a number of 
politicians, who presently compromise political differences with the aim of 
reaching the elites and achieving political and social validation. Having political, 
class and geographical biases, the elite press perform the function of symbolically 
containing the “encapsulation narrative”, not only as a reflection of the Chilean 
political micro-culture but connected more widely to the nature of elites and the 
social endogamy that characterises much of Chile’s social scaffolding.  
Neither politicians nor journalists are oblivious to the disconnect between the 
elite circuit of communication and the rest of society. Both groups express 
concerns regarding this aspect, as well as having little ability to challenge the 
situation: 
Of course, that is the block in which one lives because is obviously 
important what comes out in La Segunda, El Mercurio; but we read that, the 
bulk of the population do not read newspapers.  
Politician 11, Senator. 
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Maybe 25 thousand read El Mercurio daily. Conversely, Emol57 has between 
350 and 400 thousand visitors. But they still don’t manage to make that click. 
They still believe, especially the political world, that if they were interviewed 
by El Mercurio on Sunday everything changed. And it's not true. The media... I 
mean, it is true for those in power. They still live there. People live 
elsewhere.  
Journalist 15, Senior editor, radio. 
 
The encapsulation of the elite communication circuit appears to be reinforced by 
the relative homogeneity exhibited by the elite press, both in terms of their news 
agendas (Valenzuela & Arriagada 2009; Gonzalez-Bustamante & Soto Saldias 
2015), and the alignment these newspapers have shown regarding political party 
agendas (Porath 2007). Added to this are the widely acknowledged links between 
the elite press and the political and economic right (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; 
Gonzalez-Rodríguez 2008; Monckeberg 2009; Couso 2012; Herrero 2014). Some 
politicians and press officers – especially those on the centre-left of the political 
spectrum – question the elite press’s neutrality and accuse it of political bias and 
of the open pursuit of sectional interests and the existence of favouritism, 
highlighting the elite press as a closed space where political actors have unequal 
access. Others differ from this assessment and emphasise that access to the media 
– the elite press included – depends mostly on journalists’ professional judgement 
and does not correspond to party distinctions.  This discrepancy among research 
participants is not a trivial matter and indicates that a left-right distinction could 
be an inaccurate interpretation of the clientelistic networks observed 
transversally across the Chilean elite and some news organisations. Rather than 
claiming strict political parallelism, research participants identify relationships 
                                                          
57
 Emol is the main website controlled by El Mercurio S.A., which reproduces some content published in 
El Mercurio but has separate staff.  
182 
 
built on proximity and privilege, facilitated by the small and manageable size of 
the political communication community.    
Additionally, news organisations that are part of the elite press are identified as 
political actors in their own right, with a significant ability to position issues on 
the political agenda. However, there is consensus that their abilities to render 
topics and actors invisible – greater at the beginning of the transition – is 
increasingly being questioned in a new communication environment that allows 
and encourages the circulation of a greater variety of sources and viewpoints, 
especially online. This new communication environment appears to be eroding the 
discursive hegemony of the elite communication circuit, posing challenges to both 
political and media actors. This point will be expanded in the next section.  
5.1.1 An eroded circuit: a sign of shifting logics or further isolation?  
Both the Chilean media and political environments are undergoing a period of 
profound change. New actors have entered into the public debate, both in the 
media and the political domain. On the one hand, digitally-native news 
organisations and social media have expanded the informative circuit and the 
range of subjects covered by news media (Franco 2009; Godoy & Gronemeyer 
2012; Gonzalez-Bustamante & Soto Saldias 2015). On the other hand, the main 
political coalitions are experiencing processes of fragmentation and re-
organisation58, while leaders emerging from the social mobilisations of 2011 and 
2012 have formally entered politics.59 These changes occur in the context of high 
                                                          
58
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the main political coalitions are going through processes of re-branding 
and change (e.g. the former Concertación is today known as Nueva Mayoría, while the centre-right 
Alianza has launched a renewed coalition rebranded as Chile Vamos).    
59
 Four student leaders were elected deputies for the period 2014-2018 (Camila Vallejo, Karol Cariola, 
Giorgio Jackson and Gabriel Boric) plus a community leader, Ivan Fuentes, who acted as spokesperson 
during protests against the centre in the southern region of Aysen.  
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levels of distrust towards institutional politics60, and a series of political scandals 
that have brought into the spotlight the too-close-for-comfort relationship of 
political and corporate actors,61 and the emergence of new forms of social activism 
where political parties do not play as significant a mediating role (Mayol & Azócar 
2011; Arditi 2012). All these developments have situated institutional political 
actors under constant civic scrutiny, which has been dubbed an elite crisis by 
some commentators.62  
As previously discussed, the ability of the political press – and the elite press in 
particular – to control collective attention at a wide societal level is perceived as 
severely damaged. However, it is the circuit of elite communication as a whole that 
appears in question, as demands for transparency and accountability are directed 
towards both political and traditional media players, which makes ideas of 
discursive hegemony barely sustainable. 
It is not a cliché to say that the student movement is a before and after for the 
whole of society: to politicians, the media, and authorities; for everyone. 
Definitely, Chile is no longer the same as before. And politicians know 
that (…) they can no longer operate as before; everything goes out now (...) I 
don’t believe, truly, that El Mercurio and La Tercera have the power and 
impact they once had; impossible, not anymore. 
Journalist 2, Editor online media.  
 
                                                          
60
 In April 2015, 65 per cent of the population disapproved of the Government of President Bachelet 
and 77 per cent disapproved of the work of Congress.  
61
 The relationship between politics and corporate actors has been at the centre of the news agenda 
during 2014 and 2015. Two emblematic cases are Penta, which takes its name from a powerful holding 
whose owners were prosecuted under suspicion of tax evasion and the illegal funding of political 
campaigns; and Caval, which takes its name from the company owned by President Bachelet’s 
daughter-in-law, who was allegedly involved in influence peddling to access a millionaire real estate 
business.   
62
 The Ministry of the Interior, Jorge Burgos, provided an “official” recognition of this state of affairs 
during his intervention in Icare, an important business forum where political and economic elites 
converge: “The country is experiencing a serious crisis in certain respects. It is painful because it is a 
crisis of the elites, which are essential for the country's development”, said Burgos in his intervention 
(Weissman 2015). 
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In my time, the media and the politicians still managed the agenda. Today that 
does not happen; and therefore today politicians know they don’t control the 
agenda. The citizenry play a greater role in the construction of the 
strategic agenda and, therefore, politicians today have to adapt to the 
agendas that the people are indicating; in the environmental field, in the field 
of education, in the political field. Social media are structuring relevant 
topics nowadays.  
Politician 19, Former Deputy.  
 
So clearly this editorial logic, about certain news organisations having 
the ability to dictate the agenda, and the rest of the media reacting to that 
agenda, to the point that if something was not in those news organisations it 
did not exist, that is over in Chile. It is over basically due to the explosion of 
the internet, and the numbers of people commenting on and visiting various 
websites.  
Journalist 18, Editor, TV. 
 
As the quotations above illustrate, the new informational environment erodes the 
ability of traditional players to dominate the agenda. Media systems are hybrid 
constructs and, as such, actors are continually forced to adapt to new and shifting 
operational logics (Chadwick 2013). For Chilean political elites, navigating 
between the operational logic of traditional and new players poses a challenging 
task but, more critically, it appears to be a challenge that few identify as important 
and urgent.  
Among politicians, the emergence of new media voices has been somewhat 
welcomed, and some of the new organisational actors appear widely validated by 
politicians. This is particularly the case for the investigative independent 
journalistic centre Ciper.cl, whose work is often mentioned as an example of 
quality journalism that has pushed new subjects into the public debate. However, 
when political actors discuss their own experience and relationship with some of 
these journalistic players, an inclination to question their legitimacy and resist 
185 
 
change can be detected. This is sometimes achieved through downplaying the 
relevance these new players have or by questioning their independence. In 
contrast, traditional media players, and the elite press in particular, are still 
considered the benchmark for political news and are often regarded as a proxy of 
the political agenda itself. 
A similar pattern of partial adoption of new hybrid logics can be detected in the 
limited use of social media among political authorities. Fábrega & Paredes (2013) 
found that 73per cent of politicians (including cabinets, senators and deputies) 
had established a Twitter account at the end of 2011, yet many of these accounts 
were barely active or completely inactive. As mentioned before, around one third 
of the politicians interviewed for this study spontaneously mentioned Twitter as 
an important source of information, but even those personally engaging in social 
media said they struggled to cope with the demanding task of managing these 
platforms and adjusting to new means of communication and demands for 
transparency. The following quotation from a Deputy is illustrative of the process 
of adjustment experienced by members of Congress regarding the extent to which 
opinions salient in social media platforms should be actually taken on board:   
The first year I arrived here [to Congress] many were terrified by Twitter: 
‘such things appeared on Twitter, if we vote this way they will destroy us…’ I 
think now, today we are getting used to it and we understand that it is part of 
the logic; you have to act conscientiously, with conviction and you can be the 
object of [criticism] (...) I think the first year; 2010, 2011, with the social 
movements and all, there was a kind of panic. Not anymore; nowadays we 
have learned to appreciate it in its right dimension, we cannot ignore it 
and also we can use it a bit more.  
Politician 10, Deputy.  
Among media actors, a renewed informational environment also poses challenges 
and opportunities. News organisations are still finding ways of redefining their 
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roles, and pushing to retain editorial relevance and add value to content in a 
context of information overload where offering exclusive content is increasingly 
difficult. Different organisations will define their own policies regarding social 
media use but most political journalists agree in understanding these platforms, 
particularly Twitter, as reporting tools only; they actively work to produce content 
that might have an impact in these networks, resisting the idea of social media 
dictating the agenda. Additionally, as with political actors, news organisations face 
increasing levels of scrutiny on social media, and see their legitimacy constantly 
questioned.  
Politicians are indeed more exposed, but also we are. In social media, we 
are far more exposed to being asked: why the newspaper gave so little space 
to this information? Or why the main headline is about a worthless news 
story? Or a story that was not enough developed? Or that it wasn’t news, 
according to some people? Today the citizen has a voice and we are far more 
exposed; also in other media.  
Journalist 3, Editor, elite newspaper. 
 
People turn to digital media precisely because of the press oligopoly 
that we have. So the fact that El Mostrador is relevant, the fact that Ciper is 
relevant, is a statement about the people who are looking for information; or 
doubting in this case, distrusting of formal media as information 
providers.  
Politician 23, Deputy. 
 
They are not totally ignored; again, the front page of La Tercera is an issue, 
but probably the opinion of a large part of a more informed elite in Chile, 
won’t be: ‘oh, this is important because is on the front page of La Tercera’; but 
rather, why did La Tercera publish this on the front page? And what interests 
would lie behind this front page? (…) There is a general questioning of all 
decisions taken by the media. There is a media consumer who is 
increasingly critical, that has alternative sources of information and 
therefore feels empowered regarding that media outlet because he can learn 
about things elsewhere.  
Journalist 18, Editor TV. 
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Overall, the erosion of the circuit of elite communication is perceived as coming 
from the ‘outside’, driven by new political and media actors that do not share a 
professional culture nor necessarily engage in the system of practices that have 
sustained the micro-culture of political communication in recent years.  This 
micro-culture has certainly been hit by these changes and it is still finding ways of 
reacting to them.  Research interviews reveal that both political elites and 
traditional media are struggling to adjust to the new environment, facing 
difficulties in finding ways to deal with these developments. More crucially, these 
difficulties are common to both sides; as long as political actors and traditional 
media actors must react to diversified information sources, they both become 
subjects of increasing social scrutiny. Popkin (2006) highlights how newer media 
often represent a threat to both political and media elites, as their practices had 
become highly interdependent. In such a scenario, new technologies or the 
eruption of new players create a space of risks and opportunities; the options are 
adapting to change or losing power (Popkin 2006; Chadwick 2013). 
In the context of Chilean political elites and their relationship with the news 
media, new political and media actors will offer opportunities for change, 
particularly through widening the range of subjects and sources that take part in 
the political debate.  I argue that it is not clear, however, that this relative 
openness had substantially damaged the symbolic power traditional media outlets 
exert on political elites or the role it plays in the mobilization of political support 
within the elite, a point that will be further expanded in the next section of the 
chapter. To a great extent, these news organisations and particularly the elite 
press and niche political programmes act as elite containers: delimiting the elite 
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communication circuit and providing a forum for elites to articulate their 
concerns, interpreting what is relevant to those groups and also conferring an elite 
status to those who gain visibility through them. In other words, although the 
supremacy of the elite press is perceived as having been eroded by a new 
communication environment at a broad societal level, this section of the press still 
exerts significant power in binding together the political communication 
community in general and the political elites in particular. As such, the circuit of 
elite communication sees its ability to control the agenda seriously damaged at a 
societal level, but not necessarily at an elite level. On the one hand, this 
dissociation reinforces the encapsulation of political elites, highlighting the signs 
of exhaustion for a model of political communication that is better understood as a 
contributing factor to explaining the distance between political elites and the 
citizenry. On the other hand, it highlights the importance of better understanding 
the communication practices of political elites, their relationship with traditional 
media actors and how they have adapted to a shifting media environment.   
 
5.2. Structural sources of actors’ differentiated access to mediated 
visibility 
This section identifies a set of structural conditions pertaining to the Chilean 
political and media systems that determine the levels of access to mediated 
visibility that political actors may have. These conditions were discussed and 
identified by the three different groups of research participants as relevant factors 
in the politics-media relationship, and reflect structural forms of political and 
media organisation that belong to the Chilean context.  This analysis allows for the 
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identification of structural conditions mediating access of political actors to the 
news media.  
There are three main conditions identified by research participants: first, the 
super-visibility of the executive power; second, the sharp differences between 
national vis-à-vis regional leaderships and third, the limited pluralism of the 
Chilean media system and the implicit political alignment of some news 
organisations, which could be discussed in terms of a sui generis form of political 
parallelism. 
5.2.1. The super visibility of the Executive power 
The first structural condition defining the political elites’ access to the media is 
closely connected to the constitutional arrangements that lay the foundation for 
the institutional design of the Chilean political system. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Chile has a reinforced presidential system (Godoy 2003), one of the strongest in 
Latin America due to a set of exclusive legislative attributions (Aninat et al. 2006). 
Among research participants, the Executive power is widely perceived as having a 
clear upper hand for agenda control purposes, compared to other political actors. 
This advantage is expressed in two ways. Firstly, the exclusive initiative it has in 
the legislative realm is perceived as having a correlate in terms of news agenda 
control capacity. Secondly, the communication resources managed by the 
Executive power – dedicated staff, professionalized communication strategies, 
access to consultancy, among others – is often far superior to that of politicians 
based either in Congress or political parties.   As a result, those actors located 
outside government perceive their ability to get media coverage and set the media 
agenda as seriously compromised in comparison to those actors located inside 
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government. As a result, the most frequent alternative to the management of 
public attention is reacting to what the Executive does or says.  
These judgements were frequently expressed by actors who had transitioned 
between different branches, having therefore acquired experience from distinct 
institutional positions. The following quotation is from a communications officer 
working with a Senator, having previously worked in government: 
Yes, there are plenty of differences. I mean, when you are in government, 
you can develop a communications strategy to replicate across the 
country in 48 hours...  [laughter]. With a Senator you play it so that the news 
media decides to invite you to participate in their agenda but it is very 
difficult, although if you're involved on a very timely topic and you are really 
bold about it, you might fully permeate the agenda at the national level. 
Communications 1, Senate. 
Presidentialism has been identified as a key variable in the media and politics 
relationship. Usually, the figure of the president overshadows collective actors 
such as political parties (De Albuquerque 2012), as long as presidents are 
considered newsworthy and capture permanent media attention (Gans 1979; 
Kernell 1997).  
Additionally, the visibility of the Executive power is discussed by research 
participants in terms of the comparatively higher resources and professionalized 
political communication means available to authorities working in this branch of 
government, not just the president but also other members of cabinet and high 
level appointments. Having professional capacity, a hierarchical structure and 
extended networks across the country, the operational communication capability 
of the Executive power appears unparalleled to other actors. The inherent 
executive ability of the government would add to these structural differences in 
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relation to actors located in the legislative power or political parties, whose roles 
become reactive. 
We understand, and here you can note the presidentialism, if you ask me, 
because for journalists in La Moneda their number one priority – and I 
understand that – is to report on the activities of the president, and they 
report on the typical political agenda (e.g. meetings of the political 
committee) but they are not always attentive to the legislative agenda. They 
do it but I understand that is their focus, because it is what they are asked 
for, and is fastest and most newsworthy [reporting on the president]. 
Communications 11, La Moneda. 
  
It is a presidential system. When a politician speaks about ideas, there is 
no way, but the Executive does things that have an impact on 
communities (…) You can spend 20 years as opposition and you won’t 
project any replacement leadership. You won’t generate a presidential 
candidate from the opposition. But the moment you get to be in government; 
in 2, 4, 5 months you can achieve what you didn’t in 12 years. 
- XO: That’s the power of the Executive. 
- Yes, it is not the power of the media. 
Politician 3, Political party board. 
 
The differential in resources between the Executive and the Legislature has been 
explored by Godoy (2003), stressing that 75.35 per cent of promulgated laws were 
initiated by the Presidency in the period 1990-2003. This distinct advantage 
would be explained not only by the exclusive legislative initiative granted to the 
Executive by law in several areas (see section 2.1), but also because 
parliamentarians have comparatively little technical advice in the legislative field. 
Something similar happens in the communication dimension. The Executive 
power is usually perceived as an actor with greater capacity of positioning topics. 
The following quotations, from a minister and a former minister, reflect the 
struggle associated with managing the media agenda, as well as the material 
resources and personal relations associated to this capacity of media management.   
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When you are in charge of a campaign, your relationship with the media is 
definitely a relationship of unity and struggle, to put it one way, you are 
looking for cooperation in communication opportunities but you also 
want to get content across, get profiles and strategies and other things and 
that's very hard, and nowadays that requires a battalion of people, 
many, many people and deep knowledge of your counterparts; who are 
the owners of the media, who are the people that you have as counterparts, 
what do they think, what their beliefs are, what they want, because those are 
yours margins; this is a perpetual negotiation, from early morning until the 
news after midnight. 
Politician 29, Former Minister. 
 
Therefore, I know that when there is a topic you want to position, you 
have to insist, insist and insist on that topic at any cost, until – at the end 
– your message remains. Or rather take advantage of your minutes as 
spokesperson, because when you talk to the media most of them are doing 
live transmissions, then I start not accepting questions, I start speaking about 
what I am interested in as government, and only then I take the questions 
they want to ask. 
Politician 8, Minister. 
 
Often, political actors who do not have similar access to platforms of media 
visibility and equivalent resources (note that both quotations included above are 
from politicians in ministerial positions) are forced to adopt a mostly reactive 
approach, and wait for the emergence of appropriate opportunities of 
communication. To this first structural condition of access to mediated visibility a 
second condition is added, that of the distinction between national and regional 
leaderships, which is the object of the next section. 
5.2.2. National versus regional leaderships 
Considering the strong centralist tendency observed in Chilean political culture 
(see discussion in section 2.3.2) it is not surprising that most political 
communication efforts among political elites, especially in the space of intra-elite 
communication, are firmly oriented towards Santiago-based national media. 
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Additionally, national and regional dynamics of communication and press 
management are acknowledged as separate and distinct. For authorities based in 
central government, communication decisions are often directed from the centre 
to the regions. For parliamentarians, though, it is often a matter of either/or.  
Those political actors who represent districts located in the centre of the country 
stand better a chance of accessing the national media than actors who project 
their images from regions outside the centre. At the same time, those political 
actors who aim for career advancement will also aim for the national media.  
Studies of media content lend support to elites’ perceptions of the differences in 
editorial dynamics between national and regional media. Mujica & Puente (2006) 
note that national media give minimal coverage to news that has a regional 
impact, while Gronemeyer & Porath (2014) found that geographical differences 
are a better predictor of editorial variety than media ownership.   
In a country with a long-standing tradition of administrative and political 
centralism (Mardones 2006; Boisier 1992), having national leadership is often the 
same as building a leadership base from Santiago, which includes communicating 
with national news organisations based in the capital. Entering into this privileged 
space is difficult and highly competitive. Additionally, parliamentarians who 
develop their political capital regionally and locally will often privilege regional 
and local media, which are generally perceived as easier to access and manage. 
These positions are highlighted in the quotations included below; the first one, 
from a Deputy elected in the Metropolitan Region; and the second, from a Deputy 
elected in a southern region.  
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In the regions, people [other politicians] have regional media; they are always 
on regional radio, or regional television. Those of us who are 
parliamentarians of Santiago, if we are not in the national media we do 
not exist: we do not exist. Because in my district, I am visiting a corner, and at 
the next corner they don’t know who I am... 
Politician 13, Deputy. 
 
I think there are two issues. One, is the lack of local news. Therefore, one 
becomes a good news source [for the regional media]. And that gives you 
the possibility – beyond what you do personally – to become local news. 
- XO: An authority figure... 
Of course, an authority figure; if there is a controversy with a mayor, you can 
have a say. If there is an issue with a project, you can have a say. If there are 
issues with the government, you can have a say; whether you are in the 
opposition or with the government (…) one is an important reference for 
local media. Nationwide, instead, there are 120 deputies, 38 senators, and 
government authorities; thus the competition for space is different (…) 
nationally it is much harder. 
Politician 4, Deputy. 
 
As a result of these dynamics, local and regional authorities appear to face a less 
competitive environment in their regions, but fewer chances in the national media, 
the most prized and main arena for political debate among political elites, and the 
main platform for career advancement. It is possible to argue that these 
established communication dynamics are a corollary of other forms of centralism, 
such as that observed in terms of the composition of political elites (Joignant 
2009), party organisation and the selection of political candidates (Siavelis 2002; 
Navia 2008). However, they can also be understood as a contributing factor to 
political centralism, given that regional leadership has a significantly reduced 
chances of national visibility.  
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A senator for [the Region of] Magallanes cannot go for [a position in] Santiago, 
simply because nobody knows him. You may have done an impeccable job, 
but you will never appear in the [national] press. For example, you have 
Senator C. He rarely appears in the press. However, in Magallanes, he sweeps 
away  everybody else. 
Politician 15, Assessor political party. 
 
As such, it is often the case that party press officers based in Congress approach 
press strategies, depending on the places each parliamentarian represents and 
whether she or he occupies other positions within central party structures in 
order to justify communications strategies directed towards national media.  
5.2.3. Limited media pluralism and political biases 
The third structural condition defining political elites’ access to media visibility is 
that of the limited pluralism exhibited by traditional media players, as a result of 
the way the Chilean media system has developed during the democratic transition. 
More concretely, politicians, press officers and journalists alike highlight how the 
political biases of news organisations as a whole make media outlets more or less 
receptive to certain topics and actors. 
As was discussed in section 2.4.1, the main concerns about pluralism in the 
Chilean media system have been based on systemic analyses that stress issues 
such as the concentration of media ownership on business interests with close 
connections to the political right (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Bresnahan 2003; Leon-
Dermota 2003; Gonzalez-Rodríguez 2008; Monckeberg 2009; Couso 2012). In 
other words, these are analyses that rely on an understanding of the political 
economy of Chilean media industries.  
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This established narrative about the functioning of the Chilean media system 
becomes more textured when analysed from the perspective of daily media-
oriented practices, and it is a divisive topic among the elite itself. Some actors do 
claim degrees of censorship or indifference from the main news media actors in 
the political beat because of their political positions – in particular among the elite 
print press and television – as illustrated by the following quotations.  
Sometimes we talk [to the media] about issues that we want to position in the 
public debate, which is not very easy due to the concentration of the media, 
because this is not really an open space, where everyone has equal 
chances of communication. 
Politician 11, Senator. 
 
It is very little [my ability to position topics on the public agenda]. The press 
and generally the news media in Chile is tightly controlled, very 
ideological; there is no plurality in terms of media ownership, and like 
everything else in the country, the owners, those with the money are those 
who play the music. The spaces are reduced and that clearly works against 
us (...) you have just to check out who are those frequently invited onto one 
program or another. It is relevant. 
Politician 6, Senator. 
 
Positions, including those of the politicians quoted above, were reinforced by 
many press and communications officers and, to a lesser extent, by journalists, 
some of whom recognised organisational pressures to amplify or minimise certain 
stories or actors. Contradicting such views, other politicians have far more 
tempered assessments about the so called “information blockade” (cerco 
informativo), claiming that the lack of access of certain political camps to the 
media is a myth, a caricature and an old-fashioned concept that cannot be 
seriously sustained in the current media environment. This diversity of views can 
be appreciated in the following quotations:  
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No, I think that's a caricature, rather than coming from academia, created 
by the same political class, that journalism is not plural in Chile. I think that is 
a lack of respect for journalists themselves. 
Politician 12, Deputy. 
 
I have never felt excluded from the media by ideological issues. It would be 
very ... I sometimes see these arguments that I do not agree with ... 
exaggerated. No, I have not felt excluded. I acknowledge, though, that the 
press especially – television has come a long way – still has a very clear 
ideological stance, particularly in its editorial lines. 
Politician 20, Deputy. 
 
In order to make sense of these apparently contradicting views beyond individual 
differences, it is important to resume some of the arguments introduced in section 
3.3.1 in order to make some conceptual distinctions that might help to better 
understand how the limited pluralism in the Chilean media might operate as a 
structural condition defining political elites’ access to the media. 
A first distinction is connected to the form political parallelism has taken in the 
post-transitional Chilean media: highly commercialised and not formally 
connected to party politics. In spite of this, the proximity between traditional 
media players and economic and political interests has been widely acknowledged 
(Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Leon-Dermota 2003; Monckeberg 2009; Couso 2012), 
which has led some scholars to describe the Chilean media system as one 
characterised by high levels of political parallelism (Mellado et al., 2012; Mellado 
& Humanes, 2014). In the definition offered by Hallin & Mancini (2004), political 
parallelism refers to the links between the media and major political divisions or 
tendencies in society, which are demonstrated – among other things – by the 
presence of politically-oriented content, partisanship of media audiences and a 
variety of media outlets with different political alignments. These attributes do not 
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necessarily fit a description of Chilean media. For a start, rather than polarised, the 
media environment has been described as subordinated to economic interests and 
highly homogeneous with respect to political leanings (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; 
Leon-Dermota 2003), as well as with respect to news media agendas (Valenzuela 
& Arriagada, 2009; Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011; González-Bustamante & Soto 
Saldías, 2015). To this is added, a high dependency on official sources (Faure et al. 
2011; Mellado & Rafter, 2014), and adherence to journalistic values of neutrality 
and objectivity (Mellado & Humanes, 2014), according to which the media do not 
openly endorse political candidates or parties.  
Taking these antecedents as background, it is not surprising to find 
inconsistencies in the perceptions of politicians, journalists and press officers 
regarding the extent to which political affiliations facilitate access to mediated 
visibility. In terms of everyday information exchanges, media biases are not 
always clearly exposed, but rather appear associated to the establishment of elite 
cliques that run across the political spectrum, and have developed during the 
transition. 
Regardless of divergent individuals’ perceptions about their own access to the 
media, there is a shared acknowledgement of the role some news organisations 
play as actors that represent interests within the political field. From this 
viewpoint, some news organisations are described as displaying important 
degrees of agency in the selection of issues and voices, not so much from a 
journalistic point of view but from an organisational point of view and therefore 
based on the interest of influencing certain political decision-making processes. 
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You do not do politics as a rhetorical activity, to shine individually, but rather 
with the claim that these ideas will occupy a considerable space in public 
debate and will achieve not only greater influence but that they will gather a 
number of people to be an instrument, and for those ideas to be embodied in 
public policy. That is what this is about. And the media is not very different. I 
do not think that the main objective of the media is to inform, but rather 
to influence (...) and I think that to the extent that we recognize that the 
issue set in dispute is influence, it will be easier to be open about our goals. 
Politician 5, Assessor, political party. 
 
We have news media that are so biased, they are in the hands of the same 
people, and then everything is entangled. Ultimately, what happens is that 
media owners, with few exceptions, generally they do not own news 
organisations as their main business activity, but strictly with the 
purpose of reinforcing certain views or holding certain positions. I mean, 
for Luksic Channel 13 is not a business, TVN has a different reality. For Claro, 
Mega was not a business; Saieh does not make his salary in La Tercera, does 
he? El Mercurio transcends that field as well. They play with mechanisms that 
are very different. 
Journalist 15, Senior editor, radio.  
 
Claiming a right-wing bias in the Chilean media is a simplification, as studies on 
political coverage have shown (Navia & Osorio 2015). The latter especially 
considering that five out of six governments elected since the recovery of 
democracy have been centre-left; and therefore the relationships between the 
traditional media players and authorities that have been part of the ruling 
coalition over the last decades have naturally strengthened. As such, it is useful to 
borrow the concept of “elite closure”, used by Torche (2005) to describe the 
minimal downward mobility of the Chilean elite, as opposed to the high mobility 
observed between middle and lower classes that are not highly differentiated. 
Drawing a parallel, the analysis of interviews suggests that the Chilean media 
structure has created a communicative closure, favouring certain official voices 
against others and strengthening the proximity between political and economic 
elites. 
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Taken together, I argue that all the structural conditions so far identified – the 
super visibility of the executive power, the distinction between national and 
regional leaderships as well as the limited pluralism of the media system – 
highlight that not all actors enter the media arena with the same visibility options, 
nor the same incentives and conditions to become mediatized. Instead, some 
actors – those located in the executive power, projecting national leaderships and 
close to economic elites – will stand a better chance and will have more 
institutional resources available to adapt to media languages and formats; that is 
to say, to become mediatized. Other actors will develop mediatized practices to 
compensate for this very lack of attributes.  
In the next section, a typology of mediatization levels will be developed based on 
the already identified structural conditions together with the individual and 
situated decisions regarding the value of media capital as a political capability.  
5.2.4. Linking institutional resources with individual routines: a typology of 
mediatization levels based on resources allocation  
The purpose of this section is to establish a typology of political actors’ 
mediatization levels that takes into account some of the structural conditions 
identified in the previous sections, together with individual media-oriented 
routines of specific actors. Overall, this typology is based on the levels of resources 
allocated to the end of managing media visibility, be they time or human and 
material resources, such as dedicated and specialised press and communications 
staff. This typology seeks to map profiles of political actors in their relationships 
with the media, according to the time they devote to the media and the 
institutional positions they occupy. As such, it accounts for structural conditions as 
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well as actors’ individual decisions regarding the extent to which they will adapt to 
media demands and actively pursue mediated visibility. In this regard, this 
understanding of mediatization assumes proactivity from political actors, what 
has been described as reflexive mediatization (Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014) or 
self-mediatization as, “a reflexive response by the political system to media-
related changes in their institutional environment” (Esser, 2013: 163). 
Furthermore, this is seen as caused by the dependence of politics upon media-
controlled communication resources (Hjarvard 2008) together with the 
contingent need for public attention (Marcinkowski 2014).  
Public agencies react to the process of mediatization by allocating resources to 
deal with media demands (Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014). In other words, the 
perceived centrality of the news media within the political field is reflected in a 
generalised allocation of resources to the management of media visibility. This 
allocation of resources is often paired with other power resources (Kunelius & 
Reunanen 2011), and associated with the professionalisation of political 
communication. 
Most interviewees agree on a steady, yet uneven, movement towards the 
professionalisation of political communication from the recovery of democracy 
onwards. The literature available includes mentions of the professionalisation of 
political campaigning (Tironi & Sunkel 1993; Silva 2004; Espíndola 2008) and the 
institutionalisation of polling and other techniques of public opinion monitoring 
(Huneeus 1999; Cordero 2009) as government tools. To this is added the use of 
advisors and dedicated press and communications staff (ICSO/UDP 2004; 
Santander 2013). 
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There is general agreement according to several interviews conducted that the 
Executive power has been the main driver in the process of professionalisation of 
political communication in Chile, both in terms of division of labour (specialising 
and multiplying communication-related positions) and the amount of resources 
devoted to this end. In other relevant political institutions, such as Congress and 
the political parties, the picture is uneven and complaints about lack of resources, 
improvisation and amateurism are frequent among politicians and communication 
officers interviewed.  
Communication budgets are not disaggregated in the Nation Annual Budgets, and 
therefore exact information about the evolution of monetary resources devoted to 
this end is not easily accessible.63 From the manual revision of Annual 
Management Reports that the various public agencies are obliged to provide to the 
Directorate of Budget, however, it can be observed that media and 
communications management is usually integrated into the work of these public 
agencies. Typically, each Ministry –and most public agencies- have a dedicated 
communication and press team which is overseen by La Moneda through SECOM 
(Secretariat of Communications). 64 
In contrast, most political parties have only one or two press or communication 
officers in their headquarters, who are in charge of dealing with the press mainly 
in relation to the main figures of the party. Some of them might have additional 
                                                          
63
 The category “publicity and dissemination” is incorporated into the broad category “services and 
consumer goods”, that each public agency receives annually, and is therefore utilized in a variety of 
ways. Publicity and dissemination –as a budget category- allows multiple uses, although there are legal 
restrictions associated with it. According to the Budget Law (2013) these resources can only be used “to 
fulfil the duties of those agencies” and their use is explicitly prohibited in publicity campaigns whose 
sole objective is enumerating the achievements of a specific authority or the Government in general, 
with the exception of public accounts. 
64
 SECOM stands for Secretaría de Comunicaciones (Secretariat of Communications), a public agency 
housed in La Moneda and dependent on the Ministry in charge of the government’s communications, 
including regular spokesmanship functions (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno).  
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journalists in important regions. Additionally, there are one or two press 
managers for each parliamentary bench in the Senate and between one and four 
for each parliamentary bench in the Deputies Chamber, based on the numbers of 
parliamentarians elected in each party. Coordination between these different 
levels scarcely exists, if at all, and their functions are mostly concentrated in daily 
press management, lacking resources to undertake further communication 
functions. 
Often communication professionals follow and execute political decisions, but 
senior communication officers are not always integrated into the decision-making 
structure of  parties or government structures; one of the dimensions identified by 
Stromback & Van Aelst (2013) as typical organisational adaptations to media 
demands. As an example, during Sebastian Piñera’s government, Cabinet meetings 
were followed by communication meetings, where heads of communications 
discussed how to execute decisions and guidelines agreed by the Cabinet. In the 
case of Senators and some Deputies, weekly agenda meetings, in which press 
officers might or might not be included, are a standard practice. In these meetings, 
scenarios are anticipated and the main issues of the week defined, including media 
and press management aims.  
When looking at media-oriented routines at an individual level the variation is also 
relevant between authorities. All politicians interviewed for this thesis were asked 
to estimate the time consumed by media-related work in their day to day routines, 
including media monitoring, meetings for media planning, conversations with 
journalists or editors, as well as formal exchanges, such as press contacts, press 
conferences or interviews. For all of them, the media were considered a relevant 
dimension of their work, but the answers ranged from those who said they were 
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monitoring the media 24/7 and estimated that these activities counted for about a 
half of their work routine and those who admitted having only sporadic contacts 
with journalists and very selective media consumption. As a general rule, the 
relevance attributed by the actor to the issue of press and communications 
management is, in the first place, reflected in whether she or he has dedicated 
press staff, which usually involves daily efforts of visibility management. As 
discussed above, this is standard practice in most public agencies within the 
Executive, but within Congress and political parties some politicians resort to 
party press officers instead of having their own staff, which naturally leads to a 
lower frequency of formal contacts with the press. Among those who employ 
personal press staff, they are typically but not necessarily journalists, and their 
daily work is generally focused on press management at national and/or regional 
level, assuming functions such as liaising with journalists, monitoring the news 
environment, supporting the dissemination of activities, advising on decisions 
about news management, spinning stories to fit media languages and 
requirements, and producing standard information subsidies, such as press 
releases and press conferences. 
The time allocated to media-related work within a politician’s routine seems to be 
determined by their institutional position on the one hand, and their own political 
definition regarding the role attributed to the media in the construction of their 
leadership on the other. The success of these strategies is a completely different 
matter. Nonetheless, as stated at the beginning of this section, it is possible to 
identify some typologies of actors associated with the intersection between these 
two variables.  
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Regarding the institutional position variable, in a Presidential system such as 
Chile’s, the President represents the top end of institutional visibility  while the 
lowest end of institutional visibility is represented by political party members 
with minor positions in the party structure. The attention granted to officials due 
to their hierarchical positions is widely acknowledged in the literature (Cobb & 
Elder 1971; Seymour-Ure 2003; Manning 2001), as is the visibility of the figure of 
the president in different national contexts (McCombs 2014; Rincón 2008; Cook 
2005; Gans 1979; Kernell 1997). Although it would be arbitrary to locate different 
institutions along this variable in terms of absolute values, it is possible to 
establish relative differences. For instance, the institutional visibility of the 
president is higher than that of his or her ministers, the institutional visibility of 
the Senate is higher than that of the Deputies Chamber, the institutional visibility 
of the president of the Deputies Chamber is higher than that of other deputies, and 
the institutional visibility of the party leader is higher than that of one out of five 
party vice presidents. A higher position in terms of institutional visibility is 
generally accompanied by resources for visibility management, including 
dedicated staff, a combination of long-term vs. short-term media planning, better 
options for coordination between actors, and also better chances of getting media 
attention, as the following quotation from a journalist working with a Senator and 
former Deputy illustrates: 
 
And now I realize the difference between the Senate and the Deputies 
Chamber; not before. I had never been in the Senate. It is easier, since 
Senators are fewer; they are more respected, The Deputies’ Chamber is 
much more of a jungle; trying to appear in the media competing against 120 
Deputies is much more difficult than trying to appear between fewer. 
Communications 5, Senate. 
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Regarding the individual definition variable, if mapped, the top end of the axis 
represents those political actors who consider mediated visibility a prime political 
asset and work proactively in the management of their visibility. The low end of 
the axis represents those political actors who have a low frequency of exchanges 
with the media and do not actively work in pursuing additional visibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The upper right quadrant represents those politicians who engage in permanent 
visibility management, both proactive and reactive. These political actors actively 
pursue media visibility and have integrated media-oriented practices into their 
daily routines, supported by institutional resources devoted to achieving that end. 
Politicians in this position consider the control of public attention through 
traditional news media as a baseline for maintaining political capital and 
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occupying positions of high media exposure. The quote below illustrates a typical 
perspective on this dynamic: 
 
I'm always available (…) I know where I appear, how I appear (I have a 
monthly measurement) and how many appearances there are, where they are 
concentrated; whether on television or radio. I have a monthly average of 300 
appearances concentrated in regional media, focused on electronic media, 
later comes the national print media, national and regional radio and then 
television, but clearly it has an impact; averaging 14 television appearances a 
month produces some degree of impact. Not at saturation level but, at least be 
present on the topics you're interested in. 
Politician 22, Senator. 
 
I believe for him [the minister]… It’s not that I believe, I have absolute 
conviction that for him communications are a top priority (...) He knows 
the mobile numbers of his entire press team; he knows perfectly well who is 
calling and what for. He goes everywhere with a journalist and his chief of 
staff is also a journalist (...) The minister has the personal policy that we 
[the press team] have to interrupt him but never something important 
related to the press [should be missed] because he lacks time. 
Communications officer 11, Central government. 
 
My relationship with the media is personal. I manage the relationship with 
editors, with journalists, personally. If they ask me for interviews, I deal with 
that personally as well, and I like it that way; I'm used to it, I’ve done so 
during my whole political career. See, I seek a mixture that is very complex 
from the point of view of my workload, because I do many things in national 
media but, simultaneously, I do many things in local and regional media (...) 
Some days I may have 10 radio contacts and that is strenuous, but I like 
to keep it that way. 
Politician 9, Senator. 
 
The lower right quadrant represents those politicians whose institutional 
positions may lead towards a permanent management of mediated visibility and, 
as a result, have regular exchanges with journalists and editors, as well as the 
possibility of accessing professional resources to support these activities. 
Nonetheless, these politicians adopt a mostly reactive strategy, managing media 
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demands as they come and only occasionally working proactively regarding topics 
of interest. 
 
XO: In your work routine, particularly, what place does it takes? 
- P3: The media? I would say, in everyday life, without any false pretence… 
this issue is: the relationship with party leaders is the first one; the 
relationship with leaders of the other parties, the second; and the 
media, the third. 
XO - So, it does take some space, then. 
P3: Yes, yes, yes. I cannot help it, even considering that I am... 
XO - Rather low profile. 
P3: Yes. 
Politician 3, Political party board. 
 
No, I mean something like everyday dealings, no, but I do have good 
relationships and links to some media. And every week we have at least 
some contact, primarily connected to the areas that are usually my 
competence (...) Now, I'm not a deputy who is constantly positioning 
issues. But we have done so occasionally. 
Politician 2, Deputy. 
 
The upper left quadrant represents those politicians and political actors whose 
institutional positions are less prominent but nevertheless decide to adopt a 
mostly proactive strategy and work to actively build their leadership on the back of 
mediated visibility, hoping to capitalise on their media currency to increase their 
bargaining power and their political capital. Accordingly, they will devote 
resources to managing these activities, such as hiring dedicated staff, 
communications consultancies and typically commit personally to building 
relationships with the media. The quotations below all belong to deputies who 
have relatively high media profiles and reflect this dynamic:  
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If I had to say how important my relationship with the media has been 
during my parliamentary life, it has been very important. It has been part of 
my daily agenda, both to be informed and to be attentive to have a dialogue 
with journalists, with the objectives that we have discussed (…) Important, 
very important, among the most important issues in my parliamentary 
life. 
Politician 20, Deputy. 
 
In my case, I would say half of my workload is the media; I usually talk to 
ten to twelve local radio stations that I have in the various municipalities in 
my region every week, I do a press conference a week and I write articles in 
several newspapers every so often, every two weeks or so (...) I am 
absolutely a man who uses the media to spread what you do, both the 
good and the bad. It is very important in my system. 
Politician 27, Deputy. 
 
Yes, every day, every day. For example, today: in the morning, I was 
interviewed on radio Agricultura by Alejandro de la Carrera, after that I was 
called by La Tercera, later Pulso spoke to me, and now El Mercurio is calling. I 
talked to television stations and radios at 12.30; at 11.30 I was interviewed 
for a program in the Chamber television station (...) And… this has not been a 
very newsworthy day. 
Politician 10, Deputy. 
 
The lower left quadrant includes those politicians and political actors whose 
institutional positions allow for a reduced and localised management of mediated 
visibility, and accordingly they do not actively pursue mediated visibility as an in-
built part of their professional routines. In other words, these actors will react to 
occasional media demands, generally at regional or local level. They will privilege 
direct contact with interest groups, and therefore will invest in alternative sources 
of political capital.  
 
Because I am very interested in my region, in being an actor there (...) So 
here [in Congress] I do those two things [attending all sessions and 
participating in the discussions], I do not dedicate myself to, for instance ... 
sometimes I have been invited to journalistic programmes here in Santiago. 
[Alejandro] Guillier, when he was still on TV, he was a very special journalist 
210 
 
and he invited me twice and he said but how is that possible, deputy, why 
would you reject this, and I explained that I am off to my zone on 
Thursdays, and here is my schedule, and you would not believe how full it 
is… 
Politician 28, Deputy. 
 
The position represented by this last quotation (localised and occasional media 
visibility management) was mentioned minimally by the research participants, 
while the vast majority of the politicians interviewed could be located in any other 
of the three quadrants, depending on their positions, the resources and the 
intentionality placed on media-related work. 
 
It is important to note that this proposed typology refers mostly to relations with 
traditional news media. While it would seem reasonable to expect those 
politicians working in media management as part of their political strategies (the 
top half of the typology) to embrace social media platforms, that is a separate 
enquiry that will need further research to establish. Additionally, the generation of 
direct media and communication channels (such as dedicated websites, individual 
radio programmes, paid advertising or leaflets) also occupy separate media tracks, 
meaning that political actors with minimal media visibility management still 
might, and generally will, develop different communication strategies with their 
groups of interest.  
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5.3. Final discussion and conclusion to the chapter 
Two main arguments have been developed in this chapter. Firstly, the 
communication practices of political actors have been circumscribed within a 
circuit of elite communication, within which actors adopt outward-facing and 
inward-facing strategies of communication.  This circuit, however, appears to be 
struggling to come to terms with a new informational environment that 
potentially challenges the legitimacy and the intermediation role of both 
traditional political and media players. Secondly, some structural conditions were 
identified, which would act to facilitate or hinder politicians’ options of visibility in 
traditional news media outlets. Nonetheless, these conditions are not 
deterministic and levels of self-mediatization appear to also be reactive to actors’ 
individual practices, resulting in multiple profiles of mediatization, as illustrated 
by the typology developed in section 5.2.4.  
Overall, this chapter has examined salient cultural elements shaping 
communication practices among political elites and salient structural elements 
defining actors’ access to the media. In doing so, contextual linkages between 
media and political institutions are explored before looking into relationships and 
specific practices of communication, which are the focus of Chapters 6 and 7. 
Taken together, the analysis here stresses two important features of the political 
communication culture of Chilean elites: encapsulation and centralisation. 
5.3.1. Encapsulation: The circuit of elite communication  
While the structural proximity between media and political institutions has often 
been analysed in terms of formal linkages expressed in levels of state intervention 
(for example, patterns of media ownership, regulation and subsidies, see Hallin & 
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Mancini 2004), factoring the impact of local political cultures into the dynamics of 
the media and politics relationships has proven a more challenging task, even if 
recognised as a fundamental tenet of the study of political communication 
(Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Barbara Pfetsch, 2004; Guerrero & Márquez-Ramírez 
2014). Locating academic enquiry inside sites of power (Cook 2005; Davis 2007), 
instead, allows for a less deterministic inspection of these relationships and a 
better assessment of how practices embedded in specific cultural contexts 
mediate these relationships. This is the value of situating political elites’ 
interactions with the media within a circuit that has been described explicitly by 
research participants as isolated from civil society.  
Although the idea of a circuit of elite communication is certainly an abstraction, it 
has been grounded in the connections between a specific set of actors, a specific 
set of places and a specific set of media organisations that both contain and act as 
referents within the political beat, and whose news agenda is often equated to the 
political agenda. In this regard, the elite press was widely identified as a space of 
convergence and as a pivotal reference point within this micro-culture.  Describing 
this space as a micro-culture is sustained in the identification of shared practices 
of information exchange, media consumption and information monitoring further 
identified by this relatively small group of individual and organisational actors and 
illustrated above. Additionally, this description is sustained in the recognition of a 
disconnect between the communication practices of the elite and an expanded 
informational environment perceived as operating according to different 
operational logics. 
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The recognition of the existence of this circuit of elite communication does not, 
however, intend to suggest that media and political actors can be regarded as 
acting in unison. Some traditions of communication research have favoured the 
idea that the media disseminate the views of political elites (Herman & Chomsky 
1988), including in the context of the Chilean political transition (McNair 2000; 
Bresnahan 2003; Otano & Sunkel 2003). However, the notion of the media acting 
as a mere platform for the reproduction of hegemonic views has also been 
questioned, either in recognising the autonomous spaces generated in the media 
(Altheide, 1984; Cook, 2005) or the multiple interpretations audiences may have 
of the messages presented by the media (Gamson et al. 1992). Thus, identifying 
the existence of a circuit of elite communication has a more modest objective of 
recognising that the symbolic space where the representation of politics is 
disputed – especially within the elite – is shaped by routines, tensions, practices 
and long-term relationships that deserve closer examination. The insider culture 
that shared practices generate, can potentially challenge autonomous journalistic 
practice (a point that will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 7) but does not 
deny autonomy altogether. The implications of this proximity are described in 
insights from the very same inhabitants of this circuit who, on the one hand, 
recognise how the representation of politics may become ‘encapsulated’ as 
separate from the citizenry, and on the other hand that it is overwhelmed by an 
informational environment that cannot be contained by the old practices.  
Therefore, the circuit of elite communication can be regarded as suffering what 
Bourdieu (1984) calls “the hysteresis effect”; the discrepancy which occurs when 
practices “appear as ill-adapted because they are attuned to an earlier state of the 
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objective conditions” (Ibid: 109). Likewise, the circuit of elite communication as a 
whole is in search of new scripts to guide its interactions.   
5.3.2. Centralisation: Centralised politics, centralised communication  
The second argument that can be formulated from the findings presented in this 
chapter derives from the identification of those structural forces that position 
some actors in more favourable terms than others in their opportunities for 
mediated visibility. In other words, the communicative power of some actors is 
higher as a result of how the Chilean political and media systems have been 
configured.  
On the one hand, the political power that is highly centralised in the figure of the 
President in particular and the Executive in general (Godoy 2003; Huneeus 2005; 
Santos et al. 2014) seems to have a communication correlate. On the other hand, 
voices based in the centre of the country appear to have much more weight than 
others. To this is added conditions of limited pluralism that reinforce the 
relevance that certain media outlets – in particular the elite press – have in the 
formation of public opinion within the elite. The identification of these sources of 
differentiation highlights the centralist character of the Chilean political 
communication culture. Communicative power is concentrated in Santiago, in the 
Executive, and in specific media outlets that are relevant for the circuit of elite 
communication and of which this community presumes some political biases. 
Certainly, because of the nature of this study, it is only possible to state that a 
presumption of political biases exists and not confirm those biases. However, the 
links between the main media players, corporate and political actors have been 
established in the literature (Monckeberg 2009; Couso 2012; Herrero 2014) and 
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empirical works have shown moderate but consistent biases in the political 
coverage of the main newspapers (Navia et al. 2013; Navia & Osorio 2015). 
These observations also invite caution against optimistic assessments of the 
political diversity gained with the multiplication of voices through new 
technologies, as well as the relevance of such new voices. They do exist and add 
new viewpoints and subjects that traditional media tend to ignore (Godoy & 
Gronemeyer 2012; Gonzalez-Bustamante & Soto Saldias 2015). However, as 
Karppinen (2013) argues, the distribution of communicative power reflects 
structural asymmetries that are generally much more resistant to technological 
change than what analysis might otherwise suggest. The findings in this chapter 
lend support to the idea that the political communication culture is structurally 
weighted towards the centre of the circuit of elite communication (in Santiago, 
with the President and the cabinets, and with elite media), and chances of visibility 
are usually aligned to institutional resources available to central actors for the 
management of mediated visibility. Therefore, some actors are in advantageous 
positions of communication because of their location within their respective fields 
and how those fields have configured over time, favouring a communicative 
closure that today is under strain, adding tension to relationships inside the 
micro-culture of political communication. 
Nevertheless, structural conditions cannot account for the totality of social 
relationships. That is a basic premise that the institutional logic perspective 
(Friedland & Alford 1991; March & Olsen 2006; Thornton et al. 2012) shares with 
other traditions including field theory (Bourdieu 1998; Benson & Neveu 2005). 
The typology of mediatization developed towards the end of this chapter offers an 
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initial indication in this direction, as some actors proactively adopt media-
oriented practices in order to gain communicative power within traditional media, 
regardless of their positions. In the next chapter, analysis will go beyond the 
macro-level in order to examine inter-field relationships. That is to say, attention 
will be paid to everyday practice and relationships between political and media 
actors, in particular to how field-level logics (news media logics) are understood 
by political elites and what type of adaptations to the media are prompted as a 
result of these understandings.  
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CHAPTER 6 
POLITICIANS SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE OF NEWS 
 
This chapter is structured in three sub-sections. The first (6.1) examines the main 
drivers of Chilean politicians in their media-oriented practices by focusing on 
goals attached to politicians’ interactions with news organisations. The second 
(6.2) explores the political elites’ understandings of the news media logic. Finally, 
the third section (6.3) identifies the main expressions of adaptation to the news 
media logic; that is to say, the practices through which the mediatization of 
political actors is more commonly expressed. In doing so, this chapter deals 
directly with the question about how political elites understand and interact with 
the logic of the media and the drivers guiding that relationship.  
Paying attention to drivers of action has been theoretically justified as a way to 
improve understanding of how actors negotiate meaning within institutions. 
Different analytical traditions such as that of institutional logics (Thornton et al. 
2012) and the sociology of critical capacity (Boltanski & Thevenot 1999) pay 
attention not only to practices but to justifications for behaviour as a way to 
improve understanding of social interaction and the management of conflict 
within institutions. Following these approaches, this chapter identifies the main 
goals that drive political actors to engage in media-oriented practices by 
considering those goals explicitly declared by politicians and their communication 
aides, as well as the perceived gains derived from having media exposure. This 
analysis lends support to the idea that mediated visibility is mainly considered by 
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political actors as a “mobilizing capability”, using March and Olsen’s (1995) 
terminology to describe a resource able to activate other political resources. Media 
visibility is, nonetheless, considered quite volatile and a potentially risky form of 
currency, as media content is not something which political elites have full 
capacity to control. On the contrary, media contents appear strongly shaped by the 
operational criteria of news media organisations.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, news media logic in this thesis is broadly understood as 
the modus operandi (Hjarvard 2008; Hjarvard 2013) and the organising principle 
(Friedland & Alford 1991) of the media institution; those routines and practices 
that have “become taken-for-granted assumptions about how to produce news” 
(Sparrow, 2006: 145). As such, news media logic is a theoretical construct that 
accounts for professional, commercial and technological determinants of media 
outputs (Meyer 2002; Esser 2013; Hjarvard 2013). Although it has been 
acknowledged that the news media logic is open to certain variations across media 
organizations and media platforms (see discussion in section 3.2.1), it is the 
existence and relative resilience and stability of this institutional logic that defines 
the media as a social institution (Cook 2005; Asp 2014). Additionally, one of the 
premises of the mediatization theory is that this operational logic is being adopted 
by actors in institutions other than media (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 
2008). Institutional logics, though, are not behaviour templates that spread 
effortlessly (Hay 2006). They are open to interpretation and elaboration by 
individual actors, which means that they pose opportunities and constraints 
(Friedland & Alford 1991; Thornton et al. 2012) but, as much as they can be 
embraced, they can also be resisted or barely tolerated. 
219 
 
To understand the mediatization of Chilean political elites and the adoption of 
news media logics by political actors within this political culture, it seems 
necessary to first identify how they understand and elaborate this logic. This is 
aided by exploring how they explain their media-oriented practices as well as 
their interactions with journalists and news organisations. This question is 
answered by means of identifying the main features political elites associate with 
the logic of the media, which are (1) conflict, (2) permanent attention to the 
present as a reaction to media temporalities, and (3) commercial underpinnings of 
media routines, characteristics also identified by communication officers and 
journalists as integral to the operations of the media. Additionally, though, 
politicians discuss the news media logic as an opportunity and as a gateway to 
control public attention. On the one hand then, the news media logic is resisted 
and criticised on normative grounds for overemphasising conflict and being blind 
to long-term processes that bring some unwanted consequences to political 
actors. On the other hand, even if resisted, the news media logic is generally seen 
as open to instrumental use. 
The third and final section of the chapter examines the main domains of 
adaptation to the logic of the media as a result of political actors accepting and 
even internalising the news media logic and the predominant news values – what 
Strömbäck (2008) refers to as the fourth stage in the process of mediatization of 
politics. Four domains of adaptation are identified, strongly connected to the main 
traits of the news media logic: (1) the professionalisation of political 
communication, (2) the adaptation to media languages, (3) the adaptation to 
media temporalities and (4) the adaptation of information subsidies, more 
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specifically, the dissemination of unattributed information as a form of covert 
information subsidy.  
The implications of these forms of adaptation are further discussed: first, 
identifying the effort for control over media contents as the main driver of political 
elites’ adaptations to the news media logics and secondly, identifying potential 
implications of this process of adaptation that are not necessarily wanted by those 
involved.  
6.1. Media visibility as a political resource and the ‘uses’ of media 
exposure 
As discussed in section 3.2.3, the literature on the mediatization of politics has 
devoted significant attention to identifying elements conforming to news media 
logics and how actors adapt to them, and less attention to identifying the 
resources political actors seek or expect to find in their interactions with the news 
media and how these resources empower political actors in their institutional 
fields (for a theoretical discussion see Stromback & Van Aelst 2013 on the 
mediatization of political parties). The premise is that media visibility has greater 
relevance in the political field (Thompson 1995; Thompson 2005) and other 
societal fields (Kunelius & Reunanen 2012), and political actors and institutions 
have therefore become dependent on these communication resources (Hjarvard 
2008; Strömbäck 2008). In order to better understand the process of 
mediatization of politics from the perspective of political actors, this section 
investigates how those resources controlled by the news media are understood by 
Chilean political elites, paying particular attention to the goals political actors 
attach to their media related activities. 
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The most basic meaning of mediated visibility for political actors is that of 
affirming public existence. The accumulation of media visibility is often discussed 
by politicians in the most basic sense of ‘being seen’, and therefore associated with 
existence and public recognition in the eyes of both general audiences and peers. 
Affirming existence can be easily associated with electoral ambitions, although it is 
clear from politicians that this is a resource that has to be constantly managed and 
pursued, beyond specific campaigning periods. Additionally, visibility capital is 
discussed by politicians as an asset for career advancement and power 
reproduction; the promotion of achievements or personal qualities; and the 
chance to make actions and decisions visible to voters or the general public. This 
permanent need for remaining visible to relevant audiences is reflected in the 
following quotations: 
If your goal is to improve your level of knowledge, having presence in the 
media will always help, because clearly the media reach and penetrate 
citizens. That's the idea. If your interest is to position a subject, obviously 
the media end up being equally useful, if you are able to transmit that. I 
always consider that the media end up being obviously a positive 
element to gain political capital, regardless of your definition. 
Politician 2, Deputy. 
 
Firstly, because what is not known, does not exist. I mean, if something is 
unknown, it didn’t happen. Secondly, because in order to be in politics you 
must have power; power is the essence of politics. For transforming reality 
you have to manage power and, for that, you have to be a public opinion 
figure; you have to be considered, you have to be recognised as a 
necessary agent; influential, an articulator. That is why you need to be in 
the public eye. 
Politician 7, Senator. 
 
The multiple goals identified by Chilean political elites in their relationship with 
the news media can all be associated with the overarching objective of managing 
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mediated visibility to the end of using this visibility as a political resource and an 
asset that can contribute, in different capacities, to political action. When looking 
at the specific goals discussed by research participants, it is possible to distinguish 
between goals of electoral and policy rationale. These distinctions have been built 
mainly for analytical purposes and while they may overlap in practice, it is 
possible to identify how specific goals relate to specific audiences and key media 
channels (see Figure 14). Goals of electoral rationale point towards an 
understanding of the news media as a platform to reaffirm existence and seek 
recognition among electors, although these goals are not necessarily restricted to 
elections. Goals of policy rationale concentrate a larger number of actions in non-
electoral contexts, and are oriented to agenda building, public bargaining 
processes and the mobilisation of public support around policy issues. 
In this regard, the value attached by political elites to the common dimension of 
media visibility can be captured in the concept of “mobilising capability”, a term 
coined by March and Olsen (1995) to describe those resources needed for the 
activation of other political resources. The idea of mobilising capability is favoured 
over other more abstract terms such as “symbolic power” (Thompson 1995), on 
the basis that it better captures the notion of media visibility as being expected to 
have, and perceived as having, concrete consequences for political institutions. 
Actors acknowledge, nonetheless, that these consequences are not always positive 
since media content is not under their direct control and, even if positive, media 
visibility necessitates complementary non-mediated forms of attention control, 
both for electoral and policy-making purposes.  
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6.1.1. Goals of electoral rationale   
Being seen in the media is perceived as having the value of showing politicians 
active and committed to work in the eyes of audiences; informing and 
communicating with the public. This form of visibility can potentially become an 
electoral capability, although it is clear from the interviews that the news media 
are perceived as playing a limited role in this regard. This is due mainly to the 
relevance territorial work is perceived as having for defining electoral contests, 
and because spaces for political content in mass media are reduced and do not 
necessarily adjust to promotional expectations.  
Goals of electoral rationale associated to mediated visibility are here widely 
defined to encompass communication with voters and also more loosely with 
members of the public. Based on this distinction, goals of media exposure with 
underlying electoral rationale can be organised into two main clusters: firstly, 
those directed at fostering dynamics of power reproduction, and secondly, those 
directed at communicating with the public. As such, they are not only pursued 
during election periods but permanently as ways of building and maintaining 
support between elections. While this is clearly the case for elected officials, it is 
also true of those who are increasingly evaluated by their public performances 
despite being appointed, such as members of the cabinet and the heads of 
numerous public agencies.  
Goals of power reproduction relate to the use of the news media as a platform 
campaign, but also to affirming existence, increasing levels of knowledge, 
obtaining public recognition and promoting one’s own qualities and achievements.  
 
224 
 
FIGURE 14: Goals of media exposure 
 
 Overarching goal: Managing media visibility 
 
 
 
Common dimension of value 
attached to media visibility 
 
 
 
Visibility as mobilising capability  
(Activation function by means of controlling public attention) 
 
 
 
 Goals of policy rationale 
 
Goals of electoral rationale 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific dimensions of value 
attached to media visibility 
 
 
Agenda building 
(positioning topics, setting the 
terms of the debate) 
 
Public bargaining  
(differentiating position, 
accelerating decision-making, 
sending messages to 
counterparts) 
 
 
 
 
Power reproduction  
(news media as campaigning 
platform:  
affirmation of existence, public 
recognition, promotion of 
achievements) 
 
Communication with the 
public  
(Representation, social 
legitimation, accountability to 
voters) 
 
 
Key targeted audiences 
 
Peers, political audiences (intra-
party, inter-party, other 
representatives), elite, interest 
groups 
 
 
Public opinion, electorate 
Reach Mainly national National, regional and/or local 
 
 
 
Key media platforms 
 
Print elite-press (El Mercurio, La 
Tercera, La Segunda) 
New media (El Mostrador, CNN 
Chile, TVN 24 Horas) 
Niche programs (Radio and TV) 
Twitter 
 
 
TV 
Radio 
Regional and local media 
Twitter, Facebook 
 
 
Non-mediated parallel work 
 
 
Intra-elite relations, bargaining 
abilities, technical knowledge 
 
 
Territorial and local work 
 
Limits to media centrality  
 
Power of the Executive as 
agenda-setter 
Relevance of non-mediated 
networks (small and cohesive 
elite) 
 
Centrality of territorial work to 
define elections 
 
 The table above offers a scheme of goals political elites attribute to media visibility, together with some of the 
main attributes that relate to those goals. 
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The necessity of having some levels of media exposure with electoral aims is 
especially acute for those politicians attempting to build a national image, as well 
as those based in urban areas, and the Metropolitan Region in particular. These 
audiences are generally perceived by the politicians interviewed, whether 
justifiably or otherwise, as more demanding than audiences based in other zones 
of the country. At the same time access to the national news media is perceived as 
more competitive and challenging, making media exposure a goal that demands 
more resources.  
The distinction between the construction of national and regional leaderships was 
already identified in Chapter 5 as a structural form of differentiated access to the 
media. Goals of media exposure associated with power reproduction appear 
closely connected to the national/regional cleavage, and politicians and press 
officers raise this distinction frequently. For those politicians who pursue the 
acquisition of a national profile (where ‘national’ is often equated to Santiago-
based politics), media visibility becomes a must, and part of the inbuilt repertoire 
of resources needed for career development. The following quotations are from 
politicians involved in national politics, who reflect this idea that in certain 
positions the pursuit of media visibility is not understood as optional.   
What happens is that ... politicians increasingly maintain public support for 
the next election. And in large constituencies, in large districts, which have 
[a larger component of] public opinion, not appearing in the press, it just 
kills you.  
Politician 15, Assessor, political party. 
 
Well, to me, at one point [having a regular relationship with the news media] 
had a personal gain, because I represent a district in which public opinion 
is important, where people vote more for a deputy who positions topics and 
has views on issues, rather than someone who is worried about sewers. This 
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gave me an advantage and, in fact, in the three elections I have contested, I 
substantially improved my ballot, and ended up achieveing the first 
majority in a district that has been traditionally inclined to the centre-right. 
And that is connected to this, I think, to being someone who was 
consistently and commonly in the news media. 
Politician 20, Deputy. 
 
Politicians who do not target the national media appear to be achieving these 
goals more easily. For politicians and press officers interviewed, access to regional 
and local news is generally seen as easier and as spaces where politicians still 
retain important degrees of control over the terms in which they communicate 
with the public. This is due to a largely deferential treatment of regional and local 
authorities (or the assumption of such treatment). Additionally, in some regions 
and localities political advertising become a much-needed form of income for 
small media, which are sometimes open to selling micro-programmes to 
politicians (e.g. in local radio). 
Goals related to communication with the public refer to functions of information 
that political elites expect the news media institution to perform and might help 
them to inform general and specific audiences. When it comes to reaching the 
wider public, though, traditional news media are typically envisaged as conduits to 
reach mostly passive audiences.  An example of the latter is television 
appearances, which are commonly associated with an increase of visibility capital 
among audiences that are normally difficult to reach and perceived as having little 
if any interest in politics.  
Sometimes people – it happens a lot in my district – they evaluate your work 
depending on whether you were in the media or not (...) People do not even 
distinguish which issues you raised or what was the problem, but if 
people saw you on TV, they establish a relationship, a sort of feedback 
about who works and who doesn’t. 
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Politician 23, Deputy. 
That is very interesting. I was on a television program, especially in 
[channels] 7 or 13, the next day I got into the lift and people said: ‘you were 
on TV’. People did not know doing what. 
Politician 17, Former Minister.  
 
I think that the benefit is that people see you, and realize that you're on the 
issues that matter. For example, when I appear on a national television 
channel, people tell you ... they do not know what you said ... but they saw 
you. 
Politician 4, Deputy. 
 
Quotations such as those included above reflect a one-way understanding of 
communication where audiences are imagined as mostly passive, and news 
organisations, especially broadcast, as neutral conduits through which goals of a 
promotional nature can be achieved. However in practice, these ambitions usually 
clash with news formats and languages that are not open to promotional 
intentions and commonly find resistance from journalists. As a result, goals with 
electoral rationale are perceived as more difficult to achieve in the relationship 
with the news media.  
Often politicians and communication officers mention other communication 
channels as equally or more important and effective in their communication with 
the public, especially social media or their own media platforms (including, among 
others, websites, social media sites, advertisement or micro programmes 
purchased in local media). Taken together, these trends seem to highlight the 
limits of the mass media paradigm in understanding strategies of public 
communication. Davis (2003) recognises  that when the media get involved in 
political negotiations, “a significant proportion of the discussion is produced by, 
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and aimed at, decision-making and power- broking elites” (Ibid:670) with little 
reference to mass audiences. If politicians acknowledge that, to a greater extent, 
direct communication with the citizenry happens somewhere else (ranging from 
social media to territorial work), this is then an important indication that 
traditional news organisations become a site of communication at which different 
aims are pursued, and the very process of mediatization becomes closely 
connected to the aim of sustaining power positions in society without major 
audience involvement. In other words, traditional news media are not primarily 
conceived as spaces for dialogue or debate with civic society, which raises some 
questions about the role news organisations play as part of a democratic dialogue. 
6.1.2. Goals of policy rationale  
Following politicians’ accounts, goals of media exposure with an underlying policy 
rationale can be grouped into two general areas. First and most importantly is 
agenda building, both in terms of positioning issues and setting the terms of public 
debate. Secondly, the media are conceived as a forum for participation in public 
bargaining processes, providing opportunities for actors to establish their 
positions, accelerating decisions or sending messages to individuals and interest 
groups, increasing actors’ bargaining power. In this regard, goals with a policy 
rationale are widely defined as those seeking mobilization of support around 
political decision-making, and not restricted to the technical discussion of policy 
issues. 
When political elites mention or discuss goals of media visibility with policy 
rationales it is clear that visibility in the news media becomes a prime political 
capability in terms of intra-elite communication. That is to say, media exposure 
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associated with these goals is mainly oriented towards the elite, and therefore the 
value of media visibility lies in its inward-facing communication function.  
Building the agenda, or making topics of political interest visible in the media, is 
probably the most mentioned goal of media exposure among politicians. This is 
frequently expressed in the objectives of “positioning topics” (“poner temas”) and 
“triggering debates” in the mediated arena. In practice, agenda building is an 
aspiration and a constant struggle that is, however, rarely fully achieved. Both 
political elites and press officers align in describing efforts of agenda control as 
strenuous attempts in a battlefield where political institutions are perceived as 
having diminished in their abilities to control messages and content. This goal can 
be connected to literature on the agenda building efforts of message construction 
located in the processes of news production (Cobb & Elder 1971; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury 2007), rather than the media effects presumed in the tradition of 
agenda-setting research (McCombs & Shaw 1972). As such, efforts of agenda 
building in particular are addressed as a difficult matter that requires careful 
planning, resources, professional support and generally the coordinated action of 
numerous actors. In this regard, the Executive is better positioned to steer public 
attention around specific issues by aligning resources within a hierarchical 
structure to achieve that end. For political parties and parliamentarians, 
positioning topics in public debate is more difficult and generating alliances offers 
a better chance of controlling public attention: 
We can. Yes, we can position issues but only to the extent that we 
coordinate among ourselves, particularly with partners. I mean, I do not 
think that a particular actor, except some very specific actors and around very 
specific issues; for example, in the case of the Christian Democrats, [someone 
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such as] Gutenberg Martinez65 can position a topic; say, the party wants 
Camilo Escalona66 to be a senator in some region. That, he can accomplish. 
These sorts of things, but position an entire topic, we could only do so if 
we make an agreement; for instance between the Christian Democrats and 
the Socialists; or more.  
Politician 3, political party board. 
 
Positioning “entire topics”, as the research participant explains, generally means 
occupying the media agenda over long periods of time (weeks or months) around 
major policy issues. The latter demands the deployment of major resources, as the 
quotations below reinforce. The first comes from a press officer referring to the 
communication plan of one of the most emblematic policy reforms in the 
government of Sebastián Piñera (the extension of maternity leave for working 
mothers); the second belongs to a former minister who refers to strategies of 
communication deployed during the administration of President Lagos, who 
began his period in office with the economy having been hit by a financial crisis 
and negative growth. 
With big topics we work with SECOM because they have experts from 
different areas; Marketing, Communications. Topics of this level require 
more than one ministry. We discuss how to support the issue (…) exactly, 
we gather a big team; [heads of communication] from the Interior Minister, 
SECOM, SEGEGOB67; paralleling the political committee but in the 
communications area.  
Communications 11, La Moneda. 
 
                                                          
65
 Gutenberg Martinez is a former Deputy (1990-2002), a historical figure in the Chilean Christian 
Democrat Party, of which he was twice president (1992-1994 and 1999-2000).  
66
 Camilo Escalona is a historical figure in the Chilean Socialist Party, of which he was president in the 
periods 1994-1998, 2000-2003 and 2006-2010; former Deputy (1990-1998, 2002-2006) and Senator 
(2006-20014). 
67
 The Interior Minister, SECOM (Secretary of Communications) and SEGEGOB (General Government 
Secretary) are all agencies housed in La Moneda, the presidential palace, and therefore work more 
closely with the Presidency, coordinating relationships with other branches of government, political 
parties and Congress.  
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During the Lagos government we took office in a very adverse context; very 
high unemployment rates, very adverse times around the Asian crisis. The 
cycle of distrust towards political institutions was starting, and that was a 
moment of intense relationships with the news media, where we sought 
to find windows and provide context for the negative news regularly 
appearing in the media. That was a huge effort and we had to devote a lot 
of time to that and develop units responsible for it.  
Politician 29, Former Minister. 
 
Efforts involving resources such as those described above are not available to all 
political actors equally. Most actors routinely engage in more modest attempts at 
agenda building, especially by disputing frames for the interpretation of events 
and political processes. In this regard, individual actors that stand better chances 
of success are those who have built and maintain networks within the news media, 
and therefore are in a position to more easily reach journalists and/or editors to 
activate interest around specific issues or events. 
Public bargaining through the news media is the second area of goals associated 
with media exposure by political elites. These goals are connected to the notion of 
the media as a privileged arena for public deliberation (Habermas 2006) in which 
politicians can adopt positions within a discussion, send messages to other actors, 
as well as gain leverage while waging public disputes within or among political 
parties and public agencies.  
Additionally, and as a result of public bargaining practices, some actors mention 
the possibility of increasing the speed of decision-making processes, as long as 
mediated visibility can put pressure on other actors, driving them to react in 
response to amplified public attention over some issues.  
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At the macro level, I think that receiving media coverage clearly builds 
pressure to achieve things one is interested in (...) It is likely that your 
views will receive greater consideration when you go to talk to the 
Minister of Health, or the Minister of Finance, instead of coming out of 
nowhere. So it is a tool in my opinion, to work, to achieve objectives (...) 
Because what is unseen, descends in priority levels. 
Politician 14, Deputy. 
 
Two points are raised by politicians regarding the acceleration of decision-making 
processes. Firstly, some actors acknowledge that there are important mismatches 
between media schedules and legislative schedules, so it can be difficult and 
sometimes impossible to actually react in good time to mediated pressures, 
especially when it comes to changes that have to be generated in Congress. An 
additional point raised is that controversial policy issues - where disagreements 
between interest groups are patent - are those which generally capture media 
attention (see Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer 2011). Since divisive issues receive 
greater media attention, exposing these differences in public can actually make it 
more difficult for actors to reach an agreement without compromising their 
position in the public eye.   
6.1.3. Media visibility as mobilizing capability 
As described above, the management of media visibility is identified as the 
overarching goal in the relationship between political elites and the media, and the 
main driver for the process of adaptation to news values and routines. The 
attainment of mediated visibility is therefore perceived as having consequences 
inside and outside the circuit of elite communication. In other words, this media-
controlled resource is envisaged as a tool in the governance processes. 
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March & Olsen (1995, 2006, 2009) state that institutions provide structures of 
resources, which in turn create capabilities for acting. For political institutions, 
they identify four types of relevant capabilities enabling political action: rights and 
authorities, resources (money, property, time, etc.), knowledge and organising 
capacity. Together, these provide actors with greater or lesser scope for action 
(March & Olsen 1995: 93-94). Additionally, though, they identify what they call 
mobilising capabilities, which are described as essential triggers of the 
aforementioned political capabilities: 
Capabilities are necessary for effective action, but they are not sufficient. 
Action also requires activation and attention. Since attention is a scarce 
resource, political systems are responsive not only to the distribution of 
resources, competencies, rights and authorities, but also to their mobilization. 
As a consequence, the management of attention is a major activity of 
governance. (March & Olsen 1995: 116) 
The political function attributed to media exposure by political actors can be 
described in terms quite similar to what March & Olsen (1995) describe as 
mobilising or activation capabilities within political institutions, the main 
component of which is, as they note, the organisation of the scarce resource of 
attention. The control of public attention has been identified as the main resource 
managed by contemporary news media (Thompson 1995; Luhmann 2000; 
Kunelius & Reunanen 2012), but nonetheless, these spaces of communication have 
not been a relevant concern for the neo-institutionalist tradition within political 
science.68  
                                                          
68
 March and Olsen (1989, 1995) include a few mentions of the news media in their work, highlighting 
particularly the auditing functions that democratic theory attaches to news organisations and noting 
the gap between the expectations and the actual operations of the media industry. Crozier (2010, 2007, 
2008) is one of the few political scientists that have paid attention to information dynamics and 
communications shifts as key to the understanding of contemporary governance. For other recent work 
in this direction see Korthagen & Klijn (2012) and Hajer(2009). 
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What the analysis of interviews suggests is that media visibility is understood as 
both a source of public attention as well as performing activation functions. The 
news media as a social institution renders actors and issues visible, but also 
enables political actors to act in other domains; an indication of the ability media 
visibility has to become a political resource. As highlighted by Kunelius & 
Reunanen (2012), this media-controlled resource (attention) is not an end but a 
means; it does not replace power, but eventually becomes power.  Overall, the 
activation capability associated with media exposure by political elites is closely 
connected to an increase in levels of perceived influence associated with media 
appearances. According to political elites, securing media exposure plays a 
prominent role in increasing the perceived levels of power of those subjects of 
media coverage, especially within the political environment. Thompson (1995) 
discusses how forms of symbolic power associated with media visibility influence 
actors’ capacity to intervene in the course of events and influence the actions of 
others. Likewise, politicians recognise that media exposure may have quite 
concrete consequences, such as increasing individual bargaining power, attracting 
opportunities or improving their ability to be heard, especially in front of their 
peers: 
In terms of visibility, beyond power; power is always important, the problem 
is how to use it; for me it is a tool to accomplish things for the benefit of 
the people. I've always understood this so I do not get dizzy (...) [For 
example] It is not the same to fight a minister who currently has 54 per 
cent public approval than a minister that has 23 per cent , do you know 
what I mean? It is not the same. And they know that I have press, and that if 
I call them, I am going to get all the press. 
Politician 8, Minister. 
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(…) And also, especially with authorities in your coalition, when they know 
that you have spokesmanship abilities on some issues, and opinions; 
they treat you differently. In that respect, at least in my case; they return my 
calls; if I ask for a hearing, I will have it. It isn’t the same for everyone, no. 
Politician 10, Deputy. 
 
The quotations included above point in the same direction: when conceptualised 
as a power resource, mediated visibility is primarily conceived as increasing 
actors’ capacity of action. There are, nevertheless, some important nuances 
regarding the uses of mediated visibility by political elites, which will be expanded 
in the next section.  
6.1.4. The limits of media visibility 
To complement findings discussed in previous sections about the value attached 
to media visibility by political elites, this section will look at the limitations and 
constraints of media visibility as a political resource. This was a topic that received 
uneven attention among research participants. Politicians brought up these 
concerns most clearly, followed by communications officers, whereas journalists 
addressed them superficially and less frequently. The latter highlights that the 
limitations of mediated visibility as a resource were a political concern more than 
they are a media concern. As a result, exploring these categories is particularly 
useful to better understand the limitations of media-centred approaches to the 
idea of mediatization of politics, as well as to contextualise the relevance of 
mediated visibility as one resource among others available for political actors. 
Constraints and limitations on the political value of media exposure is a topic 
which politicians in particular discussed extensively. Two points are highlighted. 
First, though highly valued, media visibility is perceived as a volatile currency, a 
236 
 
double-edged resource, potentially damaging if not appropriately managed. 
Secondly, mediated visibility demands to be complemented with other sources of 
visibility 
6.1.4.1. The volatility of the media currency 
It has been established that media visibility is identified as a mobilising capability 
within the political domain, but one that is highly volatile and political actors 
emphasise that to be seen in the news media cannot be readily equated with an 
improvement of political capital. The acknowledgement that media visibility can 
potentially be damaging comes across in the answers of most politicians. Visibility 
associated with media exposure is perceived as contingent, episodic and volatile, 
not necessarily related to an effective political performance. As put succinctly by a 
communication officer working in the Senate: “you could fill a graveyard with 
overexposed politicians” (Communications 6, Senate). While journalists tend to 
equate media exposure with power and influence, politicians are far more 
cautious in their responses. They generally make the distinction between good 
and harmful visibility, and are highly critical of those colloquially known as 
“moths” (polillas), or political media personalities always seeking the media 
spotlight.  
There are others who obviously try to be in the news by any means and I 
think that, at the end, overexposure is–at any level, assuming roles that are 
different from those typical of the function – overexposure ends up 
discrediting people (...) 
Politician 16, Political party board. 
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I think it also depends on what political exposure and what media 
exposure you have, because there are parliamentarians who actually go 
public all the time, every day, talking about everything, and I do not know if 
that ultimately generates a sort of positive political capital.  
Politician 14, Deputy. 
 
It depends, because the question is why do they go public? I can give you 
an example; Deputy A. is regularly in the press, Deputy B. is also regularly in 
the press. Probably they are in the media in equivalent measure; but there is a 
qualitative difference with respect to the topics and attitudes that relate to 
their press appearances. There is a short route and a long route.  
Politician 25, Deputy. 
 
Thompson (2005) highlights that contemporary media create new opportunities 
and new risks, exposing political leaders to “a new and distinctive kind of fragility” 
(Ibid: 42); media content often escapes political actors’ control, and therefore 
mediated visibility can potentially work against those who are brought into the 
media spotlight. In line with this idea, the quotations above highlight the volatility 
of the media currency as primarily associated by political actors with the result of 
over-exposure (too much, too often) and damaging exposure (poor media 
management, little selectivity in media appearances or little control over media 
content). Therefore, the volatility of the media currency appears attached to the 
ever-present risk of damaging media exposure, both as a result of individual 
choices as well as the outcome of a lessened capacity of controlling media content. 
Opportunities for communication are constrained in time, have a limited impact 
and their consequences are short-term, therefore over-reliance on this form of 
political capital is considered risky. Beyond electoral dynamics, media visibility is 
also perceived as potentially risky for the development of decision-making 
processes. For example, it may hinder negotiations by promoting a polarisation of 
238 
 
positions and, thus, minimising opportunities for dialogue and consensus, or by 
encouraging pernicious information leaks. 
It is important to highlight that most of these comments referred to damaging 
media exposure perceived as the result of individual choices, and therefore not 
necessarily a consequence of an adversarial press. Instead, it is a perceived risk 
that derives from the adoption of news logics that hijack the scope and tone of 
actors’ public interventions, potentially damaging their reputation. 
6.1.4.2. Balancing mediated and non-mediated forms of visibility 
Another important area discussed together with limitations of mediated visibility 
as a political resource is the limited impact mediated visibility has on the 
development of some political processes, both electoral and policy-related.  
Managing media exposure and developing networks in the media certainly have to 
be balanced with other forms of non-mediated visibility among interest groups. In 
particular, attention to territorial work and inter-personal relations within policy 
networks are frequently mentioned as equally relevant and often more relevant 
political assets.  
Attention to neighbourhood associations, cultural centres, social movements, 
unions, trade associations and other specific counterparts in policy processes are 
different forms of visibility management, perceived as running on parallel tracks 
to media work, therefore subject to other rationales for action69 where the media 
are perceived as having a marginal role, if any. In addition to community spaces 
such as those mentioned above, other spaces mentioned as separate from the 
                                                          
69
 Reunanen et al. 2010 discuss these difference in terms of media vs. policy logics; Korthagen & Klijn 
2012 contrast the logic of the media and the logic of decision making in governance networks.   
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media domain are inter-parliamentary work in commissions, where face-to-face 
communication with interest groups is crucial.  
In terms of communication with grassroots organisations, territorial work is 
frequently highlighted as decisive, regardless of whether politicians appear to be 
highly mediatized or not. Therefore, appropriately balancing media and territorial 
work was frequently emphasised in interviews as a basic skill; some might 
“compensate” between one and the other, others choose one as their main 
strategy.  
No, I mean it is important because the news media place you in the 
spotlight, but if all you do is to appear in the media, you are done. And 
conversely, if you concentrate on territorial work only, you are also done. 
Politician 21, Deputy. 
 
My work has been assessed with an 82 per cent citizen approval. I dare you to 
find any other MP in Chile with that level of approval. So, that's what 
happens when you are a regional figure and I would rather be a regional 
figure than a national figure. I have some impact on national news, but 
ultimately I focus on the region and that makes the difference.  
Politician 22, Senator. 
 
In this first period I tend to think that has a medium importance because 
when you are in your first period [in office] you must consolidate. It's like 
when one puts a product on the market, you have to make investments of 
various kinds; money, time, presence and also news media, of course (…) I 
feel that the media collaborate, yes, but it is not the most important 
point. I privilege my territory-based work (...) There are some who have 
had the experience of having a lot of media work in their first period, and they 
did not last, because they did not choose the other route [territory-based 
work]. Being in the media is cheaper; proximity is certainly more expensive. 
Politician 18, Deputy. 
 
Despite mediatization of politics having been acknowledged as a process which 
has accelerated from the 1990s onward in Chile (Silva 2004; Cordero & Marin 
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2006), the relevance of street rallies and door to door canvassing as traditional 
electioneering campaign techniques have remained central in electoral processes 
(Espíndola 2008). The analysis of the interviews reveals that this territorial logic 
is considered crucial; particularly to build and maintain support between 
elections, stressing that electoral success is the result of multiple variables other 
than media visibility alone. The following quotations exemplify these ideas. The 
first refers to an emblematic election for a Senatorial district in which a former 
candidate to the presidency lost to a “local” candidate.   
The smaller the scale, the more relevant the territorial work and the less 
weight communication has. Because there are people who believe that 
because they are on TV, they are going to be voted for, and that’s not the 
case. (…) You have the case of Lavín vs. Chahuán in the Fifth Region70, for 
example. Chahuán beat Lavín, and Lavín arrived [in the election campaign] 
from a presidential campaign and Chahuán was a Deputy. That's territorial 
work (...) He believed that because he had a nearly 100 per cent 
knowledge, and he was on TV, that would make a difference, and it 
didn’t.  
Politician 15, Assessor political party. 
 
Now, there are many examples of candidates who have been a lot in the 
media, who have a good media positioning work, who are competing with 
very quiet candidates with no media profile, and yet you are surprised by the 
results of elections when the candidate who had no media positioning is 
elected because he was well positioned with their constituents (...) Local 
context matters; is very important.  
Politician 24, Assessor political party. 
 
Those who succeed in politics know that being in the news media is 
important but touring the region in a systematic way, even if it costs the 
world, every Thursday and Friday besides the district week, those are the 
winners, and those who increase their voting throughout the years. But all 
that has to be done in parallel with the media. 
Communications 6, Senate. 
                                                          
70
 The electoral race mentioned in this quotation is the 2009 Parliamentary Elections, where former 
Deputy Francisco Chahuán (RN) surpassed the voting of former Presidential Candidate Joaquín Lavín 
(UDI), becoming Senator for the Circumscription 6 (5
th
 region coast).  
241 
 
Overall, politicians emphasise how media visibility has to be balanced with other 
visibility strategies, other activation schemes, particularly for electoral purposes. 
In the context of policy discussions, other strategies of visibility and legitimation 
inside policy networks – such as direct contact with interest groups – are also 
regarded as running on sometimes parallel tracks to strategies of media visibility. 
This demands balancing complementary spaces.   
When the media are a target of political communication, though, understanding 
media logics becomes crucial. How these logics are discussed by research 
participants is the focus of the next section.  
 
6.2. What makes it into the news? Defining the logic of the news media  
This section explores the concept of news media logic from the perspective of 
research participants, paying attention to those features highlighted by Chilean 
politicians, press officers and journalists as salient in the routines of information 
exchanges in which these different communities of actors engage on a regular 
basis with the aim of co-producing political news. As discussed in Chapter 3.2, 
news media logic is here understood as an abstract construct encompassing 
professional, technological and commercial considerations shaping news 
production, which becomes observable in the process of news making. Central as 
it is to definitions of mediatization processes, the news media logic does not 
exhibit stable components across the literature, and emphases are placed on both 
field-defined features of the news media logic, such as professional norms and 
standards of journalistic practice (Strömbäck & Esser 2009; Asp 2014), news 
values and storytelling techniques (Strömbäck 2008) and notions of 
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newsworthiness (Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014), as well as on external influences 
shaping that logic, particularly commercial drivers (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; 
Strömbäck 2008; Esser 2013; Landerer 2013; Meyen et al. 2014). What most 
analyses have in common is the attribution of structuring capacities to a logic that 
lays the foundations for actors’ interactions over media content. As such, it is 
crucial to grasp how the rules of the game imposed by Chilean news organisations 
are articulated by actors inhabiting political institutions based on their own 
practices, as well as how they interact with and react to this institutional logic.  
Three features were particularly salient in participants’ accounts regarding the 
logic of the news media, which will be further unpacked below. First among these 
is the identification of conflict and negativity as the backbone of newsworthy 
content in the political beat. Second is the permanent presentism imposed by 
media-defined temporalities and third are the commercial underpinnings 
contained in news production dynamics. All these features are fairly recognisable 
in different branches of literature on news making, in particular Meyer’s (2002) 
definition of media logic as the result of media routines - notions of what is news 
and how it is presented -, notions of media time as distinctly different from 
political time, and media economics. Yet, these supply relevant information 
regarding how this external institutional logic is negotiated and how media-
oriented practices adjusted to media requirements. Also important is paying 
attention to absent or less salient features of the news media logic, such as the 
public orientation of political news. This barely surfaces in participants’ 
discussions of what makes it into the news in the beat, not even among journalists 
who claim their professional autonomy rests on concepts of newsworthiness 
243 
 
rather than public orientation. The latter will be discussed in connection to the 
commercial nature of the Chilean media system (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Couso 
2012). 
The second sub-section looks at the political elites’ reactions to the news media 
logic, accounting for attitudes of resistance to a logic mostly perceived as external 
and constraining. Nonetheless, the logic of the news media is also discussed as an 
opportunity, highlighting that speaking the language of news – becoming 
mediatized – is mostly a way to unlock access to mediated visibility and an 
attempt to retain control over media messages, which raises questions about how 
power shifts are to be understood in the process of mediatization. Finally, some 
unintended consequences of the process of mediatization for political actors are 
identified, such as the overexposure of political confrontation over policy 
discussions, and the anchoring to the present that pushes political actors towards 
reactive rather than proactive media management, amplifying previous power 
differentials between political actors.   
 
6.2.1 Conflict and the news: no grey zones 
When comparing the accounts of the three groups, a shared understanding 
regarding the core features of the news media logic emerges. For politicians, 
political communicators and journalists alike, certain elements of news values 
become central in shaping and defining their daily interactions. Conflict and 
negativity are widely highlighted as a commonly recognised feature that values or 
devalues information. 
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Close to the time when the interviews were conducted, an independent MP made 
strong accusations against some of his colleagues during a session.71 This attempt 
at denunciation ended up with some shoving and a fistfight between this MP and 
the head of one of the then official parties, an unusual event in the Chilean 
Parliament.  This outbreak of violence had extensive media coverage for two 
days72, and was repeatedly used among interviewees of all political affiliations as 
the epitome of the distorted image of politics the news media was willing to 
spread at the expense of less-newsworthy, yet relevant, discussions that take place 
daily in Congress. Conflict and confrontation in political news are rarely physical 
as in this somewhat unusual example. They remain, nevertheless, widely identified 
core values of news production (Galtung & Ruge 1965; Tuchman 1978; Harcup & 
O’Neill 2001; Allan 2010) that helps locate stories within a narrative of 
protagonists, antagonists and the increased probability of such a story progressing 
into future episodes (Cook, 1998). Awareness that conflict adds value to stories, 
statements and actions was widely acknowledged by politicians and press officers 
alike, as the following quotations illustrate. The first belongs to a new Deputy and 
the second to a journalist working as a press officer in the Senate.  
 
                                                          
71
 The case alluded to is that of Deputy René Alinco, a former construction worker and later deputy for 
the District 59 (XII Region) during 2006-2014. On June 12
th
 2013 he urged the Ethics Commission to 
intervene on the basis of two main allegations, one directed at Rosauro Martinez, an MP from 
Renovación Nacional, whom he accused of participating in crimes committed during the military 
dictatorship. The second denunciation was formulated broadly against his colleagues and without 
names, allegedly including abuse of power, influence peddling, workplace harassment and even sexual 
harassment in Congress, committed by elected members. The accusations did not find broad support 
among political parties, and the Ethics Commission asked Alinco to give names and details in order to 
take further steps, which were not provided. The accusations about abuses of power ended there. The 
accusations against Martinez, though, followed a different path due to a parallel judicial investigation 
that ended with his impeachment and prosecution for the deaths of three opponents to the military 
regime.  
72
 At least 50 news reports in all media platforms informed about the fight on June 12
th
 and June 13
th 
2013, according to the news search engine Nexchannel. 
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I don’t have much experience since this is my first legislative period, and it is 
hard to relate to the media, if you are not really into controversial 
issues. I think that when it comes to the national media [our role] is very 
reactive, because what is interesting for the media, what makes it into the 
news is not what you are seriously working on. For example, you will 
never see a story about a good bill that will change the life of a person. It is 
difficult because few will care about it. What makes the news? The project 
that was not approved, or the project that triggered a fight between two 
Deputies who were about to come to blows. That happens to be the news of 
the day (…) Today it is like this. And I think, in that sense, you have to 
know how the system works. 
Politician 4, Deputy. 
 
I daresay that in the last 4-5 years, the sound bites that you have to send to 
the media are actually white or black: you killed it or you didn’t; it is not that 
it is wounded and might need treatment. No, that is useless. Did we kill it? OK, 
let’s kill it, and there the sound bite goes, and you are on television and you 
are everywhere... but none of this ambivalence of old politicians who were 
more likely to say ‘yes, we do have the opportunity to study this article, this 
law, because we want to see whether it is positive or not positive’. No. That 
sound bite today is absolutely left out by the press 
Communications 1, Senator Office. 
 
The perceived prevalence of conflict as the more important aspect of the 
information traded between politicians and journalists can be connected to both 
professional and commercial components of news media organisations. Turf wars, 
spin tactics and political operations are all elements identified as prevalent in the 
conduct of everyday politics and which allow journalists working this beat to add 
elements of conflict to their stories. At the same time, conflict or negativity is an 
element frequently considered in both classical and contemporary descriptions of 
news values, as long as negative news are seen as unambiguous, newsworthy and 
attractive to audiences (Galtung & Ruge 1965; Harcup & O’Neill 2001; O’Neill & 
Harcup 2009). For the political beat in particular, negativity further works as a 
rhetorical strategy that allows journalists to show distance from their sources and 
counterbalance attempts to control media messages (Frank, Esser & Spanier 
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2005). In addition to this protective role, conflict is also attached to commercial 
values that help stories sell (Lengauer et al. 2011), performing therefore a twofold 
objective: the reinforcement of the professional role of journalists and the 
attraction of audiences.  
The understanding that conflict adds news value to stories may be common 
among research participants, but the appraisal they made of this value differs 
depending on their positions. Although all groups discussed the use of conflict and 
negativity in political news, explicit mentions of this matter are more prevalent in 
the political side of the sample; 22 out of 30 politicians, and 11 out of 12 
communication officers elaborated on this point, against 7 out of 18 journalists.  
Those journalists who mentioned this point generally do so in a matter-of-fact 
way: polemic adds value to stories; lack of conflict decreases the value of stories. 
Press officers and particularly politicians, though, have a more ambivalent 
relationship with this notion, since it is usually perceived as a double edged 
resource; it may decrease the quality of public debate but it can work as a tool for 
agenda control. Press officers recognise that they are pushed to take extremes, to 
adopt white and black positions and produce bold statements in order to get 
through media agendas. There is, in this respect, an acknowledgement that grey 
areas do not fit news media languages. Politicians, in turn, understand that if they 
are willing to provide conflict their chances of being in the media are higher, and 
that triggers a process of boundary negotiation, between what is sometimes 
perceived as compromising quality in exchange for audience reach.  
The use of negative frameworks in political news has been analysed previously, 
distinguishing between actor-related negativity and framework-related negativity 
(see Lengauer et al., 2011), focusing on whether the confrontational frame comes 
247 
 
from statements and tone provided by politicians or interpretive packages created 
by journalists; both of these dimensions of conflict are acknowledged by research 
participants in this study. On the one hand, conflict or negativity is strategically 
adopted – usually through antagonising other political actors, both on and off the 
record – as a standard tool for political news management, under the premise that 
conflict adds value to their relationship with news organisations. On the other 
hand, when conflict is perceived as created by journalists and news media outlets 
it becomes a point of resistance for politicians and their press aides; ‘an-other’ 
way to do things. Critiques of the quality of journalism, together with the 
articulation of resistance to the news media as institutions, usually start from 
discussions about the negativity of news, which is expressed by politicians and 
press officers in attitudes of discomfort towards the workings of the media or the 
recognition of difficulties in the process of managing public attention.  
6.2.2 Coyuntura, presentism and the temporality imposed by the media  
The second more prominent attribute of the news media logic discussed by 
research participants is the issue of permanent attention to the present, as well as 
the timing and pace of news, which can be connected to professional and 
commercial components of news organisations equally. Politicians and journalists 
alike speak often of the need to constantly react to sudden and unexpected 
changes in the news agenda. Two words are used often to discuss the notions of 
time imposed by the media environment: coyuntura and contingencia, none of 
which can be literally translated into English. Coyuntura is a Spanish word whose 
literal meaning is “the combination of factors and circumstances that a nation 
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faces for the decision of an important matter”.73 This word, though, has been 
adopted in political communication jargon to describe evolving current affairs that 
demand immediate attention, as opposed to long-term issues. This term is used in 
a similar and sometimes interchangeable way with contigencia, to convey notions 
of immediacy, attention to the present and unpredictability. News stories are 
perceived as evolving quickly in ways harder to predict due to shortened news 
cycles and the multiplication of communication channels, anchoring political 
actors to the coyuntura, which often renders less-effective the long-term planning 
of communication strategies. Instead, it demands from actors a permanent state of 
alert in order to identify opportunities while news agendas develop.  
From the perspective of political actors, the perceived difficulty associated with 
foreseeing the life period of a story limits their ability to control media flows (such 
as proactively placing topics in the agenda). Conversely, reacting in a timely 
fashion to an on-going agenda creates space for a certain degree of visibility 
control. Similar to what politicians say about conflict, the relationship between 
political actors and the rhythm imposed by the news cycle is ambivalent. 
Following this pace closely is criticised as short-sighted and damaging to the 
quality of public debate, as the focus on the present becomes obsessive and ‘big 
discussions’ are ignored and marginalised. However, it is also instrumentally 
integrated into routines in order to render topics of interest visible, as illustrated 
by the following quotation.  
 
                                                          
73
 Definition offered by RAE, Real Academia de la Lengua Española.  
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- How would you assess your ability to place topics on the agenda?  
It is intermediate. It is intermediate to... What happens is that if you enter 
the topics of the moment74, you will appear for sure. And the more 
controversial, the more contentious, the more to the sound bite, it is 
more accepted, apparently. But if we try…. let’s see; what happens is that 
there is always a discussion; there is always the temptation of rather entering 
the topics of the moment, because it is the only thing that guarantees that you 
appear. Or we try to connect [those interventions] with the things we're doing 
in order to give a long-term vision... a medium-term let’s say, that is not just 
fighting someone.  
Politician 15, senior advisor 
 
The temporality imposed by the media due to newsroom arrangements; 
journalistic routines and media production demands is integral to news making 
(Tunstall 1971; Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979). To this is added the clash between 
political schedules and media schedules as a crucial point of friction between the 
fields of politics and journalism, as long as political messages have to be tailored to 
fit the “uncompromising presentism” (Meyer, 2002: 47) inherent to news 
production (see also Cook, 2005). Time-related concepts are essential to 
understanding the news media institution, insomuch as immediacy is a core value 
informing the professional identity of journalism (Deuze 2005), to the point that 
timely/not timely has been identified as the binary code that provides guidance 
for action in the news media system (Hanitzsch 2006).    
 
6.2.3. The commercial underpinnings of the news media logic 
Both conflict and attention to the present, the two main features of the 
institutional news media logic discussed by research participants, are strongly 
connected to notions of newsworthiness and news production cultures, lending 
                                                          
74
 In the original, “the topics of the moment” was actually referred to as coyuntura.   
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support to the idea that news values are at the core of what has been called news 
media logic (Strömbäck 2008; Esser 2013; Asp 2014). Notions of newsworthiness, 
then, structure much of the interactions between news organisations and other 
institutional fields. However, it is not trivial that levels of conflict, antagonism and 
polarisation are so uniformly highlighted as the most recognisable features of 
what makes the news in the political beat, since these are features of the news 
media located closer to the market pole of the journalistic profession (Landerer 
2013).  
The commercial underpinnings of the journalistic trade75 are acknowledged by 
Chilean political elites, although it is important to distinguish between two 
different ways of discussing the market-driven nature of the media. First, they 
discuss the imperatives of audience maximisation that shape news production and 
second, they stress the relationship between ownership patterns and corporate 
interests, which would find an expression in the form of direct commercial 
pressures in news content.  
With regard to the first point, politicians discuss the way a commercial orientation 
impact processes such as content selection and presentation, pushing news 
organisations to adjust political content to fit efforts of audience maximisation: 
                                                          
75
 The commercial drivers of journalistic practice respond to imperatives of audience and profit 
maximisation combined with pressures of operational efficiency (higher news production at lower 
costs), which are often associated with concerns about decreasing standards of quality in contents 
(Franklin 2005; Davies 2008; McManus 2009). These tensions between values of public orientation and 
pressures for audience-maximisation have been also found in studies focused on public-funded media 
(Benson & Powers 2011), showing that they are transversal to the media institution. These commercial 
rationales are integral to definitions of news media logics (Esser 2013; Meyer 2002; Asp 2014). For a full 
discussion on news media logics see section 3.2.1.   
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There is an issue there and, I insist, I do not blame the journalists. I think - and 
I've talked about this with a few of them – that is related to the editorial line 
of the media, which has a clear commercial drive. That is, they respond 
to the existing demand on consumption. And to the extent that 
consumption demand points towards, for example, sensationalism, the type of 
journalism that gets done it will be that sort. 
Politician 2, Deputy. 
 
This is all mediated by what sells and what does not sell. (...) I refuse to 
dramatize issues so they are sold, you know what I mean?, to put up a show, 
to play along with the market in the media (...) So, it's like ... it's easy to sell 
knickknack. The press likes that.  
Politician 1, Deputy.  
 
I think the media have a great responsibility in providing space to certain 
people in political issues –which is my subject – to the most aggressive 
people, those who are more bad mouthed, more vulgar, for obvious 
reasons because they produce shock, and that apparently sells or 
generates rating and profits, and there is a linkage there, a vicious circle. 
Politician 9, Senator. 
 
These complaints about the pernicious effects of a logic of audience maximisation 
resonate with familiar concerns about the impoverishment of public debate and 
fears about the dumbing down of the media which may be the result of 
commercialisation processes (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Blumler & Kavanagh, 
1999).  
As mentioned above, the second interpretation of the commercial underpinnings 
of Chilean journalism, –discussed by politicians and press officers alike, stresses 
the links between the interests of commercial media and the specific configuration 
of the Chilean media system, highlighting potential biases associated with patterns 
of ownership concentration. While the former is closely linked to definitions of the 
news media logic and attached to news making routines, the second is attached to 
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contextual features and concerns about the impact that issues of ownership 
concentration might have upon journalistic autonomy.   
 
And obviously the concentration in a few hands, few hands that have some 
ideological orientation, and – worse still - few hands that not only 
concentrate media ownership but are strongly linked to economic 
groups. It establishes a linkage; something dangerous. And we have seen it 
when relevant issues such as the issue of abuses are discussed or the 
collusion of big economic groups. 
Politician 5, Assessor, political party. 
 
But I would say that they are rather ... it is easy for corporative power to 
position issues they care about in the media, as well as to exclude the issues 
they are not interested in. And there, politics is on a rather secondary level. 
Today, they are able to outweigh positioning issues about how we understand 
the economy, development, labour relations. And in that respect, corporative 
power positions topics as it sees fit.  
Journalist 15, Senior editor, radio. 
 
Both La Tercera and El Mercurio, are receptive to denunciations involving the 
state, or the political class, or specific politicians, yet they are almost 
impervious to criticism or investigations against private agents or 
business interests. That is what happens in Chile today. I would say that 
there is not a fair play of sorts regarding politics. Perhaps some 
considerations in some aspects, but political denunciations get through. 
When it comes to business interests there is a sort of reluctance. I do not 
see the same treatment; the same receptivity from editors or journalists to 
receive that sort of denunciation. 
Politician 23, Deputy. 
 
Markedly, opinions about business interests as being more difficult to tackle than 
political interests were rather common and resonate with the findings of 
Hanitzsch & Mellado (2011), as well as Lagos & Cabalin (2013) who argue that 
Chilean journalists perceive economic pressures as stronger than political 
pressures in their work.  
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The salience of a commercial logic as a prominent feature of the logic of the media 
has been repeatedly stressed (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Negrine 2008; Landerer 
2013;  Meyen et al. 2014). As highlighted above, avenues used by both Chilean 
political and media actors for discussions about the commercial underpinnings of 
the logic of the media are distinctive. Ultimately, however, they both point towards 
the subordination of journalistic criteria to market criteria, a diagnosis which 
figures prominently in academic analyses about the political economy of the media 
in Chile (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; Couso 2012).  
6.3 Political elites’ adaptations to the news media logics 
The present section looks at how political actors adapt themselves to news media 
logics to proactively pursue spaces of mediated visibility. Despite the reservations 
expressed regarding the formal and informal norms regulating the functioning of 
the media, politicians and press officers often adjust their practices, statements 
and actions to fit media languages to the end of achieving the goal of media 
exposure. Acknowledging that, for the most part, actors willingly adapt to news 
media logics (Stromback & Van Aelst 2013; Blumler 2014; Marcinkowski & Steiner 
2014; Van Aelst et al. 2014), a reflexive understanding of the mediatization 
process is favoured that recognises actors’ agency and strategic actions in the 
process.  
As was discussed earlier in the chapter, politicians and press officers identify 
salient features in the inner workings of news organisations, and an 
understanding of these norms often goes hand in hand with the possibility of 
instrumentally embracing some of these informal rules in an attempt at retaining 
control on the visibility of topics and stories of interest.  What makes the news is 
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generally understood and articulated in a similar way for the politicians and press 
officers interviewed. Where they are more likely to differ is in the position they 
take when deciding how to deal with this institutional logic, which might vary 
from one actor to the next, but also from case to case.  Overall, the adaptation to 
news media logic is best understood as a reaction to changes in the media 
environment.  
A narrative of change was prevalent among all groups of research participants: 
changes in the relationships between politicians and journalists, changes in 
political strategies oriented towards the media and changes within the media 
environment itself. What all of these have in common is that they suggest a shift in 
power relations and a substantially damaged political ability to shape and steer 
media content, a shift that has been met with an awareness that old scripts of 
action have to be rewritten and routines of political communication updated in the 
context of a a more demanding competition for media attention. 
Some elements of these descriptions stand out, particularly the idea that both 
spaces and time devoted to politics in traditional media have shrunk, limiting 
opportunities for visibility, an aspect in which Chilean politicians are not alone 
(Negrine 1996; Marcinkowski 2014) . However, these spaces have not only 
diminished but have changed in important ways.  Traditional media actors have 
seen important transformations in recent years, particularly from the turn of the 
century onwards. Among others, important to the micro-climate of politics was the 
eruption of a more adversarial and interpretative form of political journalism 
since Cristian Bofill became director of La Tercera in 199976 (Ramos & Matus 
                                                          
76
 Bofill is an important character in the recent history of political journalism in Chile. He was in charge 
of La Tercera during the period 1999-2013, consolidating the newspaper as up-market-oriented and a 
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2003), or the eruption of infotainment genres, which also fuelled the 
transformation of a newspaper, the successful tabloid Las Ultimas Noticias.77 
Although dissimilar in form and consequence, these changes dragged political 
elites out of their comfort zone, introducing new languages to be considered for 
public communication.   
The collision between older and newer media logics has been acknowledged as a 
point of friction inside government, political parties and other groups aiming for 
political influence (Chadwick 2013), and that becomes especially clear when 
research participants discuss the impact social media have had on their daily 
routines. Twitter in particular, by far the most important social media network 
mentioned for the political communication community, is frequently identified as 
a disruption, not only because of the fluidity and uncertainty that social media add 
to communications, opening unexpected flanks for press officers throughout the 
day, but also because social media messages may have resonance in traditional 
media, the set of media which actors orientate most actions towards. 
Before was the press release, was the press conference, and now is 
Twitter. You know that parliamentarians – when they are not in person in 
Congress – they replied to each other on Twitter, sometimes they go with 
their gut in the replies, and although they may be interesting sound bites 
for the press, that has provoked many problems too. 
Communications 6, Senate. 
 
It has changed many things. Twitter is a tool that makes us shiver 
constantly. I mean, at some point we have to silence two of our 
politicians. I mean, please stop because you are causing a mess! Facebook 
 
direct competitor of El Mercurio. Revelations of corruption in Ricardo Lagos’ government were unveiled 
in its pages. According to Ramos and Matos (2003) Bofill was known for a style based on formulating 
theses and then sending reporters to prove them. This confrontational style of work was acknowledged 
for some of the politicians interviewed.   
77
 In 2000, Las Ultimas Noticias, former mid-market newspaper, adopted a classical tabloid editorial line, 
becoming the most read newspaper in the country by 2003 (Edwards 2009).  
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never caused anything to us; it was just about who had more followers, 
playing that game; but Twitter is different. You have to follow relevant 
characters. Many use Twitter as a formal means of communication because 
next day the *quotation marks* formal news media may publish easily 
something from Twitter. So, that has added an additional front to pay 
attention to. 
Communications 12, Political Party. 
 
At the level of everyday practice, in terms of how the political communication 
culture has developed as a result of these environmental changes, it is possible to 
identify domains of adjustment to the media that are common to most actors. 
These are (1) the professionalisation of political communication, (2) the 
adaptation to media languages, (3) the adaptation to media temporalities and (4) 
the dissemination of unattributed information as a form of covert information 
subsidy. These domains of change will be unpacked below.  
6.3.1. Professionalisation of political communication  
Most changes and adaptations to the news media logic are underpinned by a 
process of professionalisation of political communication. That is to say, a process 
of change over time that indicates new ways of doing things as well as division of 
labour as new specialities emerge (Blumler & Kavanagh 1999; Norris 2001; Holtz-
Bacha 2002; Negrine & Lilleker 2002).  
This is first and foremost an adaptation of an organisational nature, connected 
with the level of resources allocated to manage press and communications issues, 
as well as the roles played by senior press officers within a given organisation 
(Stromback & Van Aelst, 2013; Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014). In Chile, the political 
elite have increasingly professionalised press and communications management 
(ICSO/UDP 2004; Santander 2013), and there are certain indications about how 
this process has been led by the Executive power which indicate, nonetheless, 
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uneven levels of development across political organisations (already discussed in 
section 5.2.). 
Professionalisation in this context is a relative concept, as long as media systems 
are constantly evolving (Chadwick 2013). As such, the notion of 
professionalisation is often used to describe the application of new skills and 
knowledge that could also be addressed as an on-going process in the relationship 
between media and politics (Lilleker & Negrine 2002). In the grand narrative 
about mediatization of politics, the professionalisation of political communication 
and PR techniques is understood as a reaction and adaptation to greater media 
autonomy and an assumption of an increased capacity of news organisations to 
define political contents in their own terms (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; 
Strömbäck & Esser, 2009).  
6.3.2. Adaptation to languages: embracing conflict and sound bites 
Embracing political conflict or exploiting personal stories as a way of retaining 
some degree of control is a strategy that some actors will accept as part of the 
rules of the game. As discussed in section 6.2.1., conflict and negativity are clearly 
understood as integral to the logic of the media, and as a result, most political 
actors refer to an increasing demand for these attributes in statements and actions 
by media organisations. Hence, antagonising political enemies (and occasionally 
political allies) is often mentioned as a common resort to capture media attention, 
which pushes press officers and politicians alike to turn messages into bold sound 
bites. It is not unusual that decisions about whether to seek visibility in the media 
with a topic were assessed on the availability and quality of these sound bites (or 
cuñas). Thus, despite complaints about how this environment might lower the 
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level of debate and the public perception of politics, many decide to use conflict 
instrumentally on occasion. The following quotations illustrate these positions, 
which are not necessarily exclusionary; the first narrates a staff meeting in which 
the group reflect on how much to compromise in exchange for media visibility, the 
second is a typical example of a politician with routinised relations with the news 
media: 
 [We ask ourselves] What do we have to do to be on TV? And then, let’s see 
if we get a breakfast show, and what do we get for the breakfast show, and 
how do we get there. And it is almost impossible, unless you are willing to 
pull down your trousers, you know what I mean? Let's see how much we 
pull down our trousers to see if we get the breakfast show.  
Politician 17, Former Minister. 
 
Well, I'm a pretty straightforward person. From that standpoint, it is often 
best for the media to report on what I say because it causes controversy, 
rather than something duller (...) absolutely; absolutely. Then you know when 
you are causing something, you know how to say it, and there are different 
media for different actions. 
Politician 27, Deputy.   
 
If you manage to understand what the media is interested in, and you 
transform your message accordingly, your storyline, they will perfectly 
be able to get hooked in what you are presenting (…) It is easy to work 
with some parliamentarians when they understand this. Others are more 
complicated and you have to constantly advise and help them to build a 
storyline. That’s the more difficult part, the fine tuning.  
Communications 6, Senate  
 
Other traditional techniques widely used by politicians, especially 
parliamentarians, to establish working relations with news organisations include 
specialising or creating thematic niches. This was found to be a predictor of media 
exposure in empirical work by Wolfsfeld and Schafer (2006), who show that one 
of the most valued individual traits (of political actors by journalists) is the 
potential to thematically link an individual to a certain topic. It was very common 
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for politicians to discuss specialisation in one or more topics as a standard 
strategy for visibility management, sometimes configuring thematic feuds that are 
respected by fellow politicians.  
 
Sure, but what is the technique of parliamentarians: they specialise in 
something, they try to become a technical reference, someone who knows 
more, from which they may have more work or more influence or more 
respectability (…) then specialise in one area or more and assume 
spokesmanship on the subject. 
Journalist 6, Editor, online media. 
 
When I started in Congress, when I was elected deputy, one of the first 
[pieces of] advice I was given was not to talk about everything but find 
topics that were relevant to me and focus on those. And that is what I have 
done (...) I have sought to have those niches. And that has finally allowed me 
to gain a kind of respect from journalists on these issues. Sometimes you 
appear more, sometimes less and you take the risk of not appearing at all if 
none of your issues are trending, but finally one gains a kind of consideration 
by journalists, and that's good. 
Politician 14, Deputy. 
 
Although the search for attractive and bold sound bites is mainly associated with 
broadcast media, it is nonetheless a benchmark used to plan interventions and 
direct emphasis across media platforms. “Speaking the language of news”, and 
being able to offer good sound bites is often described as a necessary step to 
improve communication with the media, and a learning process that most career 
politicians will need to undertake. Press officers prize those politicians who are 
“cuñeros” and, therefore, less demanding than other less-attuned authorities.    
6.3.3. Adaptation to times: monitoring and planning on the go 
In addition to professionalisation and adaptation to media languages, a third 
domain of change relates to reactions to the temporality imposed by a shorter and 
faster news cycle, developed along with the process of media convergence. The 
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clash between media and political times, especially driven from the acceleration of 
the news cycle and the implementation of 24/7 news media outlets, has often 
been highlighted as one central matter of friction between the media and political 
fields (Cook 1998; Meyer 2002). The Chilean political elite is no exception in this 
regard and adaptations to media temporalities can be observed on different levels.  
It is a fact that political actors with regular exchanges with news organisations 
have adapted their communication practices to fit media demands and maximise 
chances of mediated visibility; for instance, making public announcements on days 
and at times where little newsworthy activity is expected, thereby increasing the 
chances of media coverage or releasing an announcement near the time of the 
central television bulletin and targeting live coverage. However, this is a 
somewhat superficial analysis on this issue. In addition to these extended 
practices, it is possible to identify a gradual shift from temporalities imposed by 
traditional media players to temporalities imposed by newer media players, which 
have injected an overall greater speed into the media environment. Particularly 
relevant for the micro-climate of politics has been the introduction of 24 hour 
television stations (CNN Chile and TVN 24 Horas), newspapers that operate on 
digital platforms only (El Mostrador, Ciper, El Dinamo) and social media 
(particularly Twitter), in addition to processes of convergence experienced by 
traditional media players (e.g. La Tercera and El Mercurio, Bio Bio, Cooperativa, 
television stations etc.). These developments have contributed to an alteration of 
news making routines within media organisations, which are learning to adapt. 
Jenkins (2004) claims that the process of “convergence alters the relationship 
between existing technologies, industries, markets, genres and audiences”, and 
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different studies have shown how processes of convergence are often met with 
resistance and scepticism by media professionals (Huang et al. 2006; Quandt & 
Singer 2009), and that old media practices tend to dominate news production in 
new convergent media platforms (Himelboim & McCreery 2012). In Chile, 
processes of convergence and digitalization have been gradually adopted within 
newsrooms, though not without resistance from already over-worked and under-
paid journalists (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012). These developments which 
challenge news making routines and, accordingly, the very foundations of the 
news media institution, must certainly be faced by media actors but also by 
political actors, who face increasing new demands. In the absence of scripts, most 
reactions are intuitive and new routines are developed and co-created through 
practice.  
The following quotation, from a journalist working in a 24-Hour television station, 
illustrates the idea of news stories that are in constant flux, whose life span is 
more difficult to determine, as well as possible ramifications: 
How news is produced today has also introduced changes, in the sense that it 
is a bit more radial… I mean news starts somehow and then evolves: someone 
gives an interview, says something and that generates immediate reactions. 
Before, it was what was said in the morning and in the evening bulletin; you 
could see the story with all the reactions collected throughout the day. And 
that was it. Today actors know how others react, they can follow that 
throughout the day in 24-hour information channels; so the story adds 
new characters and may even substantially change, because it is gaining 
feedback from reactions (…) For the same reason, going public has a greater 
cost and weight because of the speed of reproduction, the reach, the potential 
reactions. 
Journalist 16, Editor, TV. 
 
The acceleration of news making routines adds an additional sense of urgency to 
the presentism inherent in news making routines, pushing political actors to 
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concentrate most of their media management activities on issues that arise 
throughout the day. Therefore, their ability to plan and anticipate scenarios is 
further limited. Perceptions that “day to day” issues generally surpass 
communication plans are in the majority, and as a result of this rapidly changing 
agenda, politicians and their aides invest great effort in monitoring the 
information environment, which involves online and offline practices.  
The monitoring of the information environment involves observing news media 
outlets and also maintaining regular contacts and conversations with journalists 
and editors, a task that is partially assumed by communication staff, when 
available. Although patterns of media consumption vary individually, media 
monitoring implies being attentive to those media outlets considered relevant for 
the political beat, with the aim of observing how issues develop during the day and 
are potentially replicated by other outlets. In addition, the one-to-one mutual 
monitoring practice is also of great relevance. Conversations between politicians 
and journalists, as well as conversations between communication officers and 
journalists are an important input that feeds both news stories and press 
management decisions. 
 
We are always alert. We have a dynamic of talking daily to the media, in 
order to know what they are doing; we talk to the reporter that covers us. If 
we don’t have further development with him, we talk to the editor; we get to 
know, we try to have an idea, as early as possible, about where the day is 
heading towards (...) how is the ground, and we manage the ground: 
talking to the media, know what they are doing, monitoring. That is us. 
Communications 12, Political Party. 
 
The monitoring of the information environment, though, is not only a matter of 
being up to date with the news. It is primarily a constant search for appropriate 
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opportunities of visibility, aimed at detecting suitable issues and determining how 
to approach them. Since political actors understand that they have a limited 
capacity for agenda control, detecting and seizing communication opportunities is 
a key ability for maximising chances of media coverage. “Getting on” or “hopping” 
on issues (subirse a los temas) generally means reacting quickly to issues that are 
already visible in the media agenda, instead of positioning issues, an ability that 
generally demands greater resources.  
The resource of going public, reacting to statements or actions does not 
necessarily point towards debilitated political actors and more powerful media, 
since opportunities to offer “reactions” are often proactively pursued, using the 
visibility of social media, for example. Instead, it emphasises the recursive nature 
of a mediated political agenda that has become increasingly fluid, posing 
challenges to media organisations and political actors alike.  
The search for windows of opportunity associated with the “coyuntura” also 
becomes a constant task, and is often the only gateway to exposure for policy-
topics. It is frequent for political actors, thus, to refer to these windows of 
opportunity as available spaces to render visible issues previously ignored by the 
media. 
For example, in the last few days I have been 3 times on television talking 
about lobby, and lobby became a topic of interest to people without 
understanding very well what it means, as a result of the news about the 
pharmaceutical drugs law. If that had not happened… For years the issue 
of lobbying has been a priority issue for me, the regulation of lobbying, I have 
spent years and nobody cared; but they do care now as a result of 
something else. 
Politician 20, Deputy. 
 
So, according to the quality of the topic we have is the possibility to appear. 
What I mean by this is you have to adapt yourself. You know that, 
depending on the coyuntura, there are things that are going to receive 
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tremendous attention and you have to work according to that, in order to 
appear; at least [involved] as an aspect of the subject. And that's the hard 
part. That’s what I face every day; [to decide] when to position a topic and 
when to not position a topic. 
Communications 9, political party 
 
How can we get on that topic, and what opportunities we have to get on this 
topic, do you know what I mean? So, that's the first thing; what are the 
opportunities and the costs associated with getting on that topic. There are 
issues that do not gain momentum. That is what happens in politics at 
least, opportunity is key (...) something happened that is linked to your 
topic, and the issue goes up. 
Politician 24, Assessor, political party. 
 
Perceptions about the acceleration and increasing fluidity of the mediated political 
agenda are certainly contributing factors for the already discussed devaluation of 
old information subsidies. The case is different with covert information subsidies 
such as leaks, off the records and political operations which remain widely in use 
and are the focus of the next section. 
6.3.4. Strategic disclosures and unattributed information as covert 
information subsidies  
A fourth reaction to the perceived relevance of media visibility in the political beat 
is the adaptation of information subsidies. In particular, the extensive use of 
strategic disclosures that can be interpreted as a reaction towards more 
interpretive forms of journalism, in which traditional media subsidies (such as 
press releases) have lost efficiency.  
One of the more frequent complaints among press officers is the devaluation of 
traditional information subsidies, such as press conferences and press releases, a 
traditional way for sources to define the content and tone of news (Gandy 1982). 
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Press conferences, scheduled press points and staged events – normally addressed 
as pautas – have structured an important part of information exchanges between 
politicians and news organisations. Although still used, there is a shared 
acknowledgement that these are increasingly ineffective techniques as a form of 
everyday communication, and therefore they are used selectively.  
Here we do pautas on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, generally 
between 10.30am and noon. Sometimes we have, I don’t know, 6 press 
conferences in El Pensador, which is a zone we have here in the Deputies 
Chamber; 6 scheduled conferences. We have sent emails to our colleagues, 
we have explained to them which are the subjects to be covered, we 
have done all the prep work, and when the time comes, there is nobody 
here.  
Communications 6, Senate. 
 
Many years ago we used to make denunciations in the media, but later, the 
media discarded us and now they make the denunciations. They 
assumed that role and we deputies were left out. We used to organise 
press conferences to make these denunciations public but that has become 
infrequent. You see, very few media attend the press conferences that we 
organise (…) We used to be invited to breakfast shows to give our opinions 
and now... experts. There has been a decline in space. 
Politician 13, Deputy. 
 
Sure, and in the process journalists have clearly taken a more active role. I 
think they have gained greater prestige and they are no longer the mere 
mailboxes that they formerly were, because there were those who had to go 
to the press conference because the minister wanted to talk, those who had to 
cover such a thing because such a parliamentarian requested it, or La Moneda 
or some Minister. The media are taking greater distance. I do not know yet 
about television stations. I feel they still receive a lot of pressure, especially 
TVN, with regard to some issues when they still may be influenced by the 
requests of the authorities. 
Journalist 10, Journalist, elite newspaper. 
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From different perspectives, the above quotations reflect a common panorama of 
changing languages, rhythms and priorities that not all actors are equipped to face, 
and thus require as much specialised skill as they do a trial and error approach.  
Increasing covert information subsidies can be identified as one reaction to this 
development. Backstage information exchanges are generally addressed with the 
umbrella concept of ‘off the record’ conversations, although they include a variety 
of practices ranging from informal briefings to strategic information leaks.  These 
exchanges are recognised as a standard form of communication within the 
political beat and between political and media actors. Informal conversations 
between politicians and political journalists are widely acknowledged as part of 
the in-built features of political reporting, as well as crucial for the understanding 
of the politics of news making (Cater, 1965; Sigal, 1973; Cook, 1998; Schudson, 
2002; Davis, 2007). However, these are rarely discussed as information subsidies, 
partly because empirical studies which seek to measure the input of PR in news 
stories naturally rely on press releases as a unit of measurement (for example, see 
Turk 1985 or Lewis et al. 2008). In Chilean political reporting, these are frequently 
used as a way of monitoring the environment, as well as exchanging information 
and providing interpretive frameworks to understand political actions, decisions 
and statements.  
Both journalists and politicians are ambiguous when they discuss the meaning and 
use of off the record conversations. Although many research participants deplore 
the abuse of unattributed information, they understand that this is often the only 
way for journalists to get access to stories and for politicians to openly discuss 
their views on on-going current affairs. However, the explicit dimensions of the 
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practice are unclear. Some research participants refer to off the record as 
information provided to journalists in strict confidence and, therefore, not meant 
for direct publication but rather as cues to pursue further reporting. Others 
understand it as information that journalists are free to use, as long as they do so 
without attribution. Otano & Sunkel (2003) also note that this distinction is 
blurred in Chilean political reporting, leading to the normalised use of 
unattributed information that may lead to a certain impunity for sources that are 
not accountable for their declarations.  
The tension between a practice that is extensively used yet questioned becomes 
clear in all groups of reference when the underlying theme of risk, that underpins 
descriptions about how unattributed information is exchanged, is discussed. 
Communications officers highlight the need for previous trust in the journalist or 
media outlet you are passing information to for such exchanges, as long as they are 
not in control of what exactly is going to be published and how or if this 
information is going to be appropriately checked. This is especially the case when 
other politicians might be willing to leak information, therefore creating some 
vulnerability by exposing information that was not sanctioned for publication. 
Similarly, when politicians discuss off the record information they also refer to 
risk, but connect this to potential attacks from adversaries, including the 
intentional leaking of false or inaccurate information or personal accusations. 
Taking this into consideration, why is it that unattributed information remains so 
widely used?  
A first explanation can be found in the already discussed definitional ambiguity of 
different forms of information exchanges, which leads to a blurred distinction 
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between practices. It was not unusual for politicians to identify the practice of 
leaking information to the media when done by others, but not by themselves, 
only later offering some contradictory remarks on their own practices:  
I'm always required by journalists and I always try to act with great caution 
(...) I immediately explain that I speak on [the record]. Rarely have I had to 
use off the record to build something (...) strategically. A couple of times 
we might have had to position a political issue according to this logic, or that 
line, to position an issue that the UDI was interested in (...) And if I had had a 
bad experience, I don’t remember, and if I had it, it was quickly clarified with 
the journalist. 
Politician 12, Deputy. 
 
While I was in office, I never had off the record conversations, ever. Now, 
sometimes I have a couple of friends, people that I get along with and 
sometimes they call me and tell me: “Do you know something, what is 
happening in the party?”, and sometimes I say, yes, such a thing. I do it for 
nothing, because I am not really involved today, it’s to help them, you know 
what I mean? (…) Sometimes I speak off the record and give information 
but with some care because it depends on what information you are 
giving away”. 
Politician 17, Former Minister. 
 
There are always conversations with reporters. I try to do everything on the 
record: what I say privately I hold it in public, but obviously there are 
relationships of trust with some journalists, but I try to make that 
infrequent; I do not try to generate some kind of business with them.  
Politician 22, Senator. 
 
As the quotations above suggest, politicians frequently make a distinction between 
information passed without attribution to journalists with the aim of informally briefing 
on recent events and information strategically leaked with political ends. The former is 
considered a standard and acceptable way of discussing recent political developments 
while the latter is more questionable and generally oriented to either damage an 
opponent or obtain personal gain, whether in the form of protection or improved 
exposure. While the rationale behind this distinction is relatively self-explanatory, it is 
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reasonable to expect that partisan actors are bound to get involved in processes of 
strategic framing even when providing contextual background about events. That is to 
say, they will try to shape the meaning of events to favour certain public understandings 
over others (Esser & Spanier 2005; Entman et al. 2009). 
The widespread use of backstage exchanges and unattributed information – which are 
especially important yet not exclusive to print and electronic newspapers – is also 
confirmed by journalists. The theme of risk is also present in this group, primarily in 
connection to the perceived double standard of politicians, especially if they provide 
information and later decide to deny in public what they have confided to journalists in 
‘private’, therefore undermining the journalist’s credibility.  
 
What happens sometimes is that you lose certainty about what 
politicians tell you off [the record]... At some point in life you associated off 
the record conversations with people telling you the truth, or close to that, 
and they did not say so on the record, because they did not want to speak 
openly. But today, frequently you suspect that half-truths are always on 
the go in off the records. 
Journalist 17, Journalist, radio. 
 
They have an obligation to say what they do, and explain what they do to the 
public. But no, as this is a cloudy preparation, they ultimately use the off. And 
what is told in off? Why resorting to off? Why is everything they tell you in 
off? Because they are, usually, entanglements created to damage 
someone else, and journalism plays that role. Then the guy tells you 
something that is going to bring down the other parliamentarian or will 
reveal some weird business of another politician ... and does so anonymously, 
because as this is also a club of friends, they give sticks to each other 
under the table. And journalism plays along, which is unfortunate, 
because that should be above the table. 
Journalist 15, Senior editor, radio 
 
I think what is still prevalent in Chile, as a political technique with 
journalists, is doublespeak. That has not ended and that has much to do 
with the society in which we live. Today, any of the actors we have in conflict, 
one journalist could tell you what they are going to say publicly and what 
they are doing in private, because these are two things completely 
decoupled from each other, and run on different tracks. And what happened 
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in the early 90s, as a matter of not hurting sensitivities, because people on the 
right would not speak of human rights, people on the left would not touch the 
market, today it is something institutionalised.  
Journalist 3, Editor, elite newspaper. 
 
Although risks are stressed by all groups involved in connection to off the record 
conversations, this is considered by journalists a valid and standard reporting technique, 
especially to understand processes and context and for getting access to interpretations 
of current affairs. What is more, when confronted with the possibility of being 
potentially used for political ends, most reporters accept this possibility as part of the 
rules of the game, as long as there is a convergence of interests between both parties, 
and the resulting story is newsworthy enough (or can be complemented with additional 
on the record sources).  
 
I start, in any combination, I start assuming that our conversation is 
always off the record, and if I need anything, I ask the person if he can 
endorse what he has said on [the record]. That is my policy and also the 
newspaper’s policy. 
Journalist 10, Journalist, elite newspaper. 
 
Sometimes I do pass information to journalists; if you want them to 
cover a topic, a little scandal, some denunciation. Now I have one here in 
my hand… If you want this topic to ultimately get published in the news 
media, sometimes you say ‘look’, instead of sending a press release that 
nobody will pay attention to; I say ‘look, I have a scoop, you can have the 
story and from there you ask me reactions. I give you all the 
background.’ And there are some news media outlets that will be actually 
interested. 
Politician 10, Deputy 
 
Here, I mean, political journalism is ‘off’. There is no choice. There are two 
premises [you report off the record and] all the sound bites they give you 
are good for nothing, usually, with few exceptions (...) I mean, what I do is 
talk to the person, So, I call and say: hello Deputy, I need to talk to you; look, 
this issue is a little complicated, so tell me what you prefer, as it suits you 
better, I don’t mind, if you want [to speak] on [the record], off [the record], 
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half and half, as you wish (…) It helps me because if he is going to give me a 
sound bite with which I do nothing, I do prefer him to tell me the truth 
off the record. 
Journalist 14, Journalist, online media. 
 
In addition to convergence of interests between political and media actors, a 
second explanation for the widespread use of unattributed information can be 
found in the slow movement towards more interpretive forms of journalism in the 
last couple of decades (Cordero & Marin, 2006; Mellado & Humanes, 2014). As a 
result of this trend, journalists may try to distance themselves from routine 
information subsidies by pursuing their own agendas. Nonetheless, these agendas 
appear to be heavily subsided by under the table information subsidies.  
According to available evidence, dependence on official sources has remained 
stable (Faure et al., 2011; Mellado & Rafter, 2014). Distance from the source is 
expressed with techniques such as the use of the conditional form or a decrease in 
opportunities for direct quotations (Mellado & Humanes, 2014). Hence, for 
political actors the use of strategic disclosures appears to be as much a means to 
skew media contents in their favour, as it is a reaction to evolving forms of 
political reporting and media demands. In spite of the normative questions that 
may arise from these practices – a point that will be resumed in section 6.1.5 of the 
discussion – it is important to highlight that the different forms of political 
adaptations so far discussed (professionalisation of political communication, 
adaptation to media languages and routines and the use of strategic disclosures 
and unattributed information) are all accepted practice within news organisations. 
They are, indeed, often welcomed and understood as politicians being creative and 
facilitating the exposure of political issues on media platforms, which accentuates 
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the idea that political actors are those adapting to the needs of a changing and 
more autonomous media institution.  
 
6.4. Final discussion and conclusion to the chapter  
In this chapter, three key aspects for the mediatization of political actors were 
examined: goals attached to media-oriented practices, understandings of the news 
media logic and domains of adaptation to the news media logic. In a context where 
Chilean elites perceive the media as having increased their power over time 
(PNUD 2004; PNUD 2015; ICSO/UDP 2004), the chapter has focused on identifying 
drivers and consequences of the institutionalisation of media-oriented practices 
among political elites by looking at these complementary aspects. The main 
implications of these findings are discussed below. 
6.4.1 The battle for public attention control  
Identifying the main goals in the relationship between political elites and news 
organisations allows for a better grasp of the value politicians attach to mediated 
visibility as a political resource, the rationales for action mediating their 
interactions with news organisations and media professionals, as well as their 
adaptation to news logics of action; thus directly addressing the research 
questions that underpin the present chapter: how political elites understand and 
interact with the logic of the media and what are the drivers guiding that 
relationship 
The chapter has shown that goals of media exposure can be grouped into two 
general areas: goals with a policy rationale and goals with an electoral rationale. 
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The first group of goals points towards strategies of agenda building and public 
bargaining, while the second group of goals points towards strategies of power 
reproduction (permanent campaigning) and communication with the public. 
It is important to note that the visibility linked to goals with an electoral rationale 
is only partially pursued in the space of traditional media. This could be explained, 
on the one hand, as a result of promotional stories often being resisted by 
journalists while, on the other hand, the political press are understood as elite-
oriented and therefore distant from the general public. Beyond the elite press, ‘the 
people’ are accessible via TV, a highly valued forum that, nonetheless, offers very 
limited space for political actors; through social media, which has not been evenly 
embraced by Chilean politicians (Fábrega & Paredes 2013) and in local media, 
which is often discussed by politicians as operating according to alternative 
dynamics and seen as more easily permeated by political agendas. Presumably for 
the same reasons, becoming visible to voters and interest groups through 
territorial work is identified as crucial, especially for parliamentarians and in spite 
of expanded opportunities for communication in a more diversified media 
environment. As such, although communication with the public is often raised as a 
justification for interactions with the news media, from the perspective of 
politicians this goal is not easily achieved.  
Goals with a policy rationale, on the other hand, follow clearer scripts. That is not 
to say that getting media exposure for the purpose of entering into a policy debate 
is straightforward. On the contrary, it can be quite demanding. Yet the inward-
facing function of the relationship with the media is more clearly established in 
the relationship with the press and validated as a legitimate aspiration. Davis 
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(2007) stresses that a major function of the news media is acting as a channel for 
inter-elite conflict, negotiation and communication, the latter often to the 
exclusion of the general public. Research participants readily identify this 
democratic deficit. Nonetheless, because media visibility is perceived as a tool 
inside the political community, it is all the same actively pursued. There is some 
awareness that this ‘political conversation’, relevant as it is in the microclimate of 
politics, is an intensive yet exclusive conversation, restricted to the limits of a 
certain informed elite. To this, it is possible to add that the configuration of the 
elite press in particular – close to corporate power (Monckeberg 2009; Couso 
2012) and ideologically homogeneous (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002) –has added 
further distortions, capturing elite discussions along certain political lines.  
By establishing the goals that provide rationales for politicians’ actions in the 
media realm, this chapter has shed light on the way in which the media-controlled 
resource of public visibility operates within political institutions. In particular, 
how media visibility is primarily understood as a mobilising capability, a form of 
activation for other political resources. The latter is an important reminder that 
the mediatization of political elites is primarily and clearly grounded in the need 
for retaining control over public attention, and therefore it is a process where the 
struggle for control is central, and the main driver for adapting to news logics.  As 
highlighted by March and Olsen (1995), issue selection, political decision-making 
and sense-making in political institutions are dependent on flows of attention. 
Thus, media visibility is seen as a tool in the context of governance processes, a 
point that the literature that understands political PR as an effort to intervene in 
processes of news making with the aim of contributing to media agenda-building 
has explored for some time (Cobb & Elder 1971; Turk 1985; Tedesco 2011).   
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On the one hand, the accumulation of media capital becomes necessary for career 
advancement in politics (Davis & Seymour, 2010). On the other hand, and even 
more so as a result of mediatization processes, the media have become a space 
where policy struggles are articulated (Thompson 2005; Crozier 2008; Hajer 
2009; Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer 2011). Nonetheless, this is a process that 
comes associated with some risks, as research participants stress when they 
describe media visibility as a volatile form of currency. As has been noted 
somewhere else, the media might erode or destabilise control over policy 
problems definition (Hajer 2003; Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer 2011), which is 
closely linked to understandings of news media logic and notions of 
newsworthiness, as will be discussed next.   
6.4.2. What the news media logic rules out 
As discussed in section 6.2, political elites and press officers describe the 
operational logic of the media through highlighting the attributes of conflict, 
presentism and their commercial orientation. Certainly, the Chilean media system 
is firmly grounded in the market (Tironi & Sunkel 1993; Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; 
Couso 2012) and therefore subject to market considerations and imperatives of 
audience maximisation.  Generally, the literature stresses that although news 
media as a social institution are informed by both market and normative 
considerations (Landerer 2013; Asp 2014), the commercial logic is often favoured 
over public service logics as a result of dominant market forces (McManus 2009; 
Donsbach 2014). As argued by McManus (2009) and Lewis et al. (2008) it is more 
cost-effective for owners, advertisers and sources to follow an economic-based 
model of news selection criteria than a socially responsible one.  
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In the interviews, criteria such as social relevance or public interest are not 
regularly mentioned as main drivers in the daily information trade-off by 
politicians, and only occasionally mentioned by journalists. Within this logic of 
action, conflict and immediacy are core elements of a competitive environment in 
which political actors compete against each other for media attention and against 
other topics often judged as more catchy and interesting for audiences.  
It has been established that notions of newsworthiness are the main predictor of 
the success of political information subsidies in newsrooms (Turk 1985), and as 
long as political elites recognise and adapt to news media logics, these notions of 
newsworthiness become an internalised standard for communication with the 
media (Strömbäck 2008; Stromback & Van Aelst 2013). A common concern among 
research participants is the perception that conforming to standards of 
newsworthiness in the political beat would lead to a certain homogenisation of 
news content, since most actors are constantly monitoring the environment and 
reproducing the most successful story lines. Empirical studies conducted in 
Chilean media lend support to this perception, emphasising the homogeneity of 
inter-media news agendas (Valenzuela & Arriagada 2009). Additionally, both 
groups acknowledge that some news stories can be impossible to avoid, especially 
if they are newsworthy enough to dominate the agenda for some time.  
Two main arguments can be inferred from the characterisation of the news media 
logic offered by research participants. Firstly, the analysis of interviews lends 
support to the idea that political actors’ adaptation to this logic is primarily a 
reaction aiming to retain control over media contents, secure some level of 
visibility and participate in the process of media agenda building.  Secondly, the 
core elements of conflict and presentism, the main definers of this logic, are often 
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perceived by both politicians and journalists as an entry barrier for multiple topics 
of relevance within the political sphere.  Regarding the latter point, the ongoing 
quest for novelty and confrontation inherent to news values and the dynamics of 
news production will discourage or limit the ability of both media organisations 
and political actors to pursue topics that do not easily fit those parameters. The 
news media logic, therefore, would act as an entry barrier for some political topics, 
restraining the scope of issues that enter the mediated political agenda, which is 
commonly referred to by political elites as a proxy of the political agenda.  
6.4.3. Playing under the rules 
The identification of domains of adaptation to the operational logics of the media 
allow a clearer visualisation of how media and political logics enter into dynamics 
of both collision and synergy. As discussed during the chapter, this logic is resisted 
by most political actors and though it is externally situated it is also instrumentally 
adopted, and occasionally internalised by those actors showing higher degrees of 
proximity to media routines.  
The trading of information and news between politicians, journalists and political 
communicators is based on a mutual understanding of what is or might be 
valuable information for news organisations (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995) and 
political actors readjust their practices to changes in the media environment 
mainly to regain control capacity (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Wolfsfeld 2003; 
Negrine 2008). Overall, these practices show the form this adaptation has taken, 
triggered by the perception of a lessened capacity to define media contents.  
Strömbäck & Van Aelst (2013) contend that the mediatization of political actors 
comprises organisational and communicative forms. Both of these forms of 
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adaptation are identified in this study. Perceptions about a more autonomous 
media have prompted the professionalisation of political communication, and the 
allocation of resources to the end of media management. Nonetheless, this process 
of professionalisation appears uneven across organisations and individuals. 
Additionally, communicative changes are detected; languages have to be adapted 
as well as the form of information subsidies. Regarding the last point, it is 
important to note that off the record briefings are a common technique of 
information exchange in political reporting, which serves as a means of informally 
controlling information flows (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Manning 2001; Cook 
2005). However, the contention that these forms of reporting may have increased 
over time, together with the observation about the devaluation of routine 
information subsidies such as press conferences or press releases, could be 
reflective of a movement towards more interpretive forms of journalism where 
official versions become less valuable. Studies of content focused on newspapers 
have determined that the levels of media interventionism in Chilean journalism 
are low, though they have increased in recent years (Mellado & Rafter 2014; 
Mellado & Humanes 2014). This is consistent with the findings detailed here. 
Marcinkowski & Steiner (2014) have argued that the mediatization of politics as a 
societal phenomenon is a reaction of the political system to increasing difficulties 
in getting public attention, which appears to be consistent with the description 
and interpretations made by Chilean political actors about the institutional rule of 
the media. Although this rule is frequently judged through a normative prism, it is 
instrumentally incorporated into routine practices of communication 
management. In other words, in spite of eventual reservations, political actors and 
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institutions have strong incentives to adapt messages, actions and statements to 
fit media parameters, in order to retain some control over their own visibility and 
the policy issues they favour. 
By paying attention to political actors’ goals in their interaction with the media, as 
well as their understandings of the news media logic and the main domains of 
adaptation to this logic, an overall sense of diminished control over media content 
becomes clear in the responses of political elites. Applying a systemic perspective, 
the media is clearly delimited as functionally distinct from politics, as long as is 
able to self-define and lives up to its “code” or primary rule, which appears 
strongly linked to notions of newsworthiness and strategies for audience 
maximisation, both of which place constraints over political elites’ behaviour and 
policy problems definitions.  
At this level of analysis the autonomy of the news media as a system is primarily 
built on a collective and consistent understanding of what makes it into the news. 
This understanding leads politicians to adapt strategically to this rule, in order to 
improve their chances of managing public attention. Understanding and adapting 
to the logic of the media, by means of professionalising strategies of political 
communication and adjusting languages, times and information subsidies to media 
demands, implies that political actors react to the increasing autonomy of the 
news media by developing more sophisticated strategies for control. This 
continuing struggle generates consequences for both institutional domains, some 
of them unintended.  
The fact that the news media logic reflects institutional autonomy, while it is at the 
same time open to instrumental use, introduces questions on the assumption that 
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the mediatization of politics is to be understood as a loss of autonomy for political 
actors. Some of these practices, nevertheless, reveal important tensions in the 
relationship between political and media actors that might be better understood 
by paying attention to a micro-level analysis of the politician and journalist 
relationship, which will be presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7  
DYNAMICS OF AUTONOMY AND CONTROL BETWEEN POLITICAL 
AND MEDIA ACTORS 
 
This chapter examines the interactions between media and political actors at the 
micro-level, exploring two complementary areas. First, (7.1) it looks at the 
practices and vocabularies of practice characterising the backstage of the 
politician-journalist relationship. Secondly (7.2), it examines role relations among 
these groups, paying attention to those elements that threaten journalistic 
autonomy. In doing so, the chapter examines how the idea of a media institution 
that is becoming increasingly autonomous (see Chapter 6) can be reconciled with 
a journalistic practice that appears restricted both in its connection to 
organisational constraints and the relationships it has established with powerful 
sources.  
The narrative of the mediatization of politics focuses on the increasing 
institutional autonomy of the media as a field. The analyses presented in the 
previous chapter lend support to the idea that, at the meso-level, news 
organisations in Chile have been able to create some distance from political 
institutions and develop their own criteria for news production, for the most part 
a result of commercialisation processes. At the same time, the adaptation to the 
logic of the media has been delineated as a control-oriented reaction on the part of 
political institutions. 
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In this chapter attention will shift towards micro-level interactions between 
politicians and journalists, in order to examine how the narrative of mediatization 
fits into the dynamics of everyday practice and day to day information exchanges 
between political and media actors. I argue that only by doing so can the idea of 
increasing media autonomy that permeates mediatization theory be fully assessed. 
The literature on source-journalist relationships paints a picture of high 
interdependency between government officials and journalists (Sigal 1973; 
Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Negrine 1996; Manning 
2001; Wahl-Jorgensen 2014). These groups interact in “competitive symbiosis” 
(Wolfsfeld 2003); they develop relationships of proximity (Tuchman 1978; Davis 
2007a) as both parties need each other. The permanent struggle that characterises 
this contentious relationship (Schudson 2005), marked by front stage 
adversarialism and backstage cooperation (Cook 2005), eludes generalisations. 
Some of the literature seems inclined to confer the upper-hand of the relationship 
to political sources as the main definers of what makes the news (Sigal 1973; Gans 
1979; Manning 2001; Wolfsfeld & Sheafer 2006). More recent work articulated 
around the idea of media interventionism, though, asserts that as a result of 
mediatization processes, the media have gained greater autonomy in their ability 
to decide what is news and how to present it (Strömbäck & Esser 2009; Strömbäck 
& Dimitrova 2011; Cushion & Thomas 2013).  
For Chile, the literature highlights the “officialist” character of news-making 
(Faure et al. 2011; Mellado & Rafter 2014), and also identifies a gradual movement 
towards greater interpretive techniques (Mellado & Humanes 2014). The scarce 
information available about politician-journalist relationships, beyond studies on 
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content, depict a professional field rather submissive to political power (Leon-
Dermota 2003) and easily permeable by means of routine information subsidies 
(Santander 2013). 
In order to look at micro-level interactions, bringing journalists into the spotlight 
becomes important.  Certainly practices of information exchange with politicians 
are institutionally shaped and therefore patterns of regularities described in the 
international literature are to be expected, yet these practices are also culturally 
embedded, “as the culture of social groups, of which individuals are members, 
provides individuals with symbolic structures to understand and construct their 
environments” (Thornton et al. 2012: 79). Thus, politicians’ and journalists’ 
interactions play a central part in the political culture of a country (Blumler & 
Gurevitch 1995; Pfetsch 2004).  
This chapter pays attention to the relationship between political actors and 
journalists at the micro-level during daily interactions, looking at role relations 
and informal rules organising relationships within circuits of elite communication. 
These two aspects –roles and informal rules – have been reclaimed by the neo-
institutionalist tradition as crucial for the understanding of continuity and change 
within institutions (March & Olsen 1984, 2006; Scott 2001), and provide a 
framework to connect individual behaviour and institutional constraints (March & 
Olsen 1984; Searing 1991; Thornton et al. 2012). In this tradition, as well as in the 
interpretive approach (Bevir & Rhodes 2001; Richards & Smith 2002), the 
understanding of roles and rules does not refer to the observation of formal rules, 
procedurally defined or legally binding, but to interpretations about social 
identities and unwritten rules that arise from social interactions. 
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By looking at roles and informal rules, attention is paid to different ways in which 
spaces for autonomy are asserted and reclaimed in their daily interactions. First, 
role definitions: identity-based dispositions regarding what is appropriate 
behaviour in a specific position (March & Olsen 1984; 2009) which allow both 
journalists and politicians to build boundaries and create distance from each 
other. Nonetheless, some problems for the assertion of journalistic autonomy are 
identified, including organisational constraints and a low esteem of journalism 
among political elites, a dynamic which may be at least partially explained by the 
transitional legacy.  Secondly, those informal rules regulating the trade of political 
news are found to be bound by rules of expected utility, therefore departing from 
normative considerations usually raised in processes of role definitions.  
As will be revealed in the following pages, research participants engage in an 
active process of boundary construction, reflecting on the limits of their own role 
and, especially in the case of journalists, using professionalism as a protective 
shield. At the same time, the findings highlight that some practices that are 
integral to political news making contribute to the blurring of those lines, such as 
the establishment of friendly relationships, the need to identify spaces for 
collaboration or the act of entrusting delicate information to others. This double-
edged process demands individual strategies for boundary maintenance and 
management.  In order to build platforms of collaboration, political and media 
actors will have to reconcile logics of action, yet this is less about reconciling 
media and political logics of action as it is about switching between rules of 
appropriateness and rules of expected utility; that is to say switching between 
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normative expectations placed upon professional roles and strategic actions 
oriented to the pursuit of instrumental goals.  
 
7.1 Vocabularies of practice in the backstage: trading news in the 
political beat 
This section examines the main features of the daily trade-off between political 
and media actors, highlighting the rationale of expected utility that underlies the 
relationships between politicians and journalists. As discussed in section 5.1, 
relationships between political elites and traditional media players develop for the 
most part within an elite micro-culture inhabited by a limited number of actors. 
The restricted nature of this community contributes to the establishment and 
reproduction of news making routines, and facilitates the formation of platforms 
of collaboration between politicians and journalists.  
The geographical and social proximity between official sources and journalists is 
recognised in classics of the literature as a key element in the success political 
actors have in accessing the news (Sigal 1973; Gans 1979; Sparrow 1999). At the 
same time, the insider culture that facilitates journalists’ access to privileged 
information (Tuchman 1978) naturally hampers journalistic autonomy (Voltmer 
2013; Wahl-Jorgensen 2014). Inspecting this relationship is, therefore, key to 
understanding how the micro-level of the political communication sphere 
operates (Davis, 2009).  
The platforms of collaboration between political actors and journalists are not 
disinterested. The daily exchanges between journalists and politicians are 
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structured by the drive for visibility, on the one hand, and the pursuit of news 
stories on the other.  It is a relationship described as one of interdependency and 
reciprocity (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Schudson 2005).  For research 
participants, understanding the relationship as one of mutual utility was 
prevalent. The acknowledgement of the instrumental nature of these exchanges is 
recognition that both parties – politicians and journalists – recognise that the 
actions of each party are permeated with specific interests and embedded in 
distinct institutional environments. Therefore, their interactions are shaped by 
distinct institutional constraints and loaded with overlapping but conflicting 
interests. Despite this, platforms of collaboration based on instrumental exchanges 
are constructed:  
Just as he is trying to do his job, I am also trying to do mine. We do not lie 
to each other (...) He or she knows where I am, and I also know where he or 
she is. I don’t get lost there and I hope the people I speak to do not either. 
Communications 8, La Moneda. 
 
Journalists seek news. Politicians often seek (political) manoeuvres and 
occasionally we can reach an agreement. Crudely, that is the thing. 
Journalist 9, Journalist TV. 
 
There is a clear relationship of mutual utility, but that is… How could we 
say that? Good. You know what I mean? 
Politician 3, Political party board. 
 
These short excerpts illustrate the consequentialist or utilitarian perspective that 
permeates many of the accounts of journalists, press officers and politicians. This 
perspective is realised in patterned strategies of collaboration, routines and 
normalised narratives to describe action. Thornton et al., (2012) identify the 
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emergence of narratives or vocabularies of practice as an indication of how 
practices are adopted or institutionalised at the micro-level. Crucially, they stress 
how these vocabularies of practice guide attention and decision-making, providing 
a framework for what constitutes appropriate behaviour for the group. Using this 
analytical perspective, it is possible to identify two major threads that run 
throughout the accounts of the three groups of reference regarding their daily 
interactions: first, the identification of trust and trust-testing exercises in the 
construction of long-term relationships and second, the use of business-like 
language for the description of most interactions. These features will be expanded 
in the following sections.   
7.1.1. Trust and trust-testing exercises  
When asked to describe their daily interactions, members of all groups 
interviewed highlighted the high frequency and routine nature of their exchanges.  
Most politicians claim to have direct contact with journalists and editors, an 
observation corroborated by political journalists. The higher the status of an 
authority, the more likely the existence of filters or mediators for reporters and 
editors. Nonetheless, there is consensus that, with some exception, access to 
politicians is not heavily intermediated. Unlike the corporate sector, PR and 
strategic communication agencies have not made great inroads into the political 
field, and they tend to act as external consultants for political actors and 
institutions but not in the activities of daily media management. This role is 
performed by press officers hired directly by the organisation (political party, 
public agency) or an individual politician, such as those interviewed for this study. 
These officers support the task of press management but do not necessarily act as 
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gatekeepers for the political actors they represent, with the exception of top level 
authorities in Government.  
Trust is mentioned by members of all groups, indicating this is an asset in political 
reporting that works in all directions. Politicians and communication officers are 
more inclined to share information, especially off the record, with journalists they 
know; journalists are more inclined to make use of unattributed information 
coming from sources they have known for some time, and they also assume this 
information will be of better quality (up to date, truthful, more nuanced and 
outside of official lines). 
Sure, and trust-based because often we ask for some topic to be covered, but 
with no source, and then you have to trust your colleague, who will publish 
the story without a source but off the record, you know what I mean? (...) That 
is why the issue of trust with the colleague is there. 
Communications 3, Deputies Chamber. 
 
But I would say that you are everyday speaking to either the politician you 
trust the most, or the press officers, now that we're in campaign period. And 
not necessarily talking but communicating by text message, WhatsApp, e-
mail. It is daily communication. 
Journalist 3, Editor, elite newspaper. 
 
I have a Head of Communications and a Press Officer who are in direct 
contact, who are doing the job every day, and the job of having corridor 
conversations in Congress. However, it is also important to do it myself 
sometimes, because you obviously generate trust relationships and you 
must generate those yourself. 
Politician 26, Senator 
What emerges from these and many other similar quotations is that most 
politician-journalist relationships are regular and based on frequent contact. For 
politicians who engage in intensive relationships with the media, being perceived 
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as a reliable source who delivers truthful background information and 
newsworthy cues is considered an important asset, as this provides greater ability 
to occasionally position topics of interest or to offer interpretative frameworks to 
understand political developments.  
What I do is try to talk to journalists with whom I have a closer 
relationship and that seem more influential. I call and say, ‘Look at this, 
why don’t we enter this topic?’ or give them information which might allow 
the topic to get in... That’s it. It is that sort of dialogue, at the end… because 
they often call me, I can call back those journalists and tell them, ‘Look; 
you have not covered this issue’. Sometime it goes well, sometimes badly. 
That is my dialogue with them. 
Politician 20, deputy DC. 
 
The issue of trust, therefore, extends to the reputation of politicians as sources. 
Some of the research participants refer to issues of accuracy and consistency as 
features that gain the long-term respect of journalists, reflected in the words of a 
Cabinet Minister who comments on off the record conversations occasionally held 
with members of the press: 
I have codes of ethics that gain you respect from journalists. There are these 
famous cafes that the guys downstairs often ask me to, or sometimes chief 
editors. I meet them and chat with them. And my code of ethics is always 
telling the truth; never cheat, never bluff, because you are damaging the 
journalist and you're giving yourself a bad reputation as a source; you become 
an unreliable source. 
Politician 8, Minister. 
 
Delivering, receiving and processing unattributed information could be seen on its 
own as a constant trust-testing exercise that characterises many of the exchanges 
between these groups. On occasions, though, journalists and politicians also reflect 
on more exceptional situations where trust is explicitly tested, as a way to 
delineate the rules of the game in a journalist-politician relationship. 
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- In other words, you had a close relationship with him… 
- Very privileged, and also he tested me and I delivered. ‘OK’, he used to 
say, ‘I will tell you this but you cannot publish’. And I just swallowed it. And 
suddenly, he would call me to tell me, ‘OK, now you can publish’. And there 
you go, a huge scoop, you know what I mean? Some people teased me, they 
would say that I was a spoiled girl, but this is a relationship that I earned 
thanks to my effort, my work, for being respectful of the rules 
Journalist 14, Journalist, online media. 
 
Trust-building and trust-testing exercises are best seen as practices that enable 
platforms for collaboration between actors who also acknowledge conflicting 
interests. To this is added a practice of permanent courtship, especially in the 
press officer-journalist axis, and the cultivation of personal relationships, which 
occasionally result in grey areas that can challenge autonomous decision-making.  
Social proximity between political and media elites is identified in the literature as 
a source of blurring boundaries between the two (Gans 1979; Davis 2009; Wahl-
Jorgensen 2014). In Chile, although this is an important issue to consider in terms 
of the relationships between political actors and news organisations it is not often 
the case at the level of journalists and rarely at the level of editors.  In those cases 
where previous relationships do exist, either by way of common social circles or 
family relations, the positions adopted by the different groups differ from each 
other. Those politicians who acknowledged having personal networks inside the 
media during interviews did not raise the issue in a problematic way. On the 
contrary, it was generally mentioned as a source of greater understanding of 
media demands and consequent willingness to collaborate. For communications 
and press officers, having personal contacts within news organisations and good 
relationships with former colleagues is explicitly considered a professional asset 
and a useful gate to media coverage. Journalists, instead, tend to be more 
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defensive regarding potentially conflictive relations, such as having friends or 
relatives in politics. Compartmentalising work and personal spheres is often 
mentioned as a strategy to face these problems, which take different forms, such 
as avoiding professional conversations with politicians/friends, not publishing 
information obtained in social contexts or avoiding personal socialisation outside 
work. How exactly to draw these lines will vary from one person to the next but 
the separation between professional and social interactions is perceived as an 
efficient mechanism to claim professional autonomy. The latter becomes crucial 
within a profession that has built a narrative of autonomy as one of its core values 
(Deuze 2005; Singer 2007).  
Proximity, nonetheless, is more generally built on the shared experiences of an 
insider culture. All actors occasionally play the ‘friendly card’, whether 
highlighting the ‘colleague to colleague’ nature of journalist-press officers’ 
relationships or providing unattributed information upon the basis of mutual 
trust, in the case of politician/journalists relationships. Additionally, many of these 
relationships are actually built over time. Years and sometimes decades of work in 
the political arena, on the one hand, and the media arena on the other, facilitate 
the blurring of boundaries and the active pursuit of collaborative spaces using 
personal networks as a relevant asset.  
The grey areas emerging from the proximity between politicians, press officers 
and journalists are multifaceted.  For example, in the case of journalists, they need 
to assess the eventual impact of potentially damaging publications on key sources 
or relevant contacts.  The protection of key sources is a practice that most 
experienced journalists –especially those who report regularly in the political beat 
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– recognise as part of the pragmatics of the job. This protection will not 
necessarily translate into communication ‘armouring’, but can result in greater 
lenience in any assessment of eventual public mistakes. Failure to comply with 
these trust-testing exercises tends to result in some form of implicit or explicit 
sanction against specific journalists or organisations. Whether short-lived or more 
durable, these practices, often executed by press officers, encompass cutting 
privileged access to information, denying interviews or privileging competitors 
and, occasionally, obstructing journalists’ participation in press conferences, trips 
or other organised information subsidies.  
7.1.2. News trading as business  
When research participants describe their interactions, information trading as a 
business-like activity is mentioned as prominently as trust. Many actors expect 
reciprocity in the relationship, and often invest in their counterparts collaborating 
with each other and aiming to increase their bargaining power in future 
transactions. The perception of an on-going trade-off is articulated in the frequent 
use of business language to describe reporting and information exchange routines. 
Words such as ‘business’, ‘currency’, ‘selling’, ‘buying’, ‘exchange’ and ‘deals’78 
populate research participants’ accounts: politicians and press officers sell stories, 
journalists and news organisations buy them, some stories are used as tokens in 
exchange for others and on-going deals are always suspected, among those who 
know the business.  
 
 
                                                          
78
 In the original interviews: negocio, negociar, moneda de cambio, vender, comprar, intercambio, tratos 
or arreglos.  
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Sometimes you can be upset with someone, and you say, OK, this person 
never again, but you know that this is going to be short-lived and within two 
months, you will have to give him something and he, in turn, is going to need 
something from you. It is a business after all. 
Communications, Senate. 
 
I mean, look, some people do not like this expression, but I really think that 
journalism, especially in politics, is a sort of – in the best sense of the 
word – business. I mean, I give you something and you give me something. 
Journalist 3, Editor, elite newspaper. 
 
To generate certain complicity with the media; journalists, editors. You use off 
[the record] because you give information about others; not about you (…) 
and that implies certain facilities with that media outlet. They will owe you 
one. And that pays back later, so to speak. It is not very attractive, but 
actually that sort of exchange exists. 
Politician 15, Assessor, political party senior advisor.  
 
The acknowledgement of deals (information versus visibility) between politicians 
and journalists is mentioned in most interviews. Nonetheless, the practice reveals 
itself as conflictive to the parties involved. Some refer to these exchanges as an 
implicit rule dominating many relationships within the political communication 
community, and many do so in a very open way. However, it is usual to find 
mutual criticism or resistance, expressed in normative undertones, condemning 
the use or abuse of this practice when it is perceived as driven by self-interest in 
the case of politicians, and commercial interest in the case of news media outlets. 
These critiques feature more prominently among politicians, many of whom 
acknowledge the existence of deals in others but not themselves 
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People who really knows this business realise what you are saying. Everyone 
could make a list with the cast of leaders who are repeatedly in the media. 
And – not all of them, because I do not want to be unfair – but many have 
this sort of deal with the media; about providing information and, in 
exchange, having a certain level of prominence.  
Politician 29, Former Minister. 
 
Alternatively, some condemn the ‘deals’ selectively, judging the motives of the 
actors involved. On those occasions, they make a distinction; instead of 
condemning the trade-off in itself, some specific actions are judged as negative, if 
they are perceived as solely motivated by personal interests. In this sense, the 
trade-off or information exchange would not have an inherent negative burden, 
but its normative value would be the object of a situated and case by case 
assessment. This selective criticism is typically illustrated in the quotation below:  
In general I don’t ask…. I mean, it is not this thing: ‘look, I tell you this and you 
give me that’. I don’t do that. I must admit, though, that one develops a 
sort of friendly relationship with journalists, and later one can say, for 
instance: ‘can you make me a small favour: this topic is important’. And they 
do so; but it is not like ‘what are you going to give me back?’, something I feel 
also exists. 
Politician 14, Deputy. 
 
The profusion of references to both trust-testing exercises, that operate according 
to implicit rules, and the adoption of business-like language points towards the 
construction of platforms of collaboration between political and media actors, 
through the instrumental identification of converging interests. Returning to the 
point raised by Thornton et al. (2012) and the role played by vocabularies of 
practice in the institutionalisation of logics of action, this section has shown how 
the backstage routines of political news production are permeated by a rationale 
of expected utility, wherein an instrumental stance prevails on both sides.   
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As explained by Cook (2005), the relationships between political and media actors 
comprise a backstage and a frontstage dimension. The former is the space of 
collaboration and exchange, typically hidden from public scrutiny. The latter is the 
space where politicians and journalists make assertions about their autonomy and 
display greater levels of antagonism. This suggests that the threats to autonomy 
that are inherent to political news making (Gans 1979; Wahl-Jorgensen 2014; 
Voltmer 2013) are normally compensated by strategies of distance-keeping and 
even occasional adversarialism. In order to assert their autonomy and counteract 
instrumental practices, journalists have to establish some defensive boundaries, a 
process that is often located in a normative axis (Revers 2013; Carlson 2015) and 
determined by professional considerations about what good quality journalism 
looks like. In the next section, the way roles and boundaries are constructed and 
threatened in the relationship between political and media actors in Chile will be 
examined. 
 
7.2 Role relations and boundaries  
When describing their interactions, politicians, journalists and communication 
officers actively reflect on the limits of their relationship. They do so by defining 
their own role or their expectations about other actors’ roles. This section 
examines relevant aspects regarding how these groups articulate their role 
relations. That is to say, instead of examining how politicians or journalists 
understand their roles broadly in society, this section deals with how politicians 
and journalists understand their roles in relation to each other. Building 
boundaries, both around themselves and others, is a strategy often used to adopt 
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positions, justify or judge their own and others’ behaviour (Gieryn 1983; Abbott 
1988). 
Roles are understood as part of the informal component of institutions in the 
sense that they are not fully specified in the formal scheme (Searing 1991). 
Examining how roles and identities are constructed within institutions is crucial to 
understanding how cognition and behaviour are, in turn, institutionally shaped 
(Thornton et al. 2012), how individuals locate themselves within institutions 
(March & Olsen 2009) and how belief systems inform practice in specific contexts 
(DiMaggio 1997). Reflecting on what their own role is or is not works, therefore, 
as an open or implicit rhetorical strategy to create distance and draw limits.  
During the interviews, these limits are sometimes drawn through affirmation and 
sometimes are drawn through opposition. For instance, some communication 
officers might emphasise that they are not “political operators”, and some 
journalists would insist they are not in the PR business.  
Roles, you know what I mean? My job is not PR, I'm doing my... There are 
politicians who understand how it is and politicians and sources who do not 
understand, and they always have a bad relationship, or complicated, because 
they believe that criticism is an attack. Or they think that because you criticise 
or raise an issue, you are a… Communist (laughs). So the spectrum is really 
wide. I’ve got sources and I’ve got other sources that I have lost over the 
years because I've had problems, precisely because that line has blurred 
on their part. 
Journalist 14, Journalist, online media. 
 
Contributing to boundary building or the identification of limits in the politician 
and journalist relationship, the concept of distance or distance-keeping is also 
relevant in many participants’ accounts as they aim to balance cordiality and trust 
with a clear distinction of functions. 
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I always try to keep a distant treatment, I know that not all agree on this, 
but I avoid being on familiar terms with them, it's like my main professional 
barrier. I avoid being on familiar terms, and as long as I build a respectful 
treatment, I hope… My way of working has worked out fine; they also 
respect me, they know that I also keep some distance from the things 
they tell me. 
Journalist 10, Journalist, elite newspaper. 
 
Observing boundaries is intrinsically linked to the definition of professional roles 
and the connection between those roles and society at large (Abbott 1988; Lamont 
& Molnar 2002). As the quotations above suggest, establishing boundaries is seen 
by journalists as a necessary step to establishing a working relationship where 
there is a mutual understanding of each other’s roles. 
7.2.1. Journalists and narratives of professionalisation  
At the time of identifying the boundaries in the relationship with political actors, 
journalists and editors use the narrative of professionalisation as a defensive 
shield. Professionalisation is recognised in the literature as a major movement 
towards the autonomous pole of journalistic practice (Hallin & Mancini 2004), and 
a counterbalance to clientelism in transitional contexts (Hallin & 
Papathanassopoulos 2002; Örnebring, 2013; Voltmer, 2013). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that journalists assert their professional status as a framework for 
information exchanges and trust-testing exercises with political actors.  
Among journalists, the main claims of autonomy in the relationship with political 
sources stem from the recognition of shared notions of newsworthiness, that 
allow them to make judgments about events and happenings based on 
professional criteria about what is considered news.  
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When political journalists describe their daily routines and their exchanges with 
their sources, they commonly refer to news values79 as something obvious, self-
evident, a characteristic element of events and actions that guides the processes of 
news gathering and news production. Among the elements that distinctly add 
value to stories, journalists highlight conflict and exclusivity, the latter an 
increasingly elusive and difficult to attain feature, in an environment where the 
speed of the news cycle has shortened and information circulates faster. 
Conversely, stories pertaining to the policy sphere, such as technical discussions 
and legislative procedures, pose a challenge, since they are perceived as generally 
uninteresting for audiences.  
Some of these elements overlap with politicians’ and press officers’ descriptions of 
the news media logic. Perhaps not surprisingly, considering that this is the 
institutional realm they inhabit on a daily basis, the way political journalists refer 
to this logic is less critical compared with the other groups of research 
participants. Many journalists show an awareness of the limitations and 
constraints imposed by these norms, especially with respect to the topics that do 
not get coverage or get very limited coverage, such as policy discussions or 
legislative processes. Nonetheless, what makes the news is identified as something 
almost objective and self-evident.  
 
                                                          
79
 News values and notions of newsworthiness are used here interchangeably referring to those 
patterns of regularity observed in the journalistic selection and production of news. In an abstract 
sense, these are regarded as those values that enshrine the logic of appropriateness of journalistic 
practice, therefore reinforcing the description of news media as a social institution (Schudson 2002; 
Cook 2005; Esser 2013). More concretely, some research literature has attempted to delimit and 
describe such values, stressing factors regarded as significant by journalists; among others, conflict, 
relevance, personalization, negativity, reference to elite persons and nations (Galtung & Ruge 1965; 
Harcup & O’Neill 2001; Allan 2010). This set of factors comes to be associated with “implicit biases” 
(Cook 2005: 89) and “ideological imperatives” (Allan 2010: 71) attached to the journalistic trade, 
socialised through collective understandings of public events and reproduced in day to day practice 
(Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; Zelizer 1993).  
299 
 
I reckon what some politicians pose can be extremely undemocratic. If 
someone is highly popular, there will be expectation about what they say (…) 
they have an influence. Why should I give the same space to someone who 
just decided to be a candidate, why should I? (...) There are politicians who 
believe that because they are candidates for something you are obliged to 
offer the same coverage than you offer to others, and I think that is not the 
case. There are journalistic standards they misunderstand. Someone 
who is more popular than others deserves more coverage because it 
generates more interest and, ultimately, this is also the art of what is 
interesting and what people might be interested in.  
Journalist 12, Editor, elite newspaper. 
 
There are characters that will always be newsworthy. Now it is Bachelet, 
for example, and others are less interesting. Some young politicians have 
managed to enter this circuit (…) who have managed to develop a particular 
imprint, through having bold positions (…) Sometimes people try to sell 
you stories and they are completely promotional… no chance. But 
sometimes someone clever manages to find an angle that is 
journalistically attractive. And then you can do something with it.  
Journalist 13, Editor, print press. 
 
Just as politicians define the news media logic using normative undertones, 
journalists embrace news values in order to establish distance from their political 
sources, making statements of professional autonomy upon them. The fact that 
journalists set limits and create resistance to external pressures from the 
understanding and acceptance of shared notions of news suggests that this 
dimension of journalistic autonomy pertains to the institutional level. Inter-
organisational consensus about what is news, together with consistency on rules 
and outcomes of news making have been identified as what gives institutional 
status to the news media (Benson 2006; Cook 2006; Asp 2014). Likewise, the 
striving for journalistic autonomy stems from collective notions of what Schudson 
calls “news judgement” (2005: 218), which becomes the main boundary-drawing 
device for media actors, providing space for journalists to distance themselves 
from external pressures at the time of gathering information and producing 
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content.  This shared understanding becomes a guiding value and a source of 
legitimacy, as the following quotation illustrates:  
 
I mean, requests and pressures you get them all the time, but what I can say is 
that we have absolute editorial independence (...) Therefore we build the 
news agenda that we consider convenient, and we receive comments, we 
receive suggestions, all of them, but we define the agenda and we do so in a 
very independent way (…) Hence there is total independence, based on 
identifying journalistic criteria, professional criteria about what is news 
and what is not news. 
Journalist 18, Editor, TV. 
 
In spite of its constraints, the news media logic becomes a central asset for self-
defining parameters of political content, asserting professional identity and 
offering some resistance against political influence in the news; all elements 
identified as the basis of the autonomy claims of news media institutions 
regarding political institutions (Strömbäck 2008).  It is important to note that the 
most frequent co-occurrences when journalists discuss definitions of what makes 
the news in the political beat are references to organisational editorial lines and 
frequent contact with sources. These co-occurrences are not trivial, and they 
indicate that news judgements exhibited by journalists are strongly shaped by the 
organisation they work for and the routinised relationships they have with their 
sources, an aspect highlighted in the literature about political news-making 
(Tuchman 1978; Cook 2005; Wahl-Jorgensen 2014).  
Their accounts, though, signalled that these shared news values allow them to 
offer some resistance from both organisational constraints and sources’ 
requirements. In other words, although political journalists are acutely aware of 
the limitations of their work, news values are generally perceived as boundary-
drawing devices that can, at least on occasion, challenge some of those external 
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pressures. For instance, by drawing a line between what is news and the 
promotional coverage that some politicians expect, or serving to indicate the 
extent to which key sources may receive special treatment; if they are involved in 
events of high journalistic interest, coverage will be unavoidable. 
Important for its almost complete absence are those direct references to the public 
interest or the civic-orientation of political journalism among the journalists 
interviewed. The public is conceived and discussed as audience: concrete, 
fragmented and attached to specific socioeconomic and political features. Thus, 
distance from sources and notions of autonomy appear less rooted in normative 
notions of the public, and more in the ability to make decisions on content based 
on professional criteria. Accountability to power, though, is brought up among 
journalists as a goal and the ideal outcome of journalistic work in the political 
beat, together with the idea that nowadays it is more difficult than before to block 
potentially damaging information from the public. Cases such as that of Laurence 
Golborne, the candidate who abandoned the presidential career due to allegations 
about tax evasion, was mentioned as an example of how political malpractice is 
being exposed by the media, a trend that has maintained and increased since then 
(this case unfolded during the time of the field work). 
7.2.2. The contested autonomy of (Chilean) political journalism: 
organisational constraints 
 Notions of professional autonomy among journalists are also discussed against an 
organisational narrative. Different factors have been collapsed in this dimension. 
The concept is used as a shortcut to cluster incidents in the data referring to a 
range of constraints expressed at the organisational level and which shape 
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political reporting. These constraints emerge either directly from news 
organisations (editorial lines and direct commercial interests) or indirectly, 
reflecting external pressures channelled through news organisations (corporate 
or political). This mainly refers to decision-making processes within the 
organisational level of news media outlets that journalists perceive as restraining 
contents and with which they have little, if any, involvement.  
From the analysis of interviews it is possible to identify a prevalent sense of 
subordination among journalists, and even editors, as an awareness of being 
employees who are naturally subordinated within an organisational hierarchy. In 
other words, most of them understand they work for organisations that have more 
or less explicit editorial lines and commercial interests, which occasionally 
become explicit restrictions and editorial biases.  This sense of subordination is 
often reinforced by the relationship established by politicians with high-level 
media executives. As a consequence of the latter, it is often assumed and accepted 
that many decisions affecting content are taken in “higher” spheres, as the 
following quotation illustrates: 
And sometimes you are asked to do stuff because someone who is above you 
was asked by someone else (…) It was agreed in a sphere that is not yours, 
and where you don’t have much say. It is not most cases but there is always 
something. Not all the time, but from time to time there is some, let’s say, 
request, a request or a topic that is beyond your control, which does not come 
from your reporting, that is beyond your ability to turn the agenda around. 
Journalist 7, Journalist, elite newspaper. 
 
The recognition and naturalisation of these constraints among media 
professionals leads to a form of “pragmatic subordination” (I am aware of my 
place in the organisation and act accordingly). On a few occasions, research 
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participants refer to themselves and their colleagues as “the last link of the chain”, 
especially at the reporter level. 
And it frequently happens that the relationship between the journalist, 
who is the last link of the chain, with the politician, has been settled in 
two or three previous conversations. And that happens every day (…) there 
is no leeway, no, there is no power in such situations. When the director or 
the editor asks the journalist to interview someone, and he says ‘I think he 
wants to speak about a certain thing’. What do you think the journalist does? 
Does he rebel and lose his job or obey? What do you think? 
Journalist 9, Journalist, TV. 
 
Additionally, political pressures are often channelled via higher levels of the 
organisational hierarchy. Responsiveness to these pressures will vary, depending 
on the organisation. However, they are not isolated cases. Practices involve 
requesting favours in order to secure coverage to certain events, or 
‘compensation’ coverage for negative stories or difficult interviews. As reportedly 
happens in other transitional democracies (Pfetsch & Voltmer 2012; Örnebring 
2012), there is no evidence of bribery in the politician/media relationship in Chile. 
Direct pressures on content are subtler, and often channelled top-down. 
The fact that the greatest restraints to journalistic autonomy appear to be 
expressed at the organisational level should not be overlooked and deserves 
greater attention in order to avoid the risk of univocal interpretations. The 
collective nature of news making and the relatively hierarchical structure of 
newsrooms is integral to standard descriptions of the journalistic trade, which 
generally suggest a loss of individual autonomy at newsroom level (Singer 2007). 
However, some scholarship, especially in Latin America, lends support to the idea 
that a vertical organisation of news media outlets, together with restrictions 
coming from superiors, can work as significant barriers to an open communication 
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and an influential constraint to journalistic practice (Hughes & Lawson 2005; 
Sapiezynska et al. 2013).  
Suspending a normative judgment on this matter and attending to the concept of 
autonomy in political reporting, from the perspective of journalists it does not 
seem plausible to avoid editorial lines and organisational hierarchies. These have 
to be addressed and appear to have considerable weight. However, journalists 
pose that they can eventually be overridden –or at least- counterbalanced with 
stories of high news value:  
It may be the case that the editor of the newspaper may have a 
legitimate political opinion and, obviously the people he trusts the most 
also think like him, but there are different visions among journalists and, 
because this is a participatory process, if there are objective factors that 
are news, even if they go against the political interests of the editor or 
the owner, they will be published by objective criteria that are 
undeniable, because it's news. So, are there some top down requests? Yes. 
But the view of the editor prevails, weighs more than that of a journalist only 
if the reporter does not have enough evidence to support his opinion. 
Journalist 10, Journalist, elite newspaper. 
 
The belief expressed in the quotation above – that of the criterion of 
newsworthiness perceived as bending editorial lines in news organisations with 
clear political alignments – indicates some capacity of field resistance to both 
organisational and political pressures, stressing yet again that journalistic 
autonomy is mostly built upon notions of newsworthiness, and enacted on the 
back of “unavoidable” news stories, which are conferred space, albeit limited, for 
the sake of editorial credibility. 
7.2.3. Powerful media, harmless journalists  
Generally speaking, politicians do not address the need of distancing themselves 
from journalists in the same way than journalists do, which could be explained by 
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the power differentials between these groups; this point that will be resumed and 
expanded in the discussion. Instead, they distance themselves from the news 
media institution as a whole. This is done by means of downplaying the relevance 
of media visibility in the performance of their roles, and particularly by criticising 
the conflict-driven nature of news, showing attitudes of distrust and discomfort 
towards media considerations. In doing so, they make claims about the legitimacy 
of the political work, situating politics as a domain truly interested for the 
common good and oriented to the public, as the following quotations illustrate. 
But also the media have their own logic; they are interested in scandal 
and they make questions upon that logic. There is no vision of, say, let’s get 
these topics out because they are relevant from a public viewpoint. What is 
news is what stands out. 
Politician 11, Senator. 
 
As discussed in section 6.2, the news media logic is defined as conflict-oriented, 
attached to the present and permeated by commercial considerations. This set of 
attributes allows political actors to use the cleavage between market and 
normative considerations to position themselves as guardians of the public 
interest, in opposition to news organisations concerned with strategies for 
audience maximisation. This line of argumentation is frequently found among 
politicians who articulate their views on the media on normative grounds, 
accusing news media outlets of marginalising public interest, relegating 
discussions about the country and therefore contributing to lowering the level of 
public debate and damaging public perceptions about politics.  
 
That is not interesting for the press. Once we managed to attract a million 
dollars in medical supplies for a hospital… two hospitals; a million dollars for 
each of them in medical supplies. When I went to talk to the editor about it 
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... he told me: ‘good news is no news’. Then you feel a deep 
disappointment (…) and you say here we have a problem because, 
ultimately, the function of generating public opinion through the media is 
abandoned. On the contrary, the media sometimes become a tool for 
further discrediting the institutions, when we now live a critical situation 
in Chile.  
Politician 22, Senator. 
 
And [the media] inform us that parliamentarians do nothing… No: I would 
say that parliamentary work is arduous. I don’t know if that goes aligned 
with the allowances we receive; but it is arduous. You work here [in 
Congress] from Monday to Thursday, but then you have to keep working; 
Friday, Saturday, Sunday, you have to work and be available for people at any 
time. If there is a public service vocation it does not matter but (…) it is hard 
work, and then [the media] incubates this misconception about 
parliamentarians and the political class, senators; nobody does 
anything.  
Politician18, Deputy. 
 
Gieryn (1983) stresses how scapegoating can be used as a rhetorical strategy for 
the protection of autonomy. It can be argued that by criticising media routines, 
politicians reclaim the value of their own role, particularly when public trust in 
their practices has decreased. This is reinforced as another stance taken by 
politicians to distance themselves from the media; that of the need of going back 
or reclaiming political convictions and beliefs as a strategy to deal with excessive 
media demands, negative media coverage or information overload, lending 
support to the idea that the politicisation of discourses is understood as a strategy 
to manage uncertainty and counterbalance the demands of a mediatized 
environment.  
When you are a protagonist, which was my case when I was a minister, there 
you operate in different levels. First, is about what you are advised to do 
because of what is going on in the news media market. Second, where your 
convictions lay, which is very important because this does not work 
according to any rule or general theory or system (…) A new face, a change, 
can give you a communication opportunity, but at some point - and the 
curve is getting faster - you have to go back to basics, meaning that you 
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have to go back to talking about those things about which human society has 
been debating, sometimes for decades, for centuries. 
(Politician 29, Former Minister) 
 
I think that now, today we got more used to think that that's part of the logic, 
that one has to act in conscience, with conviction, and that one can be 
criticised on one side or the other and that's part (...) In the end, you have to 
make decisions upon your convictions, beyond what you are being told 
on, say, Twitter. I think that in the end, we have achieved a better handling.  
(Politician 10, Deputy) 
 
While these forms of boundary construction are mostly based in criticism directed 
at news media institutions, an additional point frequently mentioned by 
politicians and press officers alike was that of a generalised view of journalists as 
accepting with little questioning the inputs of politicians for the construction of 
stories and the interpretation of events. This is an issue that deserves attention, as 
it reveals a perception of passivity in journalists that appears counter-intuitive to 
the prevalent consensus about a diminished field capacity of agenda control on the 
part of political institutions discussed in Chapter 6.  
[The quality of the political press is] poor, deeply poor, with few exceptions. I 
think they accept what they are told, there is little research, they accept 
little things, they are interested in minor things; the assistance of deputies 
(...) It has improved a little bit more but I think there are only a handful of 
serious political journalists today. 
Politician 20, Deputy. 
 
And I'm very critical of the way journalism in Chile is done, particularly 
political journalism. I think overall we have a guild – and I say this without 
generalising to all – [that is] rather weak, lazy, which makes little 
interpretation, and instead reflect the inputs provided by the very same 
actors they should make accountable. 
Politician 5, Assessor, political party. 
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But yes, I think we have a press that could be even more inquisitive, looking at 
the international context and how journalism has progressed in those niches. 
Sometimes I feel that one provides two, three leads to reporters and 
that’s it. And there is no counter-checking. There is some superficiality... 
some journalists are rather superficial. 
Politician 23, Deputy.  
 
I found them little creative. It strikes me how they buy stories. I mean, I 
say, hey but do a little bit more research, ask a little bit more to really 
know what had happened. 
Politicians 26, Senator. 
 
Criticism on the grounds of the passivity of journalists and their dependence on 
official versions of events was a somewhat unanticipated finding, considering 
available data shows that 62.1 per cent of politicians believe that the news media 
control the public agenda and help to create a negative image of politics 
(ICSO/UDP 2004). This reliance on official sources, recognised and criticised by 
political actors themselves, could be explained by a variety of factors, including 
entrenched journalistic routines, professional cultures, and the commercialisation 
of media markets, among others. On the one hand, this observation is consistent 
with literature on sources’ relationships that has supported the idea of political 
elites as primary definers of news stories (Gans, 1979; Sparrow, 1999; Wolfsfeld, 
2003; Davis, 2007). On the other hand, it is a statement consistent with local 
literature that stresses the “officialism” of Chilean journalism (Faure et al., 2011; 
Mellado & Humanes, 2012). However, it is a revealing point about the power 
inequalities observed at the micro-level in the relationship between political and 
media actors, which comes into conflict with the idea of an increasingly 
autonomous news media institution. 
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7.3. Final discussion and conclusion to the chapter 
This chapter has examined the politician-journalist relationship by looking at 
practices shaping routine interactions, as well as exploring role relations between 
these groups of actors. In doing so, this chapter explores how politicians and 
journalists engage in strategies for collaboration and detachment. Or in other 
words, it identifies practices that contribute to the establishment and 
management of boundaries in the relationship. While boundary drawing tends 
primarily to the aim of protection of autonomy (Gieryn 1983), boundary blurring 
refers to the capacity to identify and facilitate spaces for cooperation (Revers 
2013).  Taking into consideration the deficits identified in the literature about the 
Chilean journalistic field, particular attention has been paid to the identification of 
spaces where journalistic autonomy is asserted or threatened, identifying 
organisational constraints and asymmetrical power relations with sources as 
critical areas in this regard. The implications of these findings are discussed 
below. 
7.3.1. Drawing and re-drawing boundaries 
This chapter analysed the practices associated with the trading of information 
between political and media actors, paying attention to both their vocabularies of 
practice and the rhetorical construction of role relations. This analysis lends 
support to the idea that the negotiation and re-negotiation of boundaries plays a 
fundamental part in the relationship between these groups.  Andrew Abbott 
(1988) conceives professions as interdependent systems, which claim jurisdiction 
over certain types of knowledge, practices or occupational domains. However, he 
claims, “jurisdictional boundaries are perpetually in dispute” (Abbott 1988: 2). 
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Similar to Gieryn (1983), Abbott emphasises the social construction of these limits 
which are constantly challenged by the environment. By drawing boundaries 
within the politician-journalist relationships, these groups claim jurisdiction over 
distinct institutional domains, shedding light regarding the processes of roles’ 
definition embedded in discourse.  
The negotiation of boundaries becomes important for communities that are 
exposed to frequent and habitual information exchanges, routinely converging 
around physical spaces, shared practices and common interests. Continuous and 
intensive exchanges demand the ability to transition between relationships of 
collaboration and distancing, and practices such as those identified in the chapter 
(construction of relationships of trust, handling of leaked information) constitute 
spaces for the blurring of those boundaries (see Table in next page).  
The idea of boundaries “points to fundamental relational processes at work across 
a wide range of social phenomena, institutions, and locations” (Lamont & Molnar 
2002: 169). Contrary to other liberal professions such as Medicine or Law, 
Journalism is a permeable profession (Abbott 1988; Cook 2005), which has 
historically struggled to define its boundaries (Bourdieu 2005). Recently, 
considerable attention has been placed on analysing how journalism attempts to 
define the limits of the profession from within (Chadwick & Collister 2014; 
Eldridge 2014; Carlson 2015). However, the definition of limits in relation to 
external pressures is also an ongoing concern within an institutional domain open 
to influences from power and market forces (Bourdieu 2005; Champagne 2005). 
This defence from the outside corresponds to the boundary-work that aims 
towards the protection of autonomy (Gieryn 1983), which in the case of political 
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journalism is mostly played out at the relational level of the politician and 
journalist axis. 
Figure 15: Political and media actors boundary work 
Boundary-work Political actors  Journalists 
Perceived threats to 
autonomy 
*Relevant political topics ruled out by 
the media 
 
*Adaptation to media languages 
comes with compromises (e.g. 
constant attention to present and 
polarisation) 
* Sense of subordination within 
organisational structure 
(acknowledgement of political and 
commercial biases of own 
organisation) 
 
*Political elites perception about 
journalists passivity (journalists’ 
adoption of political logics of 
appropriateness)  
 
*Direct political pressure from 
sources 
 
Boundary-drawing 
(autonomy 
protection) 
*Mentions of convictions and beliefs 
as necessary to counterbalance 
information overloads. 
 
*Definitions of the media rule are 
made by opposition (notions of 
newsworthiness seen as arbitrary or 
opposed to the public interest) 
 
*Notions of newsworthiness seen as 
self-evident  
 
*Relationship with sources and 
organisational constraints can be 
subordinated to notions of 
newsworthiness  
 
Boundary blurring  
*Frequent contacts, personal networks, construction of relationships of trust 
* Off the record information exchanges  
* Encapsulation of political agenda (elite-oriented disposition) 
 
 
When it comes to boundary-drawing, or autonomy protection, political actors 
demarcate their institutional domain by “coming back to basics” and pointing 
towards issues of political convictions, while criticising news organisations’ 
criteria for news selection. Journalists, instead, embrace news values in order to 
312 
 
establish distance from pressures coming from sources and news organisations, 
and engage with demands of accountability to power. As such, both groups protect 
their autonomy with normatively grounded arguments, and at the same time build 
platforms of collaboration with arguments based on the expected utility of those 
exchanges.   
The neo-institutionalist literature offers some tools to better understand how 
actors reconcile these different rationales for action. March and Olsen (2009) state 
that actors’ behaviours can barely be explained by one logic of action only, as long 
as “behaviour is driven by habit, emotion, coercion, and calculated expected utility, 
as well as interpretation of internalised rules and principles” (Ibid: 17). In 
particular, they distinguish between the identity-based logic of appropriateness, 
and the preference-based logic of consequentiality. The first one is based on the 
fulfilment of duties, and therefore associated to normative implications of the own 
role. The second one is based on individual preferences and expected outcomes, 
and therefore associated to rational-choice behaviour (Shepsle 2006). Arguably, 
politicians and journalists resort to identity-based argumentations when they 
engage in boundaries-drawing practices and arguments; for instance, by criticising 
the quality of the media or sources’ attempts at controlling content. However, they 
engage in self-interested behaviour when creating spaces of collaboration, while 
acknowledging their counterparts’ interests. 
The construction of relationships of trust based on frequent contacts and trust-
testing exercises, comparisons of information exchanges with business, the use of 
personal networks, frequent monitoring and exchange of information based on off 
the record exchanges are some of the more important practices identified by both  
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politicians and journalists, and seen as part of regular information trade-offs. All of 
these could be described as rational strategies of collaboration that frequently 
imply levels of compromise regarding normative conceptions of their own role. 
Berkowitz & Terkeurst (1999) highlight this, describing how reporters often “find 
themselves in a duality of meanings, by engaging from both their professional 
interpretive community and the interpretive community of their sources”, thus 
navigating between multiple logics of appropriateness. Allegedly politicians 
experience a similar duality of meanings as a result of processes of mediatization, 
which have made the logic of the media more visible and easily identifiable. 
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in sight the power asymmetries between 
these groups of actors, particularly when analysed at the micro-level. When 
perceived threats to autonomy are identified, it is the journalistic field that 
emerges as historically and culturally constrained.  
7.3.2. Journalistic autonomy vs. media autonomy  
The institutional autonomy of the media refers to their capacity to resist external 
pressures, and to abide by their own standards of news making (Strömbäck 2008). 
As discussed in section 7.2, role relations between journalists and politicians 
appear to be demarcated by shared understandings of notions of newsworthiness, 
and therefore grounded in the recognition of the news media logic and the process 
of mediatization. Still, important threats to journalistic autonomy are identified. 
This begs the question how to reconcile a context of greater institutional 
autonomy of the media and yet limited journalistic autonomy. 
An initial explanation lies in the nature of political news making. Journalists are 
certainly more powerful in the aggregate than individually (Örnebring 2013), and 
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external pressures manifest in multiple ways around journalistic work. This is 
why the striving for journalistic autonomy is best understood as a constant 
struggle against both commercial and political considerations (Bourdieu 2005; 
Schudson 2005) rather than an in-built capacity of the field.  
A second explanation lies in the linkages between political communication 
cultures and the moderating effect they may have on processes of mediatization 
(Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011) and professionalisation (Örnebring 2013). In other 
words, although the media as an institution is understood by Chilean political 
elites as increasingly autonomous, this autonomy has not necessarily changed 
previous relationship patterns that are rooted in professional cultures and 
therefore appear resilient to change.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the idea of an 
autonomous press in Chile has been challenged on several fronts. Some of these 
point towards structural features, such as the persistent duopoly in the print 
press, the high concentration of media ownership (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; 
Mastrini & Becerra 2006; Gonzalez-Rodríguez 2008) and the proximity of the 
media to political and economic elites (Monckeberg 2009). However, other 
concerns have been raised regarding the capacity of Chilean journalism to 
challenge those in power, which are rather connected to a professional ethos that 
had led scholars to characterise Chilean journalism as passive (Gronemeyer 2002), 
uncritical (Santander 2013) and highly dependent on official sources (Faure et al., 
2011; Mellado & Humanes, 2014).  
Organisational constraints, expressed in top-down decisions in which journalists 
have little involvement, were identified as a major source of limitations for 
autonomous journalistic practice, and are consistent with the findings of 
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Sapiezynska et al. (2013), who found that greater restrictions to journalistic 
practice in Chile were located in newsrooms. This verticality in decision-making 
processes has been highlighted more broadly as a problem to overcome across 
Latin America (Hughes & Lawson 2005).  
In addition to these constraints, a problematic perception of the journalistic field 
among political elites has also emerged as prevalent, and the power differentials 
between sources and journalists have become evident. On the one hand, this 
asymmetry along with politicians’ perceptions about the passivity of journalists 
opens the door for co-optation, particularly when political affinities might exist 
between news organisations and political elites. On the other hand, it reflects a 
long tradition of officialism (Gronemeyer 2002; Faure et al. 2011) that reminds us 
of an authoritarian past (Otano & Sunkel 2003). Studies on political 
communication cultures in transitional democracies have frequently found 
legacies of authoritarian practices coexisting with professional communication 
strategies (Örnebring 2012; Pfetsch & Voltmer 2012). Chile seems to be no 
exception in this regard, which might at least partially explain the characterisation 
of the journalistic field as passive and ambivalent in their commitment towards 
their professional autonomy (Gronemeyer 2002; Mellado & Humanes 2012; Lagos 
& Cabalin 2013) as well as the apparent paradox between a powerful media 
inhabited by harmless, or at least highly pragmatic, journalists. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ON INSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTIONS AND POWER RELATIONS 
IN THE MEDIATIZATION NARRATIVE 
 
This chapter brings together the conclusions of the thesis by providing a 
schematic answer to the research questions that foreground this enquiry, as well 
as discussing the main implications of the findings presented in the preceding 
chapters. These findings endeavoured to fill an important research gap by taking 
an actor-centred approach to explore the mediatization of politics in the Chilean 
context. First, this is one of the first academic studies analysing Chilean politicians’ 
perceptions of their relationships with the news media by inspecting their 
interactions with press officers and journalists. In doing so, practices that 
constitute the staple of the political communication culture within elite circuits of 
communication were identified and contextualised within wider debates about the 
mediatization of politics, from an actor-centred perspective. Grounding the 
analysis in a specific context allows for an identification of how structural 
conditions and cultural features interact with the process of mediatization. By 
doing so, this study has developed a better understanding of the claims of greater 
media autonomy that precedes the mediatization of political actors, highlighting 
how processes of mediatization of political elites mainly reflect mechanisms for 
the reproduction of political power, and not necessarily weakened actors. 
Secondly, and connected to the previous point, I argue that some of the findings of 
the thesis shed light on theoretical concerns within mediatization research, 
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particularly by proposing a multi-level analysis of the dimensions of autonomy 
and control in the relationship between political and media actors that can better 
account for issues of power distribution that have often been overlooked by 
mediatization research. 
In the first section (8.1), the working definition of mediatization of politics 
elaborated in Chapter 3 is revisited in light of the findings of the study, and 
research questions are answered, offering a brief summary of findings. In the 
second section (8.2), key theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. 
Finally, in the third section (8.3), normative implications of the mediatization of 
Chilean political elites are examined, highlighting the cultural factors that appear 
to moderate the potential democratising effects of greater media autonomy. 
8.1. Revisiting working definition and research questions  
The following working definition of mediatization of politics was introduced early 
in the thesis as an operational framework to guide further analysis: 
 
 
 
 
This definition identifies four distinctive aspects of the process of mediatization, 
built on a critical survey of the literature on mediatization in its institutional 
variant: greater media autonomy, media visibility as resource, adaptive practices 
and news media logics of action.  
 
Mediatization of politics is the process activated within 
political institutions as a result of increasing institutional 
autonomy of the news media and the necessity of 
mediated visibility, in which the actions and decisions of 
political actors, organisations and institutions are 
adjusted to news media logics. 
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Looking at the available literature, it was possible to reach a preliminary 
conclusion that Chilean politics have become mediatized on the grounds that the 
news media as a social institution have increased their autonomy, largely as a 
result of processes of commercialisation (Tironi & Sunkel 1993). Additionally, 
political actors demonstrate an increased need for mediated visibility to 
compensate for a weakened connection between the party system and civic 
society (Godoy 2003; Luna & Mardones 2010) and have therefore reacted by 
adopting tools from marketing and related areas (Silva 2004; Espíndola 2008), as 
well as adopting professional help to mediate their communication with the news 
media (ICSO/UDP 2004; Santander 2013). Despite these indications, there 
remained an important research gap, one that could be addressed by assessing 
how political elites conduct their relationship with the news media in Chile and 
the extent to which they have adopted news media logics of action in their 
everyday practice.  
Having identified this gap, the present study has developed initial answers to the 
guiding research question of how have Chilean political elites adapted to the 
mediatization of politics. This question can be schematically answered by 
connecting the findings presented in the preceding chapters to the four 
dimensions identified in the working definition of mediatization of politics, while 
adopting an inductive and actor-centred approach. As some of these points were 
developed in the preceding chapters, these dimensions will be briefly revisited 
below to highlight, on the one hand, how they connect to the different sub-
research questions and, on the other, what they add to existing knowledge. In 
addition, a final sub-section will elaborate on findings that offer empirical support 
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to mediatization of politics over time by identifying directions of change in 
political elites’ relationships with the media.  
8.1.1. Actors’ need for mediated visibility: on media and political resources  
Paying attention to the nature of the resources controlled by the media is a 
necessary step to understanding how these resources operate within political 
institutions, as they are the main drivers of individual and organisational adaptive 
practices to media demands.  
The sub RQ1, What are Chilean politicians’ goals when interacting with the news 
media, was addressed directly in Chapter 6. Goals attached to media-oriented 
activities by political elites were discussed first by research participants, in close 
connection to their potential as power resources, and classified in goals of 
electoral and policy rationale. The elitist nature of traditional media players was 
stressed in discussions about the limits of media visibility as a main resource, 
especially in electoral processes, where other forms of direct communication, 
particularly territorial work, remain relevant. As such, control of public attention 
through traditional media is primarily understood as a resource that may activate 
other political resources. This insight is directly connected to sub RQ2, To what 
extent is media visibility considered a valuable resource for political activity? This 
question was addressed in chapters 5 and 6, where the value attached by political 
elites to media visibility was discussed as a mobilising capability, using the 
concept coined by March & Olsen (1995), which refers to how controlling flows of 
attention constitute a major tool for governance that may compensate for the lack 
of other resources. 
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By paying attention to goals, the intentionality of action is taken into account 
(Thornton et al. 2012). Yet, it is recognised that these actions are embedded in a 
specific political and media structure.  The analysis of structural factors shaping 
political actors’ interactions with news organisations highlight important features 
about the nature of the media-controlled resource of public attention (Kunelius & 
Reunanen 2012) in the Chilean context. First, this is a resource that appears to be 
centrally managed; it is mostly consolidated in the Presidency, Santiago and a 
group of media outlets that together form a circuit of elite communication. 
Secondly, self-mediatization – that is, actors’ reflexive responses to the media 
environment (Esser 2013; Marcinkowski & Steiner 2014) – appears to be more 
likely dependent on the actors’ positions and aligned to both individual and 
organisational resources. As such, the drive and ability to control public attention 
through traditional media platforms is differentially distributed among political 
elites, dependant on their proximity to the Executive power, the centre of the 
country and their links to traditional media outlets. As the literature suggests, the 
use of the resource of mediated visibility  is identified as driven primarily by the 
need to control public attention (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995; Seymour-Ure 2003; 
Berkowitz 2009; Kunelius & Reunanen 2012; Stromback & Van Aelst 2013), and 
part of a bigger struggle for political control (Wolfsfeld & Sheafer 2006). Yet, this 
resource is also seen as particularly effective and therefore necessary for intra-
elite communication. At a societal level, nonetheless, exposure in traditional media 
outlets is understood as a tool that has to be complemented with others. Overall, 
its effectiveness is perceived by political elites as both limited and difficult to 
achieve, as more fragmented and horizontal forms of communication that do not 
necessarily operate according to traditional news media logics spread.    
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8.1.2. Actors’ understanding and interactions with news media logics of 
action   
Media and political logics were discussed as hybrid institutional logics shaping 
actors’ interactions (Meyer 2002; Esser 2013). These provide organising 
principles influencing action in given institutional domains (Dimaggio & Powell 
1983; Friedland & Alford 1991; March & Olsen 2006). SubRQ3, How do political 
elites understand and interact with news media logics of action?, was addressed 
directly in chapter 6, where the operational logic structuring politicians’ 
interactions with the media was discussed in connection to the accounts of 
research participants. Political elites highlighted elements such as conflict and 
negativity, permanent attention to the present and the commercial underpinnings 
of news-making. As such, news media logics were seen mostly as reactive to a 
news media system grounded in market considerations (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2002; 
Bresnahan 2003; Couso 2012). Political elites’ interactions with this prevalent 
operational logic were also described as highly ambivalent, since it is often 
criticised on the grounds of being short-sighted and limiting the range of topics 
that secure public exposure; hence, attitudes of discomfort or unease towards a 
logic perceived as external and not necessarily oriented towards the public 
interest were common among interviewees. Nonetheless, politicians widely 
discuss this logic in terms of opportunity, since adapting to it is a natural gateway 
to mediated visibility. In other words, compromises are made by political elites 
towards a logic of action recognised as external, in order to retain control over the 
terms of their own visibility.   
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8.1.3. Adaptive responses to news media logics of action: the staple of 
mediatization   
Individual, organisational and institutional adaptive responses to news media 
logics have been the staple of mediatization research focused on political actors 
(see Kepplinger 2002; Campus 2010; Reunanen et al. 2010; Elmelund-Praestekaer 
et al. 2011; Kunelius & Reunanen 2011; Korthagen & Klijn 2012; Thorbjornsrud et 
al. 2014). In this study, the adaptive practices of Chilean political elites were 
investigated in chapter 6 and 7, with the aim of answering subRQ4, What are the 
prevalent media-oriented practices among Chilean politicians and how are they 
accommodated in their daily activities? 
The typology of mediatization developed in Chapter 5 offers a first indication of 
how media-oriented practices are not equally adopted by all actors. Instead, their 
adoption is often aligned with the centrality of actors’ position in the political 
system and organisational resources available for media management. Crucially, 
the adoption of media-oriented practices and the relevance these actions have 
within individual routines is also the outcome of individual decisions regarding 
the value of mediated visibility as a political resource, which results in the active 
pursuit of relationships with the media. 
Chapters 6 and 7 present different aspects of the way political elites have 
responded to changes in the media environment, responses that are grounded in a 
need for retaining control on the terms upon which public attention is attained. 
Chapter 6 identifies four main areas of adjustment, in which news media logics 
appear to shape politicians’ everyday actions. The first of these is the 
professionalisation of political communication; that is to say, the proliferation of 
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professional and time resources devoted to press and communications tasks, 
together with the systematisation of media-oriented practices (e.g. professional 
press monitoring, regular meetings to define future actions, production of 
standardised information subsidies). Second, adaptation to media language, which 
includes efforts to offer attractive storylines to the media often by means of 
exploiting conflict and personalisation, tailoring messages and working on catchy 
soundbites. Third, adaptation to media temporalities, an ongoing process of 
adjustment connected to the acceleration of news making routines, convergence of 
media platforms, fragmentation of audiences and the multiplication of 24/7 online 
and offline channels of information. The majority of politicians and press officers 
see these changes in the configuration of the media as demanding a greater ability 
to both monitor politically relevant information and to detect windows of 
opportunity to pursue spaces of mediated visibility, limiting the scope for 
positioning new topics in the agenda. The fourth and final area of adjustment is 
less visible, as it is connected to the backstage of political news making and relates 
to the proliferation of covert information subsidies. The latter takes the form of 
off-the-record briefings together with the wide circulation of unattributed 
information. This has become an alternative route for political elites to influence 
the news when traditional information subsidies appear to have decreased their 
value.  
8.1.4. Actors’ perception about increasing media autonomy  
The concept of autonomy has been inspected in this study from a relational 
perspective; that is to say, from the perspective of interactions between media and 
political actors over news making in the political beat. This transversal topic was 
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approached in all of the chapters, each addressing different perspectives. Overall, 
the findings lend support to the idea that both politicians and press officers 
perceive the news media as having increased their institutional autonomy, 
inasmuch as their ability to control media contents have diminished and the 
operational criteria of the news media has emerged as the main guiding principle 
regulating information exchanges. Yet, at the same time, this greater autonomy 
appears moderated by structural and cultural factors, particularly a prevalent 
centralised political communication culture, clientelistic practices in some news 
organisations and a legacy of submissive journalism. 
The identification of prevalent practices in the relationship between political and 
media actors, developed in chapters 6 and 7, reveal the complexity of these 
interactions and the ways in which media content remains the object of a 
permanent negotiation, where both topics and frames to interpret those topics are 
disputed. The latter does not preclude a greater institutional autonomy on the part 
of the Chilean media, but suggests that a more nuanced interpretation of the 
implications of the mediatization process is needed. This final point will be 
returned to and expanded on in the next section of this chapter.  
SubRQ5, What are the prevalent practices in the trade-off between Chilean 
politicians and journalists?, was approached in Chapter 7, where dynamics of 
autonomy and control in the relationship between media and political actors were 
explored. Findings lend support to the idea that practices of information 
exchanges that have developed between these groups could be understood within 
a framework of expected utility, supported by the construction of trust 
relationships through frequent contact, the development of trust-testing exercises, 
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the cultivation and use of personal networks as well as the extended use of off-the-
record briefings. These complementary practices point towards the rational 
construction of platforms of collaboration between political and media actors, 
which nonetheless require active distancing on the part of journalists if they are to 
claim some levels of autonomy from their sources.   
SubRQ6, What are politicians’ and journalists’ perceptions about their ability to 
control media messages?, can be answered by taking into consideration both the 
direct claims made by research participants regarding their capacity of shaping 
news making, as well as the different threats to autonomy identified along the 
study. Among these, it seems relevant to highlight those threats to journalistic 
autonomy identified by participants, which oppose a narrative of increasing media 
autonomy. In particular, organisational arrangements that constrain autonomous 
journalistic practice emerge as a major issue that amplifies the consequences of 
already-asymmetrical power relations between journalists and their political 
sources, especially in a context where observations regarding the passivity of 
journalists were common for both politicians and those press officers who assist 
them. In this regard, a tension is observed regarding the way in which perceptions 
about levels of autonomy change according to the levels observed; overall, 
politicians and press officers retain high degrees of control in the relational-
individual level as well as important scope for negotiation at the organisational 
level. At the institutional level, however, the news media are seen to be increasing 
their autonomy and their ability to challenge political control.  
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8.1.5. Main directions of change 
It is important to highlight that some of the preceding findings are indicative of 
change in the communicative practices of both politicians and journalists over 
time. As such, they provide insight into how the process of mediatization has 
developed from a longitudinal angle in the Chilean context, and more importantly 
how political elites have negotiated these changes.   
The first area of transformation is connected to changes in the relationship 
between politicians, press officers and journalists, which have evolved as a result 
of what appears as greater capacity of the media to define news contents 
according to their own criteria. According to several research participants, 
important changes can be identified in this relationship throughout the 
transitional period, all of which point towards news organizations less inclined to 
reproduce official versions and more prone to interpretive forms of journalism. 
This shift in the relationship, nonetheless, is counterbalanced with greater 
awareness of news media logics among both politicians and press officers, a 
movement towards the professionalization of political communication and 
changes in the form taken by information subsidies, as well as organizational 
constraints in the journalistic field that seem resilient to change.  
The second area of transformation is connected to the erosion of dynamics 
embraced by the circuit of elite communication during the transitional period, as a 
result of the emergence of new actors –both in the media and the political domain- 
that appear less responsive to the practices that organized the relationships 
between these fields in the first decades after the recovery of democracy. As it was 
discussed in Chapter 5, these changes threaten the capacity of controlling the 
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agenda on both sides, since media and political actors appear to be struggling to 
cope with some of these changes and are still in the process of defining ways of 
dealing with important transformations in the pace of the news cycle, the amount 
of information available, as well as the participation of audiences through social 
media platforms, developments that demand a readjustment in the relationship 
between political and media actors.   
8.2. Theoretical implications of findings: a multi-level approach to 
mediatization  
This section will briefly review theoretical points that emerged from the analysis 
of findings and can be of use outside the specific case in which they have been 
raised. In doing so, it establishes a contribution that extends beyond empirical 
observations within a contained national environment. Specifically, this section 
questions the assumptions of political actors’ autonomy losses implied in the 
narrative of mediatization of politics, and proposes a multi-level approach to 
explore the dimension of autonomy as crucial for the understanding and 
assessment of conflicting rationales for behaviour, as well as patterns of power 
relations between political elites and the news media.  
Because of the centrality traditional media platforms have in the mind-set of 
political elites, the media institution impose constraints on politicians’ behaviours 
which, ultimately, reflect the ways in which political actors negotiate potentially 
contradicting value-systems (that of politics versus that of the media) with the aim 
of remaining visible. This is a transformative process for political actors and 
institutions.  However, I argue that the independent power the media has on 
politics tends to be overstressed. News organisations and journalists do have to 
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negotiate their behaviour as well. This opens mediatization processes to multiple 
outcomes and prevents a linear understanding of the process. 
This study has examined different patterns of power relations in the interaction 
between political and media actors, which tempers the assessment of causal links 
between mediatization and political elites’ autonomy losses. Yes, in the context 
studied, the media appear to be increasing their institutional autonomy, in the 
sense that they have claimed the power to define how news content is presented. 
Nevertheless, the process of mediatization of political actors can be interpreted as 
a field-reaction to manage uncertainty over mediated visibility. At the same time, 
political elites seem able to exert significant influence over what information is 
reported by news organisations, as well as to generate relations of inter-
dependence with media professionals in a number of ways. This is connected to 
three key areas identified in the study that condition political elites’ access to 
mediated visibility: the availability and allocation of resources for managing media 
visibility, adaptation to news media logics and the construction of relationships 
with media organisations and media actors.  
As argued by Hjarvard (2013), the need for visibility has altered the performative 
requirements of political actors, yet many remain in position to take advantage of 
the process (Elmelund-Praestekaer et al. 2011). The latter becomes clear, for 
example, in the analysis of news media logic during interviews with politicians and 
press officers when these actors directly link adaptation to media language and 
anticipation of media requirements to the instrumental pursuit of political 
objectives.  
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Deacon & Stanyer (2014), some of the more open critics of mediatization studies, 
have critiqued assumptions about the “net effect on communicative practice” 
(Ibid: 1035) brought about by mediatization processes when failing to 
acknowledge that these occur alongside other social processes and bound to 
produce causal combinations contextually relevant at different levels of social 
interactions. This study offers some empirical support for these allegations. First, 
chapter 5 acknowledges that communication practices of Chilean political elites 
are embedded in a political and media system that reflect institutional 
arrangements within a particular political culture, favouring some actors over 
others (e.g. the Executive power, Santiago-based politics, elite media 
organisations), constituting a macro-level framework for understanding 
politicians’ and journalists’ relationships. Later, chapter 7 discusses how the 
organisational level appears crucial in the Chilean context as prevalent 
organisational cultures and potential political allegiances may prevent some 
journalists from pursuing more adversarial styles of reporting. This is particularly 
the case for quality newspapers, which remain highly relevant as articulators of 
inter-elite disputes. Additionally, at the relational one-to-one level, power 
imbalances often lean in favour of political sources, which by and large see 
journalists as ill-prepared and dependant on the information provided by them 
through means of traditional media subsidies and strategic leaks. These 
perceptions appear to be favoured for issues such as the high rotation of reporters 
and precarious job conditions, contributors to power imbalances that are 
amplified in the relationship between political actors and journalists in regional 
media outlets, which politicians judge as more permeable with stories of interest.  
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8.2.1. The autonomy dimension  
Interrogating the overlooked dimension of media autonomy – the second phase of 
the process in the model developed by Strömbäck (2008) – can serve as a way to 
develop this argument further, and concretely explore the aspects outlined above; 
namely, how mediatization processes interact with other social processes and 
cultural factors, as well as inspect the power relations between media and political 
actors. This phase is described as “the degree to which the media are independent 
from political institutions in terms of how the media are governed” (Strömbäck, 
2008: 234), later expanded and equated to the process of institutionalization of 
the media via professionalisation of journalistic practice and commercialisation.  
In the preceding chapters, findings were presented and discussed, paying 
attention to and distinguishing between levels of interaction: macro, meso and 
micro-levels. This distinction emerged from the analysis of the data itself, and is 
supported by an institutionalist perspective for analysis of media and politics 
relationships (Sparrow 1999; Cook 2005) and the process of mediatization of 
politics (among others, Hjarvard, 2008, 2013; Strömbäck, 2008), as well as the use 
of the institutionalist perspective as employed outside of media studies (DiMaggio 
1997; March & Olsen 2006; Thornton et al. 2012). In the latter group, Friedland & 
Alford (1991) stand out for having greatly influenced the institutional logic 
perspective proposing a “non-functionalist conception of society as a potentially 
contradictory inter-institutional system”, adding that “an adequate social theory 
must work at three levels of analysis – individuals competing and negotiating, 
organisations in conflict and coordination, and institutions in contradiction and 
interdependency” (Ibid: 240-241).  
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Paying attention to multiple levels of interaction allows for an exploration of how 
these levels are nested into each other but may be actually distinct (Friedland & 
Alford 1991; Schudson 2002; Görke & Scholl 2006; Thornton et al. 2012). What 
seems clear from the analysis of findings in the Chilean case, for example, is that as 
a social institution (meso-level of analysis) the news media have certainly 
increased their autonomy during the transitional process, and therefore, it could 
be argued that traditional media outlets – as a whole – have increased their ability 
to act according to their own operational criteria. By that measure, news media 
would appear able to determine the conditions for the visibility of political elites 
in these platforms. As such, news media logics potentially provide a mechanism to 
enforce distance from sources. Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 6, the field-
level reaction of political institutions – adapting to the news media logic and 
 
Figure 16: Multi-level model of media-politics relationships 
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therefore being able to anticipate media requirements – can be interpreted as a 
move to counter-balance this power shift.  
As the figure above illustrates, at least three complementary levels can be 
distinguished in order to examine this relationship, each of which has been 
discussed in the findings chapters in relation to the Chilean context. First, a macro-
level dependant on prevalent media and political systems and those media policies 
and regulations that provide the framework for the interactions between these 
groups. Second is a meso-level dependant on the media acting according to their 
own criteria, which is generally met with professionalisation of political 
communication and processes of self-mediatization. Third, is a micro-level where 
actions are in fact observable in terms of organisational routines and relational 
exchanges between journalists and politicians. In the context of inter-institutional 
relationships of great inter-dependency (Sigal 1973; Gans 1979; Blumler & 
Gurevitch 1995; Negrine 1996; Meyer 2002; Cook 2005; Wahl-Jorgensen 2014) 
these continuous disputes over the representation of politics need to be 
acknowledged.  
I argue that media autonomy is not a given of mediatization processes. Instead, it 
is a dimension that claims comprehensive attention, beyond the institutional level. 
In the context of democratic theory, Dahl (1982) stresses that autonomy and 
control are dyadic concepts rarely found as absolutes. Likewise, relationships of 
autonomy and control between news organisations and political elites are, as well, 
always relative, and this becomes increasingly evident when the multiple 
dimensions for mutual influence are inspected. By paying attention to this 
dimension, variance between mediatization processes can be better captured. 
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8.3. Normative implications of findings 
Having established some of the theoretical contributions of this study at a general 
level, this section now moves to discuss the normative implications of the 
presented findings. These are naturally of a contextual nature and directly linked 
to Chile, where the mediatization of political actors has been observed and 
analysed. Making a normative assessment of processes of mediatization is not 
uncomplicated, particularly as the literature generally portrays mediatization as a 
process not loaded normatively (Hjarvard 2008; Strömbäck 2008) and therefore 
equally able to increase or decrease the quality of deliberation and decision-
making (Kunelius & Reunanen 2012). As such it is not straightforward to establish 
a relationship between mediatization of political actors and democracy. As 
mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, Blumler (2014) argues that the 
mediatization of political actors – the fourth phase of mediatization in Strömbäck's 
(2008) model – is the phase most linked with the performance of democracy as it 
is paired with assumptions about possible losses of autonomy on the part of 
politicians and the eventual concurrence of politics and media concerns; which 
points towards potential detrimental effects for the public, an assessment shared 
by Kriesi (2013). It is fair to say, however, that attempts to examine the 
relationships between the mediatization of political actors and democratic 
performance empirically have generally ended up acknowledging that the process 
is open to different outcomes (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Reunanen et al. 2010; 
Korthagen & Klijn 2012; Thorbjornsrud et al. 2015). Overall, normative 
implications of the mediatization of political elites are, therefore, not inherent to 
the process of mediatization, but demand a situated assessment. 
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Likewise, the findings of this study reveal a complex picture of tightly interwoven 
features in the Chilean media system, suggesting that political elites’ adjustments 
to the media environment are naturally reactive to the sort of news media 
institutions that have emerged in a post-authoritarian context. Moreover, they 
show some of the implications the elitist and commercial biases of Chilean 
traditional media have had in the relationships established between politicians 
and journalists. The latter group use news values as a protective shield to distance 
themselves from political sources and organisational pressures, which may enable 
– and sometimes has enabled – instances of accountability to power. Yet the same 
news values which journalists claim for their professional autonomy are often 
perceived, by politicians, press officers and journalists alike, as the main reason 
for politics being reduced to conflict stories and personal disputes, to the 
exclusion of topics of greater public relevance. Additionally, because the routines 
that sustain the relationship between politicians and news organisations generally 
demand time and human resources, access to media platforms depends on the 
availability of those resources, and the capacity to spin policies according to media 
demands. This clearly generates some inequality of access to platforms of 
mediated visibility. Finally, the self-referential nature of elite-driven coverage can 
easily lead towards disconnection between an elite public opinion and general 
audiences. The latter is especially acute in the Chilean case since it is not only the 
case of news agendas that may not be relevant to some sectors of the population, 
but additionally because elitist political practices and lack of participation have 
been repeatedly identified as one of the main shortcomings of the Chilean 
transitional process (Godoy 2003; Siavelis 2009; Garretón & Garretón 2010). As 
such, it is not too adventurous to state that an inward-facing circuit of elite 
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communication can be considered a maintenance mechanism of the political 
status quo as well as a substantial factor contributing to the crisis of trust that 
political elites now experience in the country.  
As such, the consequences of the mediatization of Chilean political elites that this 
study identifies are multi-faceted and not necessarily unidirectional, leading to the 
formulation of a key question: what sort of normative expectations can be placed 
on the relationship between institutional political actors and news organisations 
in a democratic system? Generally, news media is expected to be an independent 
actor participating in public life by observing, informing, and providing an arena 
for sources to reach the public (Habermas 2006; Christians et al. 2009). In the 
context of democratisation processes specifically, the news media is expected to 
resist clientelistic practice and function to hold power to account, provide citizens 
with meaningful information and become a forum for discussion among a 
diversity of voices (Jebril et al. 2013; Örnebring 2012, 2013; Voltmer 2013). 
The findings developed in this thesis expose serious questions about whether the 
relationship established between political elites and traditional media outlets in 
Chile has performed effectively across these ideal roles. Intra-elite clientelistic 
practices can still be observed in some news organisations, research participants 
expressed concern regarding the range of actors and topics that access traditional 
media platforms and, most importantly, the allegiance of news organisations to 
the public interest is generally subordinated to editorial lines, news values and 
strategies for audience maximisation. This is certainly problematic, as it calls into 
question the quality of public communication in Chilean society. If the information 
available for accountability processes is so strongly shaped by the power 
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dynamics between politicians and journalists, there is no guarantee that the media 
will act as an independent link between elites and society, or the information they 
produce will enable the public to make informed decisions about their leaders, 
instead of merely reflecting the extent to which political actors have learnt to 
manage a rather small circuit of relevant media outlets.  
Additionally, it seems crucial to acknowledge that the idea of mediatization 
inspected in this study is built upon a set of assumptions that today are seriously 
challenged by a changing media environment that enables new information flows 
and political participation.  As argued by Blumler (2014), mediatization debates 
belong to a certain underlying model of the political communication process that 
is linear, privileges top-down transmission and is based in inter-institutional 
relationships between politicians and journalists. Politicians in different parts of 
the world tend to privilege these platforms (Chadwick 2013; Blumler 2014; Schulz 
2014), something that the findings of this study confirms, and despite shared 
perceptions that the mass media paradigm is seriously eroded, politicians 
continue acting, for the most part, within it. More challenging, and still open to 
discussion and academic enquiry, is determining the extent to which the erosion 
of the models that have sustained the institutional media-politics binomial in the 
last decades have had an effect at the level of routines, norms and news values that 
shape media institutions themselves. Considering the media has traditionally 
worked for the reproduction of elite discourses (Schudson 2002; Bourdieu 2005; 
Habermas 2006), a shift in this inter-institutional relationship could indicate 
greater responsiveness to civil society, which may be a welcome development.  
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8.4. Directions for future research  
The strengths and limitations derived from the methodological approach in this 
study were discussed in detail in section 4.6, yet it is important to return to some 
of these in identifying the avenues for future research that derive from this thesis. 
Three main directions for future research are identified: quantitative or 
comparative approaches to assess the progression of processes of mediatization 
over time and in different places; case studies that allow researchers to ground 
analysis in concrete policy processes; and finally, exploring whether newer media 
logics might alter the routines of media and political actors and whether these are 
changing the relationship between the studied reference groups. 
For its design and purpose, this study does not lend itself to providing 
comparative evidence of change in the relationship between Chilean political elites 
and the news media. The analysis of data has offered some support for findings 
that are indicative of dynamics of transformation, some of which were discussed 
in section 8.1.5, yet they certainly demand further research, possibly of a 
comparative nature. One of these is the narrative of historical changes in the 
politician-journalist relationship, and in the communication practices of 
politicians, political parties and political organisations along the transitional 
process (1990-2015). A different area for potentially fertile comparisons can be 
detected from the sharp differences in politicians’ and press officers’ perceptions 
and practices directed towards national media, compared to those directed 
towards regional and local media, which suggests differences in national and sub-
national journalistic and political communication practices.  
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Recognising these limitations, this study has succeeded in identifying several 
points for understanding mediatization processes. Key among these, this research 
has identified how processes of mediatization interact with different dynamics in 
the Chilean context, shaping the communication practices of political elites and the 
relationship between politicians, press officers and journalists. Using the findings 
of this study to explore communication practices and media coverage in 
alternative, specific, case studies could further advance the understanding of some 
dynamics of mediatization. In the Chilean context in particular, 2014 and 2015 
have been years in which levels of trust in political elites have plummeted (COES 
2015; PNUD 2015), a situation at least partially fuelled by a series of cases that 
have exposed the dubious links between corporate and political power. From a 
research perspective, these revelations offer an opportunity to inspect, under the 
auspices of mediatization theory, how traditional media outlets have incorporated 
and reported on these cases, as well as how they have interacted with new media 
platforms, and whether the relationship between political elites and journalists 
have experienced changes as a result 
Additionally, it is important for mediatization studies as a whole to move beyond 
the institutional binomial of media and politics, in order to assess how news media 
logics interact with newer media logic (e.g. social media or community media in 
digital platforms). For example, analysis of the ways mediatization theory can be 
applied to look at political actors’ interaction with media platforms that do not fit 
traditional definitions of the institutional/journalistic media. In this sense, the 
findings of this study suggest that a new media environment has at least partly 
eroded the functioning of circuits of elite communication in Chile, posing 
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challenges for both political and media actors. This line of enquiry becomes 
especially relevant in the broader Latin American context, where the link between 
traditional media outlets and civil society has been rather weak in post-
authoritarian contexts (Waisbord 2000, 2012; Guerrero & Márquez-Ramírez 
2014). 
 
8.5. Closing remarks  
This study was developed with the aim of better understanding how Chilean 
political elites understand and cultivate their relationships with the news media, 
using the theoretical framework of mediatization of politics. In doing so, this thesis 
has produced new knowledge regarding the communication practices of Chilean 
politicians, gathering data that has been used to examine some of the theoretical 
assumptions of mediatization theory and in particular to better understand the 
notions of media and political autonomy within this field of research.  
This study contributes to existing knowledge by expanding the range of cases 
studied and methodological approaches used within this tradition. Using a 
qualitative approach to the study of mediatization, this thesis identifies how 
mediatization as a process occurs and interacts with the Chilean context, and how 
it shapes political elites’ communication practices and the relationship between 
politicians, press officers and journalists in a market-driven, elite-oriented and 
centralised political communication culture. In doing so, this thesis promotes the 
use of qualitative approaches to illuminate mediatization studies, not only by 
shedding light on the way a rather abstract process such as the mediatization of 
politics interacts with contextual features, but also contributing to the theoretical 
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understanding of the mediatization of political actors. In this regard the thesis 
argues that the mediatization of political actors primarily translates in constraints 
on politicians’ behaviour, yet assertions about power shifts in the relationship 
between both institutional domains require situated assessments. Remaining 
within the institutional tradition for the study of mediatization and using some 
conceptual tools from the institutional logics perspective, the thesis claims that by 
inspecting the micro-level of social interactions it is possible to improve 
understanding about how institutional-level logics are exported, but also how they 
are resisted and how they are often willingly adopted for instrumental ends.  
In recent years, mediatization studies have greatly developed theoretically. 
However, much work needs to be done in the field of mediatization studies to offer 
an empirical basis to theoretical claims, and especially to examine material and 
normative implications of the process both in politics and in other fields. In this 
study I hope to have made a small contribution in this direction, by examining 
theoretical claims with empirical data, and acknowledging the complexity of the 
process and some of its multiple consequences. In contemporary Chile, the 
mediatization of political actors cannot be decoupled from the media system and 
the political culture developed during the transition. Indeed, it has been a key 
mechanism for the reproduction of the institutions that support it.  It is for this 
reason that this thesis identifies some of the challenges the mediatization 
paradigm will have to address in order to engage with dynamics of continuity and 
change in the relationship between political and media actors, in a context of 
increasing public scrutiny and changing communication patterns, where extra-
institutional actors have greater visibility. This is a consideration scholars must 
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engage with in order to develop mediatization theory in a way that appropriately 
reflects changing media and political landscapes.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
FIELDWORK QUESTIONNAIRE- POLITICIAN 
 
MEDIA-ORIENTED PRACTICES  
1. Let me begin by asking about your media consumption. Could you tell me what news 
media you regularly use for information purposes? 
 What news media would you consider more relevant for your functions? 
 
2. Do you have a routine for media monitoring? How is that?  
 
3. Overall, how would you define the relationship you have established with the news media 
during your political career? 
In terms of your direct relationship with news organizations, how often do you speak to 
journalists or editors? 
 
4. In what ways do you plan your media presence?  
How do you decide whether to appear or not?  
Do you work with supporting professionals in this area? 
5. Thinking about the time you spend getting informed, planning your media presence and 
interacting with journalists. How relevant is the media within your work routine? Could 
you estimate how much time you invest in this area? 
 
 
CONTROL-AUTONOMY  
6. How would you describe the relationship you maintain with journalists that cover your 
beat? 
 
7. Do you think that the professional standards of political journalism in Chile are 
appropriate? 
 
8. Who would you say has more power in negotiating content that is published: you as a 
politician or the news organization? How come? 
 
9. Which are, in your experience, the strategies more commonly used to try to steer media 
coverage in your favour (or generally in politicians’ favour)? 
 
10. Do you have regular off the record conversations with journalists/editors? What kind of 
information you normally get/give from these talks? 
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11. Would you say that you spend more time looking proactively to appear in the media or 
reacting to calls or requests from journalists? 
 
12. Would you say that you generally understand the dynamics and priorities of the main 
news organizations? 
 
GOALS 
I would like now evaluate the goals associated with media exposure, or in other words, 
the exchange value of the relationship with the news media for you as a politician. 
13. What are the main goals or goal that you pursue in your interaction with news 
organizations? 
What are the main benefits of having media exposure? 
Would you consider necessary to appear in the media to advance positions in negotiations 
for example? (Some example if you find it useful?) 
Do you obtain relevant information (for the exercise of your functions) through the 
media? 
 
Do you see news organizations as a space for communication with the public mainly or a 
space for communication with peers/ other politicians? 
 
14. In your opinion, to what extent media coverage affects political relationships? (e.g. with 
politicians within your coalition, with your opponents, with interest groups).  
 
15. Do you think some people prioritize issues in the political agenda because they are likely 
to have good media coverage? 
 
WRAP-UP  
17. Finally, I would like to know how relevant media management is for someone actively 
working in politics and why. Is it possible to do politics outside the media? 
18. Do you think is there any relevant issue that we are leaving out? 
19. Could you recommend someone else to discuss this subject?  
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FIELDWORK QUESTIONNAIRE- COMMUNICATIONS OR PRESS OFFICER  
 
MEDIA-ORIENTED PRACTICES  
1. Let me begin by asking about your media consumption. Could you tell me what news 
media you regularly use for information purposes? 
 What news media would you consider more relevant for your functions? 
 
2. Do you have a routine for media monitoring? How is that?  
 
3. Overall, how would you define the relationship you have established with the news media 
during your political career? 
In terms of your direct relationship with news organizations, how often do you speak to 
journalists or editors? 
 
4. In what ways do you plan your media presence?  
How do you decide whether to appear or not?  
5. Thinking about the time [the name of the person you work for] spends getting informed, 
planning your media presence and interacting with journalists. How relevant is this area 
within [the minister, senator, deputy] routine? 
 
 
CONTROL-AUTONOMY  
6. How would you describe the relationship you maintain with journalists that cover your 
beat? 
 
7. Do you think that the professional standards of political journalism in Chile are 
appropriate? 
 
8. Who would you say has more power in negotiating content that is published: you as a 
source or the news organization? How come? 
 
9. Which are, in your experience, the strategies more commonly used to try to steer media 
coverage in your favour (or generally in politicians’ favour)? 
 
10. Do you have regular off the record conversations with journalists/editors? What kind of 
information you normally get/give from these talks? 
 
11. Would you say that you spend more time looking proactively to appear in the media or 
reacting to calls or requests from journalists? 
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12. Would you say that you generally understand the dynamics and priorities of the main 
news organizations? 
 
GOALS 
I would like now evaluate the goals associated with media exposure, or in other words, 
the exchange value of the relationship with the news media for you as a politician. 
13. What are the main goals or goal that you pursue in your interaction with news 
organizations? 
What are the main benefits of having media exposure? 
Would you consider necessary to appear in the media to advance positions in negotiations 
for example? (Some example if you find it useful?) 
Do you obtain relevant information (for the exercise of your functions) through the 
media? 
 
Do you see news organizations as a space for communication with the public mainly or a 
space for communication with peers/ other politicians? 
 
14. In your opinion, to what extent media coverage affects political relationships? (e.g. with 
politicians within your coalition, with your opponents, with interest groups).  
 
15. Do you think some people prioritize issues in the political agenda because they are likely 
to have good media coverage? 
 
WRAP-UP  
17. Finally, I would like to know how relevant media management is for someone actively 
working in politics and why. Is it possible to do politics outside the media? 
18. Do you think is there any relevant issue that we are leaving out? 
19. Could you recommend someone else to discuss this subject?  
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FIELDWORK QUESTIONS- JOURNALIST (Editor or reporter) 
 
DESCRIPTION OF ROUTINE PRACTICES 
1. Let me begin by asking about your media consumption. 
 Could you tell me what news media you regularly use for information?  
 
2. What news media would you consider more relevant for your functions? 
 
3. How would you describe your beat (if you have one)? What kind of organizations and 
people are your regular sources? 
 
 
CONTROL-AUTONOMY  
4. In terms of your direct relationship with political actors (parliamentarians, ministers, 
deputies, party leaders). How would you describe your professional relationship? 
 
How often do you talk to them or their press officers? 
How would you describe the relationship you have with mediators: press officers or 
communication advisors? 
5. Do you have regular off the record conversations with your sources? What kind of 
information you normally get from these talks? 
 
6. Do you think that the professional standards of your counterparts are appropriate? Do 
they understand your role as a journalist? 
 
7. Do you think that the professional standards of political journalism in Chile are 
appropriate? 
 
8. From your perspective and experience, who has more power in negotiating content that is 
published: you as a journalist or your sources? 
 
And thinking about agenda generation, are generally the topics you cover/stories you 
detect or reactive to your sources proposals? 
Which are, in your experience, the strategies more commonly used by political actors to 
try to steer media coverage in their favour? 
Have you ever been forced to modify or not publish contents due to external political 
pressures? (And what about other pressures from within the organization you work for?) 
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POLITICAL ACTORS GOALS  
9.  What are, in your opinion, the main motivations of your political sources to seek media 
exposure? 
 
WRAP-UP 
10. Do you think is there any relevant issue that we are leaving out? 
11.  Finally I wonder how relevant you think media management is for a person who is 
active in politics and why. Is it possible to do politics outside the media? 
12. Could you recommend someone else to discuss this subject?  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Node Classification Summary 
Attribute Value Attribute Value Description Number of 
Nodes 
Assigned Classification Actors (people, organizations) 
Attribute Gender 
Female  24 
Male  36 
 
Attribute 
Name: 
Group 
Politicians (1), Journalists (2) or Communication Officers (3) 
1  30 
2  18 
3  12 
 
Attribute 
Name: 
Institution 
Main affiliation- type of news or political organization they work for 
Congress  28 
Moneda  3 
Online Media  4 
Political Party  11 
Print press  7 
Radio  4 
TV  3 
 
Attribute 
Name: 
Political affiliation 
Affiliation to political party 
DC  12 
IC  1 
Not Applicable  21 
PC  3 
PPD  8 
PRSD  1 
PS  2 
RN  6 
 
Reports\\Node Classification Summary Report Page 1 of 2 
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24/04/2015 12:50 
Attribute Value Attribute Value Description Number of 
Nodes 
Assigned UDI  6 
 
Attribute 
Name: 
Position 
Specific position the participant have within the organization 
Assessor  2 
Deputy  14 
Editor  10 
Journalist Communication  12 
Journalist Media  8 
Minister  1 
Senator  6 
Senior party member 
(board) 
 7 
 
Attribute Years of Experience 
10-15  26 
15-20  13 
20+  20 
5-10  1 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
Introductory Interview Request Letter 
 
[Full name of person] 
 
Dear [name of person]: 
 
The purpose of this letter is to request your participation as a respondent in the research project 
conducted at the University of Sheffield, about the mediatization of Chilean politics. 
 
My name is Ximena Orchard, I am a journalist of the Catholic University, currently studying for a 
PhD in the UK. This project is funded through Conicyt Chile, and aims to research the relationship 
between political actors in Chile and the news media, with an emphasis on identifying practices, as 
well as the use of the news media in processes of decision making and negotiation. Your trajectory 
as a [insert salient details of research participant career] make you an excellent participant for the 
project. 
 
This research is supervised by Professor Ralph Negrine, specialist in Political Communication, and 
has ethical approval from the University of Sheffield. 
 
I understand that your time is limited but I'll be very grateful if you could make a space in your 
agenda for a 30-minute interview at the place and time of your convenience. The interviews will be 
conducted between May 20 and July 12, 2013. The identity of respondents will be kept in reserve 
for purposes of academic publications derived from the thesis. If you have any questions, please 
feel free to contact me. My email is x.orchard@sheffield.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
I appreciate your time and willingness to participate, 
 
 
 
 
Ximena Orchard 
Journalist, PhD Candidate 
Journalism Studies Department 
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APPENDIX 4  
 
TREE NODE- NODES FIRST STAGE OF CODING 
    Name Description  No. Sources No. References 
Politicians practices and 
attitudes Container Node 
  
    Goals of media exposure Container Node 
 Policy-making & media Statements that deal with the relevance 
of using the media as a management 
tool. Media coverage activates policy 
agendas or triggers management 
decisions (container node)  
 
Triggering debate-agenda control Interviewees refer to “installing topics” 
or “triggering debates” as end of media 
exposure. 
56 223 
Setting oneself apart Calling attention to oneself or one's 
position 
12 18 
Velocity (accelerating discussion) Media exposure or the generation of 
media opportunities is seen as an 
activator of political discussion. 
15 22 
Sending messages-intra-political 
comm 
Media content serves a function for 
trespassing messages within a political 
party or within a political “class”. 
Politicians give signals and messages to 
other politicians or groups of interest, 
sometimes hostile signals. 
24 41 
Elite container (validation) Media exposure is perceived as 
designating active participation within a 
political elite 
26 64 
Influence-power Media exposure is links to influence 
upon peers, public opinion, etc. Mentions 
to media visibility as a power resource 
or currency that can work as a tool. 
37 79 
Reactive decision-making Decisions on public management, 
legislative agendas, etc, are taken as a 
result of media exposure of the issue. 
25 44 
Informing-communicating with 
the public 
Media exposure is associated with 
informing the public about activities, 
projects or initiatives that might be 
relevant to them. 
34 92 
Listening Media exposure is associated to the 
exercise of listening to the citizenry 
5 7 
Reinforcing representation duties It is important to be seen fulfilling 
representation tasks, fighting for issues 
of concern to your electorate 
12 19 
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Electoral aim Media exposure is planned and tailored 
in relation to win elections. Media 
exposure is used as a tool for managing 
visibility and earning votes 
32 68 
Existence-visibility (existir, 
aparecer en los medios) 
This node groups direct mentions to 
“existence” as goal of media exposure 
(e.g. be seen, get out, be, image). 
55 181 
Attitudes Container node   
Expecting promotional coverage References to politicians' expectation of 
promotional media coverage 
13 27 
Double standard Politicians says A and does B (created 
originally in references to the off the 
record practice, politicians cannot say in 
public what they say privately) 
8 14 
Being at ease with the media Politicians feel comfortable with the 
media. He or she claims to understand 
how the system works. 
18 34 
Anticipating envy-strain A greater media exposure is seen as a 
potential source of strain among peers. 
Politicians or their assessor foresee that 
gaining visibility (over party comrades, 
for instance) might be a source of 
internal conflict 
7 11 
Adaptability It refers to the ability of the politician to 
adapt to the requirements of the media, 
for instance, depending on his/her 
current position 
20 35 
Unfamiliarity-discomfort The politicians shows unfamiliarity with 
the media or discomfort in their contacts 
with journalists, or express a limited 
understanding of how to manage the 
relationship with the media (even from 
more experienced communicators) 
23 58 
Acknowledging difficulties To gain media coverage, to access the 
media. 
27 71 
Struggling to cope Media demands are too high in terms of 
time and resources needed. Politician 
expresses lack of ability to deal with 
everything 
9 16 
Selectivity References to the action of selecting 
media appearances. Generally, because 
the actor is in a position of confidence 
and has the ability to choose. 
20 33 
Being left out References to being “left out” for not 
fitting into media criteria 
14 27 
Place of media in politicians' 
routine 
Answers to the question what space the 
media occupied in your work routine? 
32 77 
Absence of news management References to actors that do not engage 
in news management techniques 
(whether because they can't, they don't 
know how to do it or they decide not to) 
7 10 
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Political communication 
professionalization 
References connected to the 
standardization of polcomm practices, 
specially planning of media actions, 
generation of information subsidies 
(press conferences, press releases) and 
the availability of specially trained staff 
(generally journalists) devoted to 
content generation, press relations and 
communication management. 
46 167 
Targeting audiences Selecting news organizations depending 
on the public one need to reach. 
13 23 
Detecting opportunity  Seeking and using opportunities of 
“jumping into topics” (that are in the 
agenda) in order to participate in the 
public debate. 
32 118 
Diverting attention Activities or media interventions 
oriented to divert attention from other 
story 
9 13 
Language-format command The politician knows how to speak or 
construct messages that have a higher 
possibility to get across the media. 
19 38 
Politician monitoring information The politician uses his/her relationship 
with the journalist to know what is going 
on. 
17 40 
Competing for media attention References to the competitive nature of 
mediated politics (little space, too many 
actors) 
19 35 
Changing routines This node accounts for changes in the 
pattern of media-oriented activities. 
18 46 
Specialising-creating media niche Politicians work in creating thematic 
niches in which they become experts 
(often connected to their membership to 
related committees or professional 
expertise). They seek to position 
themselves in those subjects. 
29 58 
Constructing a story Working on building a story or media 
subject, steps given towards that. 
16 34 
Strategic disclosure of information Information is disclosed to a journalist 
(generally within an off the record 
conversation) in order to reach a goal. 
That information it is not always reliable 
19 51 
Political Operations References to political operations 
articulated through the media. In 
colloquial jargon, an “operacion” implies 
a coordinated effort to use media 
coverage to reach some political goal, 
often damaging a political adversary. 
27 65 
Off the record Mentions to the practice of obtaining off 
the record information. How this term is 
understood, dynamics around the 
trading and use of this information, etc. 
48 173 
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Context information References to the “use” of politicians as 
technical sources or sources that 
provide “context” to stories, regardless 
of the use the journalist will give to that 
material. Often this information is 
provided off the record. 
11 15 
    Buying space in the media References to payment for media 
exposure. Sometimes it is formulated as 
a regulated practice in regional and local 
media (to buy micro programmes), 
sometimes as bad practice, often not 
associated to oneself. 
8 23 
Patronising behaviour (politician 
to journalist) 
References and examples of harassment 
or patronising behaviour from 
politicians to journalists. 
7 21 
Complaining (about a story) Journalists received comments and 
complaints about the selection of a story 
(angles or sources included) 
12 18 
Constrains-Limits of media 
exposure 
 
  
Damaging media exposure References to risks or costs associated to 
uncontrolled media exposure. 
16 25 
Acknowledging limited impact of 
media 
This node groups referenced to the 
limited impact that media might have 
upon policy making processes, which are 
seen as political bargaining processes 
that happen out of the media eye. 
24 64 
Non-mediated networks Political work that is done building 
relationships with people, organizations, 
interest groups, etc 
17 38 
Territorial work Mentions to grassroots politicians work, 
sometimes defined as opposed, or at 
least differentiated from media 
strategies. 
26 46 
Volatility of media currency References to the episodic nature of 
media visibility (you are up and later 
you are down) or the erratic nature of 
media visibility (not all exposure is good, 
very often is a double edged resource, 
can be damaging) 
14 21 
Actors' position-differentiated 
access 
RP reflects on how his/her relationship 
with media organizations has changed 
or is dependent upon the position they 
occupy (for instance, having a position in 
the leadership of the party, being in the 
Executive power, etc). Also, some actors 
are careful about making generalizations 
in terms of politicians access to the 
media, stressing that ideological issues 
might play a role 
22 35 
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Presidentialism Some actors complain about their 
limited ability to generate agenda, since 
all legislative initiatives belong to the 
Executive branch. Also other comments 
connected to limitations for political 
actors associated to the nature of a 
presidential political system. 
7 10 
News Agenda Generation 
(Drivers) Where stories come from 
8 16 
Information Monitoring 
Strategies 
References to strategies of reporting, 
news gathering and information 
monitoring 
14 47 
Media Consumption It refers to routines of media 
consumption 
11 17 
Organizational constrains 
affecting content 
Container node   
Editorial line Expressions that denotes awareness of 
the editorial constrains or limits within 
which the journalist works and affects 
the selection of sources or topics of 
interest 
32 83 
Explicit biased coverage The news organization takes a position 
in the coverage of a topic and the 
editorial staff receive more or less clear 
instructions on how a specific topic will 
be covered 
17 27 
Journalist subordination The journalist understands that there 
are decisions in which he or she plays no 
role. Main directions and selection of 
news are beyond their responsibility 
21 63 
(Political) Editorial committee An editorial committee, integrated by 
politicians, oversees some of the 
newspaper decisions 
5 11 
Relationship with directors-
owners 
The politician maintains a relationship 
with senior executives within media 
organizations (press director, owner of 
the media, etc). Journalists are aware of 
those relationship and understand that 
they are subordinated to the decisions 
made at that level 
21 50 
Competence-InterMediaAgenda Statements that reflect relations of 
competence in reporting or 
newsgathering strategies, among media 
outlets or colleagues. Often El Mercurio 
and La Tercera are quoted as 
benchmarks. 
20 42 
Media-driven content (pauta 
propia) 
News that is perceived by the journalist 
as generated by himself or herself 
26 69 
Politics-driven media content It is the politician who decides -albeit in 
informal conversations- the information 
that is going to be news 
28 61 
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News Values- What becomes 
news  
Statements or references to the elements 
that define the news value of a story, 
situation, etc. in order to justify 
reporting and especially publication. 
References about what makes it into the 
news, what is relevant for the media. 
50 162 
Conflict-driven media content News are perceived as driven by conflict 45 109 
Celebrity-led coverage References to the news value of celebrity 
politicians, personalization 
11 17 
Contingency  It refers to what is perceived of “the 
news of the day that cannot be avoided”. 
Short term news management as 
opposed to long term aims. Often 
politicians and press officers especially 
complain about the difficulty of 
positioning topics beyond the day-to-day 
declarations and responses dynamics 
that consume much of the news cycle. 
32 82 
Journalists-Politicians 
Relationships 
Container node  
 Roles definition Mentions to the definitions of 
professional roles (both political and 
journalistic roles) 
8 17 
Normative media role This node groups references to the role 
that the media should play in a 
democratic society; the ideal journalists 
work or should work towards. 
24 47 
Defining politics Definitions of what interviewees 
understand as “political” (both from the 
perspective of journalists that defines 
the beat they work for, or politicians 
defining the boundaries of their activity) 
19 37 
Quality of political journalism References and judgments on the quality 
of journalism/ political journalism 
36 92 
Lack of understanding Mentions to lack of clarity or lack of 
understanding in one's professional role, 
whether as journalist or as politician, 
which eventually leads to expectations' 
mismatching. 
8 14 
Rules of the game References to norms that “everyone” 
working in the media/politics should 
understand. What are the rules that 
govern the relationship 
20 38 
Little world-isolation References to politics as a clearly 
demarcated space (little world, in this 
world, etc) with shared rules (albeit 
implicit). Occasionally, references to the 
“small world” are extended to the idea of 
a “small country”, which generally 
means a small elite, relevance of family 
and school networks. etc. 
30 66 
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Boundaries with sources 
(personal vs. work relations) 
Statements related to boundaries 
maintenance in the relationship between 
politicians and media professionals. 
References to “amiguismo” and how to 
deal with the limits of personal and 
professional relationships. 
17 37 
Understanding utilitarian-base of 
the relationship 
Reference to the relationship between 
political actors and the media as 
mutually utilitarian 
16 22 
Keeping distance Events, happenings that make politicians 
and journalists to take distance from 
each other. Also efforts to do so. 
23 48 
Risking corruption Reference to risk of corruption in the 
relationship, as long as boundary 
maintenance is not entirely clear 
7 11 
Being friends-close relationship References to relationships of friendship 
or personal proximity between 
journalists and politicians 
26 48 
Domestication of sources Key actors are “domesticated” by a news 
organization that actively promotes a 
relationship with a prominent politician. 
The relationship works in the opposite 
direction as well, as long as politicians 
court the media and journalists, 
promoting an informal relationship. 
7 11 
Practices Container node   
Trading of Information-News References to the active exchange of 
potentially newsworthy information 
between political elites and the media; 
exchange as an active process of 
negotiation 
38 122 
Symbiosis-synchrony Media and political interests converge. A 
political goal is served -often with media 
awareness- as long as the information 
has inherent news value 
11 20 
Collaboration It refers to descriptions of relationships 
journalists/source based on mutual 
collaboration. 
18 24 
Rough negotiation Administrating media visibility under 
strain 
11 18 
Building and testing Trust-Loyalty References to practices oriented to build 
or test trust in the politician/media 
relationship 
30 70 
Frequent contact (habitual 
relations) 
It includes sentences and comments that 
denotes a day to day relationship with 
politicians or relevant aids; regularity in 
contacts and mutual knowledge. 
46 147 
Interpretive community Journalists/media as interpretive 
community, filtering political 
information 
10 25 
Media professionals practices 
and attitudes 
Container node  
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Work conditions (journalists) References to generally precarious 
conditions of journalists' work: low 
wages, extensive workload, others 
13 18 
Poor training (journalists) Mentions to precarious preparation of 
journalists. 
10 16 
Time-constrains References to time-constrains that limit 
the fulfilment of one's ideal role 
6 7 
Experience- circulation Background of the journalist. Previous 
work in different  media outlets 
12 21 
Beat The journalist covers a specific beat, 
frequently relating to the same sources 
of information 
9 15 
Practices    
Pack journalism (coleguismo) References to practices oriented to lend 
support to a colleague. Sometimes this is 
seen as a problem for the implications to 
the quality of reporting 
4 7 
Self-censorship References to journalists self-censoring 
themselves in terms of anticipating 
editorial lines, commercial and political 
interests of the organizations they work 
for. 
2 5 
Assessing quality of information-
checking 
Journalists have to discern whether 
what they are told by political sources is 
reliable information 
11 28 
Investigative Journalism References to the relevance or lack of 
investigative journalism 
11 18 
Key Sources References to political sources that 
provide information on a regular basis to 
a journalist 
9 19 
Protecting the source  Journalists comment on the relevance of 
taking care of good sources, the special 
treatment they receive and the limits of 
that special treatment 
5 14 
Checking on power Accountability role of the press 15 32 
Attitudes    
Agency-Autonomy (journalists) It refers to autonomous decision-making 
in the process of newsgathering. It 
denotes journalists' agency in reporting 
processes. Creating space for 
“professional” agency. 
17 40 
Little anticipation capacity Journalists lack of ability of anticipating 
social conflict or potential themes 
outside the comfort zone demarcated by 
regular journalist/source relationship 
8 13 
Adversarial-Confrontational 
coverage 
Mentions to media content as 
challenging to politics and politicians 
(confrontational) 
12 24 
Passivity-dependency to authority References to high reliance on official 
sources 
20 45 
Apparent Objectivity News organizations (and people) are 
politically committed, yet they believe 
they are objective 
3 4 
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Cultural and Political Context 
 
  
Demands on politics    
Transparency Direct references to the new Ley de 
Transparencia, whether as a tool for 
journalists or for civil society 
empowerment and political 
accountability 
11 21 
Scrutiny (civil scrutiny) References to bigger scrutiny, both 
towards politicians and media (often 
connected to new technologies) 
12 28 
Public-politicians disconnection Statements that address the distance 
between politics and “the people” 
15 32 
Distrust References to citizens distrust towards 
politics or politicians 
5 6 
Political System    
Voluntary vote References to recent changes in voting 
regulations.. 
4 6 
Transition References to the transitional process 
and how the relationship between media 
and politics has changed during the 
transition 
11 18 
Centralisation Santiago is Chile; centralisation 5 10 
National reach  References to the status of a story, 
source, etc, depending on whether it is 
perceived as “national” (as opposed to 
local, regional) 
24 57 
Regional reach References to the regional reach of a 
story (localized as opposed to national) 
22 53 
Media System Container node   
Market-oriented system Mentions to the commercial nature of 
the Chilean media system 
15 29 
State role in media system References to the role the state has or 
should have within the media industry. 
3 5 
Pluralism(diversity) Statements that refer to the plurality or 
lack of plurality of the Chilean media 
system 
35 85 
Absence of citizen voices References to the lack o citizen voices in 
the media or alternative channels of 
expression 
4 6 
Independence(interests) The source reflects on the ability of the 
media to be independent (from political 
pressures) in their editorial judgements. 
40 110 
Ownership-Concentration Comments connected to the 
concentration of ownership within the 
Chilean media system 
15 31 
Examples-cases Mentions to examples or cases. For 
consideration for further development. 
21 69 
Good quotes Selected quotes that illustrate points 
graphically, or are fairly representative 
of a type of comment among a group of 
people 
39 93 
Actors (Institutions, People) Container node   
Political actors Container node   
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Social movement References to active civic society (often 
these are mentions to 2011 student-led 
protests and movements of different 
nature: environmental, LGTB groups, 
regionalism, civil liberties, etc), 
25 88 
Press officers-mediators Statements that define the role of the 
press officer or mediator between the 
politician and the journalist 
46 132 
Political parties Describes dynamics of news reporting in 
political parties (as differentiated from 
Congress or Government) 
6 22 
New Political Actors Mentions to new political sources that 
has broaden up the political spectrum 
8 22 
Moneda-Cabinet Describes dynamics of news reporting in 
La Moneda or among Cabinet (as 
differentiated from Congress or political 
parties) 
16 48 
Congress Refers to reporting dynamics within 
Congress particularly 
9 18 
Media actors Container node   
Television Role of TV or direct mentions to TV 44 109 
Social media-Twitter It describes uses of social media -
particularly Twitter- within the cycle of 
news generation. 
38 130 
New media actors  References to the way in which media 
actors have broadened (thanks to new 
digital media outlets such as El 
Mostrador, El Ciudadano, etc, citizen 
media and others) 
34 69 
Local media References to local and regional media 
as differentiated from news 
organizations of national reach 
23 76 
El Mercurio-La Tercera as political 
actors 
Direct references to the role El Mercurio 
and La Tercera play within the political 
process 
36 120 
Print Press References to print press at a general 
level. Actions undertaken to gain 
coverage in print press, comments about 
what is/ is not possible to do within this 
medium 
27 49 
Radio References to the radio as a medium. 
Strengths and weaknesses from the 
point of view of PolComm goals 
20 28 
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